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“NaƟ onal and InternaƟ onal Security in Contemporary Changing Reality” is a com-
pelling, must-read work for those who study and try to gain a beƩ er understand-
ing of today’s naƟ onal and internaƟ onal security environment. 
A collecƟ on of diverse views of Polish and internaƟ onal authors on military, se-
curity, internaƟ onal relaƟ ons, new forms of warfare such as cyber-terrorism and 
challenges they bring about allows the reader not only to see the whole complex-
ity and interdependencies of the current security network, but creates a solid 
foundaƟ on for any further studies, especially for those readers who wish to ob-
tain a beƩ er understanding of the Polish and other former Warsaw Pact coun-
tries’ perspecƟ ve on the current and future role of internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons 
such as NATO and the EU. 
While discussing security and defense from many diﬀ erent angles, authors – 
whose backgrounds are diverse and who jointly represent a vast and profound 
experience in defense-related maƩ ers – invite the reader to embark on a fasci-
naƟ ng journey through the modern world of mulƟ faceted security relaƟ ons, links 
among someƟ me remote areas of defence-related studies, and challenges that 
not only NATO and its members but all the naƟ ons of the modern world must 
face and live up to.
I found it very rewarding and at the same Ɵ me refreshing to read arƟ cles by so 
many respected luminaries of internaƟ onal security science.
To have the views of them in one volume is simply a treat for any and every-
one who – like myself – endeavours to see and understand the global picture to 
a maximum possible extent.
The opportunity to learn the views and observaƟ ons of people of such diﬀ erent 
background and experience, represenƟ ng both military and civilian academia, 
administraƟ on and chain of command is indeed rare and worth careful study.
It greatly broadened my horizons, corrected or improved my understanding and 
I can with all honesty recommend it to all scholars and general readers who are 
interested in understanding the security environment of today.

Foreword
As the authors menƟ oned in the fi rst part of the study “NaƟ onal and internaƟ on-
al security” consƟ tutes one of the principal domains of the undertakings involved 
as part of the research on educaƟ onal condiƟ ons and specialƟ es available in the 
Department of Security Studies at Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University. 
This issue is also extremely important in the fi eld of internaƟ onal relaƟ ons exist-
ing in the contemporary world. The essence and character of security, both in the 
naƟ onal and internaƟ onal dimension are being refl ected in all funcƟ onal aspects 
of contemporary society. It not only refers to military security, but also to security 
in various spheres of economic, social, cultural, poliƟ cal and ecological life. As 
regards the current globalizaƟ on processes, security applies to any area of the 
globe, equally to each and every human being and to enƟ re naƟ ons. The issue of 
safety is inseparably connected with threats and related challenges conƟ nually 
emerging in the reality around us. Such threats arise in specifi c geographical loca-
Ɵ ons and can exhibit diversifi ed dimensions. They can exert considerable impact 
on the sustainable development of countries, regions and areas. Ensuring a set of 
forward-thinking measures, which would lead to increasing security in all senses, 
will signifi cantly contribute to the proper economic development of our country, 
making the Polish economy more innovaƟ ve and compeƟ Ɵ ve.
This second part of the study seeks to familiarize the reader with selected 
problems of conducƟ ng security-related research. Expanding this domain of 
knowledge is now of the utmost importance. Although security has consƟ tuted 
the subject maƩ er of several publicaƟ ons, there are sƟ ll no concise and well-
structured studies concerning this area of human endeavor and acƟ vity, so im-
portant to our country.
In the forward to the fi rst part, it was stressed that security is generally inter-
preted as the state of non-threat, peace and confi dence. As was stated by Józef 
Kukuła, it is a state of confi dence of the country and people’s existence in the 
subjecƟ ve, objecƟ ve and processual dimension.1 The NaƟ onal Security DicƟ on-
ary defi nes it as “the state which gives a sense of confi dence, a guarantee of 
maintaining this state and the opportunity for its enhancement. The situaƟ on 
in which there is no risk of losing what we cherish most, such as health, work, 
dignity, feelings and property, is one of the principal needs of every human be-
1 J. Kukułka, Narodziny koncepcji bezpieczeństwa (The origins of the security concept) 
[in:] Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, teoria i praktyka (InternaƟ onal security – the-
ory and pracƟ ce), ed. K. Żukrowska, M. Grącik, Warsaw 2006, p. 40
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ing. Among diﬀ erent types of security, the following can be disƟ nguished: global, 
regional and naƟ onal security; military, poliƟ cal and public security; physical, psy-
chological and social security; and also structural and personal security”.2 The 
diversity of defi niƟ ons causes various enƟ Ɵ es to approach the issue of security 
selecƟ vely. One and the same dicƟ onary proposes a number of diﬀ erent defi ni-
Ɵ ons related to security and defense. Referring to the dicƟ onary cited above, 
the naƟ onal security is “a state ensured through properly-organized defense and 
protecƟ on against external and internal threats, determined as the relaƟ onship 
of the defense potenƟ al to the threats scale”.3 The essence of naƟ onal security 
in the narrow sense concerns the internal state and the internaƟ onal situaƟ on of 
a country, which eﬀ ecƟ vely secure its independence, consistency and interests, 
at the same Ɵ me excluding the real risk of internal destabilizaƟ on and external 
threats. NaƟ onal security in a broader sense is understood as the whole set of 
internal and external condiƟ ons that guarantee the sustainable development of 
society and the protecƟ on of the naƟ onal territory against internal and external 
threats, and that ensure the capability of a country to implement autonomous 
internal and external policies.
The security-related need was already referred to in the 1930s by Abraham 
Maslow, the author of the classical theory of human needs. Maslow disƟ nguished 
fi ve levels of needs where fi rst-level needs must be saƟ sfi ed before the next level 
could become dominant. Safety was assigned to the second level, immediately 
following physiological needs. It manifests itself as the need for security, stability, 
order and care, combined with the lack of fear, chaos and threat.
All we know that neither security nor favorable condiƟ ons for the develop-
ment of civilizaƟ on are given once and for all. They require an ongoing eﬀ ort to 
project the emerging challenges and to promptly react to them. The 21st Century 
world has turned out more complicated and unforeseeable than it seemed at the 
end of the previous century. Therefore, we have to set new objecƟ ves on a daily 
basis, bearing in mind our strategic goals.
This study is devoted to the new trends in research, especially in the fi eld 
of security studies, including naƟ onal and internaƟ onal security, in the evolving 
areas of contemporary reality.
The book is addressed especially to naƟ onal and internal security students, to 
all students undertaking research work in the widely-understood area of security, 
and also to the managerial staﬀ  of various units and insƟ tuƟ ons operaƟ ng within 
the naƟ onal security and defense system.
The publicaƟ on contains a wide range of topics that are relevant to security, 
and includes the following arƟ cles: Piotr Sienkiewicz – Systems analysis of se-
curity management, Mariusz Skulimowski – Military support of humanitarian 
operaƟ ons in Pakistan, Mieczysław Bieniek – Arab Spring – Dynamic changes in 
2 Słownik Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego (NaƟ onal Security DicƟ onary), Warsaw 2002, 
p. 13
3 Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego (DicƟ onary of naƟ onal secu-
rity terms), Warsaw 2002, p. 15
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the Middle East, Henryk Ćwięk – Between Germany and Russia. The Problem 
of Poland’s Security in the 20th and 21st Centuries in View of Europe’s SituaƟ on. 
Selected Problems, Michal Pružinský, Peter Varhoľák – Selected Slovak and Eu-
ropean security contexts, Janusz Liber – Counterintelligence support to military 
operaƟ ons, Marek Zawartka – Security of mass events regarding stadium hooli-
ganism. Of great interest  is the arƟ cle of Professor Czesław Dźwigaj – My 11th of 
September The Paris RetrospecƟ on, in which a diﬀ erent perspecƟ ve on interna-
Ɵ onal security is presented. 
Mieczysław Bieniek
Sławomir M. Mazur

Piotr Sienkiewicz
Systems Analysis of Security 
Management
There is no such thing as an isolated person or 
situaƟ on. There is only a relaƟ on between a person 
and their environment. A relaƟ on, whose essence 
is expressed by the word ‘threat’.
A. Magnusson
Introduction
A system analysis of security of any objects is sensible when danger exists, that is 
to say when there are threats that can cause either an interrupƟ on of funcƟ on-
ing (existence, progress) of those objects, or a loss of certain properƟ es thereof. 
Security is an ambiguous noƟ on, regarding: (1) lack of danger; (2) a system of 
insƟ tuƟ onal and non-insƟ tuƟ onal guarantees of the eliminaƟ on or minimizaƟ on 
of threats; (3) one of the exisƟ ng existenƟ al values, related to sense of stability, 
an enduring favorable state of aﬀ airs, a sense of the lack of threats, confi dence. 
In terms of poliƟ cal science and studies related to naƟ onal and internaƟ onal se-
curity, both the scope criterion (e.g. regional security, global security) and the 
subject criterion (military, economic, ecological, technical, cultural security) are 
applied. On the other hand, on the basis of system analysis, two dominant ap-
proaches exist, namely:
– Security understood as an object’s property, qualifying its resistance to the 
emergence of dangerous situaƟ ons (threats), the major stress being put 
on the object’s security failure, that on its suscepƟ bility to real or potenƟ al 
threats;
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– Security of a system understood as its capability to protect its intrinsic values 
against outside threats.
We need to noƟ ce two aspects of security: the objecƟ ve one, when condi-
Ɵ ons exist to create real threats, and the subjecƟ ve one, which expresses the 
feeling of security or insecurity. In systemic studies, the relaƟ on is highlighted, 
between the security of systems and other system characterisƟ cs, such as e.g. 
stability, balance, reliability, resilience, readiness, etc., especially their eﬀ ecƟ ve-
ness (in terms of eﬃ  ciency and/or economy) [2,8].
Model of threats
A threat to the system’s security is any occurrence (process, event) that is unde-
sirable in terms of uninterrupted funcƟ oning of the system (table 1). Such occur-
rences or their accumulaƟ on in the given Ɵ me and place, by aﬀ ecƟ ng it destruc-
Ɵ vely, create a threatening situaƟ on for the system’s existence (development). It 
should also be noted that there is a possibility of creaƟ ng situaƟ ons dangerous to 
the system, caused internal threats resulƟ ng from e.g. system failure (fi g. 1).
Table 1. Classifi caƟ on of threats
No. Classifi caƟ on criterion Threats
1 Physical properƟ es Material threats (on the road, in the air, etc.)
Energy threats (heat, radioacƟ vity, etc.)
InformaƟ on threats
Non-material threats (mental, social, poliƟ cal)
2 DuraƟ on Ɵ me Short-term, occasional threats,
Long-term, increasing, evolving threats,
Cyclical, recurrent threats; 
3 Range Local threats,
Extensive threats (regional, global);
4 Stability of territorial 
coverage
Spreading threats,
Non-spreading threats.
Source: author’s own work.
System’s situaƟ on is taken into consideraƟ on [9,12]
Σ=〈S,E,R〉
Where: S – the system, which is the object of threats: S<M.Rw>, M – a set of ele-
ments, Rw – a set of relaƟ ons between elements; 
E – the environment, consisƟ ng of elements, which are the sources of threats;
Rz⊂SxE – a set of relaƟ ons.
The system as an object of threats is characterized by its defensive potenƟ al 
(system security): P(S)≥0.
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The source of threats is characterized by its destrucƟ ve potenƟ al: P(e)≥0, 
e∈E.
Set Rz describes the threat relaƟ on Rz=Rz(e.S), such that eRzS⇔P(e)≥P(S), 
which means that the object is threatened by e∈E. The funcƟ on Rz(t) can be 
a threat relaƟ on in real Ɵ me t ∈T.
The state of threat may be interpreted as a point on a complex Gaussian plane, 
described with the coordinates P(e), P(S), which means that z=z(e.S) = (P(e),P(S)); 
suppose that to every t ∈T we can assign a complex number Z(t)=P(e.t)+iP(S.t) 
and then the collecƟ on of points described with the equaƟ on z=z(t) may be inter-
preted as a trajectory of the states of threat situaƟ on.
The trajectory can go as follows:
a) If the relaƟ on Rz(t) is true for every t ∈T, which means that Imz(t)≤Rez(t), then 
the trajectory z=z(t) is a threat trajectory.
b) If the relaƟ on Rz(t) is not true for every t ∈T, then the trajectory z=z(t)≡b(t) is 
a security trajectory.
Figure 1. General typology of threats for the security of systems.
Between trajectory z(t) and t axis, a threat plane ∏(z(t)) can be spread, 
whereas between trajectory b(t) and t axis, a safety plane ∏(b(t)) can be spread. 
Both these planes create a whole. An analysis of this model allows us to consider 
threat situaƟ ons in terms of R. Thom’s catastrophe theory.
A system analysis of threat situaƟ ons can be “scaled” according to two criteria:
a) Probability criterion (security) of the emerging of a state of threat (or other 
measure of the possibility of threat occurrence, e.g. fuzzy measurement);
b) Importance criterion (severity) of the state of threat (e.g. the risk and the 
value of the system in quesƟ on or the value of resources it disposes).
If the system S has a funcƟ on of security threats z(t) assigned to it and the 
funcƟ on of reliability is Rel(t), then the funcƟ on of the systems eﬀ ecƟ veness is 
(fi g. 2):
E(t)=f(u(t),K(t)≡φ(z(t), Rel(t)), where U(t) – uƟ lity funcƟ on, K(t) – cost 
(expenditure) funcƟ on.
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Figure 2. A concept of system analysis of security
Source: author’s own work. 
System’s security model
If the threats have been recognized, then the system’s security depends on 
equipping it with a specifi ed resistance potenƟ al (security). In parƟ cular, it can be 
a parƟ cular, usually layered security system, protecƟ ng against threats.
Let us consider, as before, a given system situaƟ on Σ and assume that the data 
is as follows:
– Outside threats A(t) coming from the system’s (S) environment (E), to which 
a funcƟ on of threat potenƟ al corresponds;
– System’s (S) resistance to outside threats B(t), which corresponds to the func-
Ɵ on of the defense (security) potenƟ al.
Above situaƟ on characterisƟ cs are random funcƟ ons with known probability 
distribuƟ on:
F(a,t)=Pr{A(t)<a, a≥0},
G(b,t)=Pr{B(t)<b, b≥0}, t∈T
A generalized indicator of the system’s security can be expressed by the 
probability that the threats will not exceed a given criƟ cal (permissible) point 
ao≥0 and the system’s resistance will be greater than a specifi ed limit bo, which is 
β(t)≡β(ao,bo)=Pr{A(t)≤ao, B(t)>bo} which, in terms of staƟ sƟ cal independence of 
the values in quesƟ on, gives us an indicator of the system’s security: β(t) = F(ao, 
t) [1 – G (bo, t)].
AccepƟ ng the desirable level of system’s security as βo>0, we may say that 
the system is safe within Ɵ me T, provided that in every moment t∈T the condi-
Ɵ on β(t)≥βo is met.
In the case of technical objects, analyses of the object’s security uƟ lize certain 
simplifi ed procedures, which basicallydetermine the probability of “destrucƟ on”
P=p(PS≤Pe), Pe≡A(t), PS≡B(t),
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Which means that there is a possibility of generalized resistance (bearing ca-
pacity) Ps is no larger than a generalized threat (encumbrance) Pe.
Apart from crisis situaƟ ons, where naƟ onal or business security is at stake, 
special aƩ enƟ on is paid to crisis situaƟ ons caused by extensive threats (e.g. 
chemical and energy disasters, weather anomalies, viral epidemics, etc.) and local 
threats (e.g. road accidents, building disasters, explosions, etc.). Procedures and 
standards are made for various types of crisis situaƟ ons, seƫ  ng out e.g. threat 
classes and threat objects’ classes, severity of the threats’ results, etc.
Security management
In the system analysis of security it has been assumed that the following have an 
impact on the system’s eﬀ ecƟ veness (fi g.3):
a) The system’s reliability, its capability to operate smoothly (with no failure, 
damage, errors, etc.) in the given Ɵ me;
b) System’s security, its capability to protect itself eﬃ  ciently against the eﬀ ects 
of outside threats.
System security management is an integral part of system management and 
is associated with raƟ onalizing the choice of measures (methods, technologies) 
providing secure (consistent with its purpose) funcƟ oning of the system in a dan-
gerous environment (tab.2).
If there are no outside threats, then system security management can be re-
duced to managing over the system’s reliability: we must chose such a reliability 
strategy, whose criterion value (funcƟ on of system’s reliability) is at maximum, 
assuming that the cost of the reliability increase (or keeping reliability on the 
desirable level) does not exceed the permissible limit.
If, however, a threat to the system’s security exists, then security manage-
ment can be reduced to choosing such a security strategy (means for protec-
Ɵ on against threats) from a set of permissible strategies, whose anƟ cipated value 
of the eﬀ ects of threats (losses) is minimal, assuming that the cost of applying 
this strategy (implemenƟ ng security measures) does not exceed the permissible 
limit.
It should be pointed out, that both the problem of reliability management 
and the problem of system security management, can be reduced to the follow-
ing: (1) minimizing the risk funcƟ on, provided the value of eﬀ ects (uƟ lity) ob-
tained due to the funcƟ oning of the system are greater than the desirable limit or 
(2) maximizing the funcƟ on of the system’s eﬀ ecƟ veness, provided the funcƟ on 
of risk is no greater than the permissible (“safe”) limit.
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Figure 3. Security system against threats
Source: author’s own work. 
Table 2. Security management
THREATS
RELIABILITY
Low High
Non-existent
“reliability management”: mini-
mizing the costs for a desired 
level of reliability (risk, eﬀ ec-
Ɵ veness)
“reliability management”:
sustaining the state of reliability for 
the permissible level of expendi-
ture for protecƟ on against failures
Existent
“security management”: mini-
mizing the costs for a desired 
level of reliability and security 
(risk)
“security management”: minimiz-
ing the costs for the desired level 
of risk and sustaining the level of 
reliability
Source: [9,10]. 
Let us assume that a system is given as the object of threat (fi g.4), character-
ized by a generalized funcƟ on of security [9,10,11]
β= f(Pe,PS,ν)
Where ν - system’s value, 0≤Pe≤POmax, 0<PS≤PSmax, ν>0
And the funcƟ on of cost of security against threats 
K=ϕ(PS, ν)>0.
It is assumed, that the costs are directly proporƟ onal to both the system’s 
value and the security potenƟ al.
The problem of opƟ mizaƟ on of security management can be formulated as 
determining such a value PS, which maximizes the level of security, that is β→max, 
provided that: K≤K0,where K0 represents the permissible value of expenditure for 
system security against possible threats Pe.
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Figure 4. A model of security management.
Source: Sienkiewicz P., Teoria bezpieczeństwa systemów, AON Warszawa 2004. 
Let us assume there are N relaƟ vely independent systems, every one of them 
characterized by the following values (fi g.5):
{Pe
i, PS
i, νi, βi, Ki, i=1,2,…,N}
A primary management system, which administers “central” security mea-
sures (resources) W. Depending on the local threat situaƟ ons, the primary de-
cision-making center may assign a specifi ed W value to i system in order to “en-
hance” its security.
In such a case, security management can be formulated as a problem of du-
plex opƟ mizaƟ on, namely:
a) Primary problem
β= F(β1,…, βN) →max
where
βi≡βi(PSi, Wi),Wi ≥ 0, ∑
=
=
N
i
i WW
1
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Provided that
∑
=
≤=
N
i
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i
Si KWPKK
1
),( ;
b) Local problem:
NiKWPK
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i
Oi
i
Si
i
i
Sii
,...,2,1,),(
max),(
=≤
→=β
It is assumed that the primary management system – thanks to the processes 
of monitoring and diagnosis of threats situaƟ ons – possesses informaƟ on on the 
threats, which means that {PO
i, i=1,2,…,N} for the moment t (or the period T). This 
informaƟ on is the basis for opƟ mizaƟ on of Wi resources allocaƟ on to individual 
systems. It can also be assumed, that the primary system (center) allocates the 
measures directly to the i local system, for internal security purposes, or indi-
rectly, for enhancing the “outside security system” (fi g.5).
Figure 5. A model of security management.
Source: Sienkiewicz P., Teoria bezpieczeństwa systemów, AON Warszawa 2004. 
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Conclusion
Security of technical systems may be considered in two basic aspects, namely (1) 
as the security of technology in terms of its negaƟ ve consequences (threats) to 
the environment (social environment, natural environment); (2) as the security of 
the technical system, resulƟ ng from its funcƟ onal states (reliability-unreliability, 
readiness, resilience, etc.).
In the fi rst case, we are dealing with a necessity to analyze the technological 
risk, which is best shown by the example of “Chernobyl syndrome”, whereas in 
the laƩ er case, the risk can be expressed by communicaƟ on security (e.g. in air 
transport), aﬀ ected by unreliable technology. Although the disaster at Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant was caused by technical system breakdown, resulƟ ng from 
human error, the social (health and biological) and ecological eﬀ ects were the 
consequence of the specifi c properƟ es of nuclear technology.
ScienƟ fi c study over technical systems’ security have a long history. Its begin-
nings should probably be sought in the ancient and medieval Ɵ mes, when giant 
structures (e.g. cathedrals, aqueducts) were created that needed to meet safety 
condiƟ ons of building construcƟ ons. A method proposed by Ch. Coulomb (1736-
1806) was known as allowable stress method and is a determinisƟ c method. 
In the 1930s it was assumed that a catastrophe, failure or breakdown must be 
treated as a random event and the reliability (security) must be analyzed with 
probabilisƟ c methods.
In the late 60s and 70s, at the Military University of Technology, a foundaƟ on 
was made for the original “school of studies on exploitaƟ on” in military technol-
ogy (e.g. the works of S. Ziemba, S. Piasecki, J. Konieczny), including issues of 
wear and tear (durability, resistance), reliability and control over the processes 
of exploitaƟ on (handling and aƩ endance) of technical equipment. In the late 80s 
and 90s, the main research centers were developed in: the Systems Research 
InsƟ tute of the Polish Academy of Sciences (systems’ reliability: Piasecki, Hrynie-
wicz), the Warsaw University of Technology (reliability and security in transport: 
Ważyńska-Fiok, Szopa), the Gdańsk University of Technology (Brandowski) and 
the Air Force InsƟ tute of Technology (Lewitowicz, Jaźwiński). ScienƟ fi c achieve-
ments in this fi eld were summarized during naƟ onal conferences in Kiekrz under 
the common Ɵ tle “Systems Security” (1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996), as 
well as “KONBIN” InternaƟ onal Conferences on Security and Reliability (1999, 
2001, 2003).
During these conferences, which presented over 1000 lectures, a creaƟ on of 
uniform foundaƟ ons of “security studies” was repeatedly postulated (S. Ziemba, 
L. Brandowski, K. Ważyńska-Fiok, J. Jaźwiński, A. Szymanek, J. Lewitowicz, P. Sien-
kiewicz). There have also been aƩ empts on creaƟ ng uniform concepts of “secu-
rity and insecurity, threats and risk” of both technical and social systems (P. Sien-
kiewicz, A. Szymanek) [3,6,7,12].
Currently, two main research trends can be disƟ nguished: (1) creaƟ ng the-
oreƟ cal basics of (technical and social) systems security, (2) designing security 
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systems, including security management and hence risk management methods 
as well (especially in crisis situaƟ ons). We can, therefore, speak of security sci-
ence, which includes the theory and engineering of systems security.
Basic methodological conclusions of widely understood systems research on 
the security of social and technical objects, may include the following:
– Security is a system category, as it concerns complex objects (technical, bio-
logical, socio-technical, social), considered as a structuralized whole, acƟ ve 
and operaƟ ng in an acƟ ve environment;
– The security of a system is a state and a process, in which the system can de-
velop (realize its development goals);
– System security is a relaƟ ve concept, always related to the general outside 
situaƟ on, moreover, it can either mean a lack of threats (objecƟ ve state) or 
lack of sense of danger (subjecƟ ve state);
– Every confl ict situaƟ on, in which the parƟ cular system parƟ cipates, includes 
potenƟ al or real threats to the system’s security;
– The system’s security depends both on the risk volume (intensiveness and 
outside infl uence eﬀ ecƟ veness) and on the eﬀ ecƟ veness of the security sys-
tem;
– One of the basic tasks of system analysis is to idenƟ fy dangerous (criƟ cal) 
situaƟ ons, including the recogniƟ on and evaluaƟ on of the sources of threats, 
their intensity, forms and the risk of their potenƟ al eﬀ ects;
– One of the basic tasks of system security engineering is developing methods 
of designing eﬃ  cient security systems, providing a desirable level of security 
to the systems;
– The issue of systems security is a strictly interdisciplinary problem that will 
become more and more signifi cant in view of the creaƟ on of a new world 
order (globalizaƟ on, the informaƟ on society); the most important issues are 
likely to include internaƟ onal and naƟ onal security, transport and communi-
caƟ ons systems security, energy systems security, informaƟ on and ecological 
security, etc.;
– Research methods over systems security should mainly be based on modern 
methods and system concepts, such as synergeƟ cs, nonlinear thermodynam-
ics, catastrophe theory, fuzzy sets theory, probabilisƟ c and possibilisƟ c meth-
ods, developing systems theory, confl ict theory, crisis management, etc.;
– An urgent need to develop a general systems security theory is observed, 
as it would be one of modern systems theories and an important branch of 
systems study, as well as of a development program of system security engi-
neering (security management system engineering).
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Mariusz Skulimowski
Military Support 
of Humanitarian Operations 
in Pakistan
LogisƟ cs, its sources and eﬃ  ciency, in large measure decide on the potenƟ al pos-
sibiliƟ es of conducƟ ng operaƟ ons. The greatest plans of tacƟ cal acƟ ons will be 
worthless, if they do not take into account logisƟ c realiƟ es. OperaƟ on Desert-
Storm, whoes name was determined by logisƟ cs, proves this theory the most.
The entrance of former Warsaw Pact countries to Nato in 1999 had enormous 
infl uence on changes in their internal as well as foreign policy. According to the 
NATO members’ regulaƟ ons, their armed forces (including Poland’s) have to be 
prepared for operaƟ ng in two fi elds. The fi rst one relates to operaƟ ons in the 
naƟ onal system, whereas the second one to operaƟ ons in the allied system.
It should be noƟ ced that current literature regarding the issues of logisƟ c sup-
port of sub-units which deal with tasks within NATO operaƟ ons abroad, menƟ on 
this problem parƟ ally and do not present all irregulariƟ es which can appear dur-
ing the accomplishment of military acƟ ons.
Term and essence of logistic support
In order to determine the defi niƟ on of logisƟ c support we should consider the 
defi niƟ on of the following terms in the fi rst place: logisƟ cs, military logisƟ cs, lo-
gisƟ c protecƟ on and support.
Basing on the historical sources we can assume that fi rst appearance of logis-
Ɵ cs in the military meaning appeared in the ByzanƟ ne Empire during the reign 
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of Leo VI (886–911). This term was connected with calculaƟ ng an army’s pay, 
its supplies and arms. A French writer sees an example of military administrator 
(quartermaster) in the person of camp prefect of Roman legions. It seems that 
we do not have to delve so far into the past in order to fi nd a defi niƟ on for the 
term ‘logisƟ cs’, as some of the dicƟ onaries as well as other works point out an 
earlier source of this word. The words of Henri de Jomini, the famous theoreƟ -
cian of French military thought, taken from one of his works (from 1835) are 
worth quoƟ ng: “LogisƟ que is the art of arranging advances of the armies well, the 
art of arranging an army in columns well, it is the Ɵ ming of their departure as well 
as the means of transport essenƟ al for securing their reaching their desƟ naƟ on. 
LogisƟ que is the rule of messages and duƟ es of the main staﬀ  oﬃ  cers.”1
Armed operaƟ ons were always accompanied by logisƟ c ones, although the 
subject scope of logisƟ cs has changed.
Reforms in the poliƟ cal, economic and defensive system meant that towards 
the end of the eighƟ es the term logisƟ cs started being used in the Polish Armed 
Forces both in theory and in pracƟ ce. 
LogisƟ cs is a scienƟ fi c branch related to planning, preparing, using and trans-
ferring objects, people, energy, informaƟ on and services in order to achieve the 
desired results.2
Military logisƟ cs is a scienƟ fi c branch related to planning, preparing and us-
ing weaponry and military equipment, material means, benefi ts and services in 
order to maintain an army in a state of suitable baƩ le readiness at home and 
supporƟ ng the army logisƟ cally abroad. In the most concise meaning, these are 
the aspects of military acƟ vity that concern the following:
• designing and development, acquiring, storing, transferring, distribuƟ on, 
maintaining and exploitaƟ on, evacuaƟ on and disposal of weaponry and mili-
tary equipment as well as chemical weapons and materiel;
• transport of people involved;
• acquiring or building, maintaining, using and removing objects; 
• acquiring and providing services;
• medical security.3
LogisƟ c security is a process of supplying an army and providing services es-
senƟ al for funcƟ oning, training and fi ghƟ ng. Supply deliveries include weaponry 
and military equipment as well as chemical weapons and marƟ al means. How-
ever, logisƟ c services are undertakings implemented by units (sub-units) and lo-
gisƟ c devices.4
1 S. Dworecki, Logistyka w wojsku, Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna, Warszawa 1997, 
s. 9
2 Zasady funkcjonowania systemu logistycznego SZ RP, Inspektorat Logistyki SG WP, Szt. 
Gen. 1429/94, Warszawa 1994, s. 50
3 Doktryna logistyczna SZ RP, Szt. Gen. 1566/2004, Warszawa 2004, s. A – 3 
4 M. Brzeziński, Zabezpieczenie logistyczne oddziałów i pododdziałów wojsk lądowych 
w działaniach taktycznych, Zarząd Planowania Logistyki SG WP, Szt. Gen. 1490/98, 
Warszawa 1999, s. 9
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From the defi niƟ ons quoted above it emerges that logisƟ cs was oriented to 
material-economic-organizaƟ onal issues concerning the assurance of the best 
possible condiƟ ons for waging war and army existence although, in the past, lo-
gisƟ cs was developed with the aim of conquest and defense..
LogisƟ c support is relaƟ vely new term used in military. Within the last few 
years instead of ‘logisƟ c security’ the term ‘logisƟ c support’ has started to be 
used. Using these two terms interchangeably has caused misunderstanding of 
these issues.
By support in the military point of view, we should understand:
• operaƟ ons of forces or their units which help, secure, complement or support 
operaƟ ons of any other kind of forces.5
• operaƟ ons of armies or their units which are aimed at helping, securing, com-
plemenƟ ng or maintaining the capabiliƟ es of other armies.6
In the terminology used by NATO we can fi nd the term logisƟ c support which 
is translated into Polish as ‘wsparcie logistyczne’. The term logisƟ c assistance is 
also oŌ en used in the same meaning.
Under the circumstances, it seems that we should fi nd the origin of the new 
term ‘logisƟ c support’ which is used in our army in the NATO terminology. How-
ever, it has no equivalent in our manuals or works regarding army acƟ viƟ es.
The usage of terms taken from English literally and using them in everyday 
oﬃ  cial acƟ vity has contributed to confusion and misunderstanding.
The latest great popularizaƟ on of the acƟ vity of logisƟ c element such as NSE 
(NaƟ onal Support Element) could also mislead military environment because of 
the great interest of our forces in foreign operaƟ ons.
Regarding the usage of NSE, in the military specialist literature naƟ onal sup-
port oŌ en limits to logisƟ c support.
Meanwhile, allies treat NSE as an element of naƟ onal support responsible for 
everything that is organized as a part of naƟ onal responsibility (not necessarily 
a logisƟ c one) and it is examined separately from the area of common and allied 
tasks resulƟ ng from the mandate of parƟ cular missions or operaƟ ons. 
An example which can be used as a Ɵ p for correct understanding of such 
a state of aﬀ airs is the statement below.
NaƟ onal Support Element (NSE) – the naƟ onal organizaƟ on or acƟ vity sup-
porƟ ng naƟ onal forces operaƟ ng abroad. NSE is under the authority of the Send-
ing NaƟ on (SN) . Its task is to secure the unique, naƟ onal support for units 7.7
AŌ er explaining and defi ning a number of terms in logisƟ cs we can determine 
what is the fundamental aim of logisƟ c support in a wide sense.
The aim of logisƟ c support is to maintain an army’s combat capability by pro-
viding it with supplies including their storing, transferring, transport, maintenance 
5 Wybrane terminy z zakresu dowodzenia i zarządzania, Instytut Dowodzenia, Wydział 
Wojsk Lądowych, AON, Warszawa 2002, s. 99
6 DicƟ onary military and associated terms, NATO Military Agency for StandardizaƟ on, 
AAP – 6 (T)
7 Doktryna logistyczna SZ RP, Szt. Gen… op. cit., s. A-3
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as well as repairing weaponry and materiel,, medical care and treaƟ ng the 
wounded, providing reinforcements and securing essenƟ al services.
Such responsibility is planned to:
• provide an army with everything that is needed in order to carry out the 
task;
• relieve an army of everything that prevents it from carrying out its task.8
Regardless of realizaƟ on of logisƟ c security in the naƟ onal system or treaty of alli-
ance, a logisƟ c system will demand realizaƟ on of the following undertakings:
• preparaƟ on and maintenance of logisƟ c potenƟ al for armed forces conduct-
ing an operaƟ on;
• analyzing informaƟ on about the state of logisƟ c forces as well as logisƟ c 
means;
• specifying the aim and concept of logisƟ c security of forces conducƟ ng an 
operaƟ on;
• planning the logisƟ c security of forces;
• planning logisƟ c tasks and coordinaƟ on as well as supervising their realiza-
Ɵ on;
• gathering materiel as well as weaponry and military equipment for the army 
supported by various sources;
• cooperaƟ on with district authority bodies (if such authority exists) in order to 
gain and use civil resources;
• organizaƟ on of the process of managing and exercising execuƟ ve posts in the 
logisƟ c system.
Despite the fact that countries are responsible for the realizaƟ on of logisƟ c 
security for their own forces in NATO, duplicaƟ ng the commonly available logisƟ c 
funcƟ ons should be minimized.
It is important to avoid too large and too expensive a distribuƟ on of logisƟ c 
forces during the stage of planning logisƟ c security.
The opƟ on of internaƟ onalizaƟ on of logisƟ c security should be chosen only in 
the event of obtaining lower costs with greater eﬃ  ciency and cost-eﬀ ecƟ veness 
at the same Ɵ me. The posiƟ on of internaƟ onal logisƟ c security will be deter-
mined during the assessment of the logisƟ c situaƟ on and the planning process. 
It will depend on the Ɵ me factor as well as the internaƟ onal bilateral agreements 
exisƟ ng between the Sending NaƟ ons (SN).
The fundamental opƟ ons of logisƟ c security are:
• NaƟ onal logisƟ c security – a country is fully responsible for supplying and 
securing logisƟ c support for its forces. Such security can be carried out only 
by basing it on naƟ onal possibiliƟ es and/or by bi- or mulƟ lateral agreements 
with other NATO countries or any other organizaƟ ons according to needs.9
• NaƟ onal responsibility – taking full responsibility for the accomplishment 
of logisƟ c security for a country’s own forces. It should be used during the 
Ɵ me of immediate redeployment of forces only if such an opƟ on ensures the 
8 Doktryna logistyczna Wojsk Lądowych NATO, ATP – 35 (B)
9 Doktryna logistyczna SZ RP, Szt. Gen…op. cit., s. A-3
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complete logisƟ c security of the forces – especially during the iniƟ al opera-
Ɵ on stage. In the next stages of the operaƟ on, as soon as there is such a pos-
sibility, the system should be replaced with a mulƟ naƟ onal one. Even if the 
sending country carries out logisƟ c security based only on naƟ onal respon-
sibility opƟ ons, the NATO commander is responsible for coordinaƟ on of the 
enƟ re logisƟ c security of operaƟ on.10
• Lead naƟ on – in logisƟ cs, this term describes a country that takes respon-
sibility for supplying and securing a wide range of logisƟ c support for all or 
a part of mulƟ naƟ onal forces or command. CompensaƟ on or reimbursement 
of costs incurred will be a subject of contracts between interested parƟ es. 
The lead naƟ on can also take responsibility for the coordinaƟ on of logisƟ cs 
of other countries as a part of their funcƟ onal and regional area of responsi-
bility.11
• StandardizaƟ on agreement (STANAG NATO) – inclusion of a naƟ onal system 
of logisƟ c security to a mulƟ naƟ onal system requires permission for sharing 
the control of important funcƟ ons of carrying out logisƟ c security with NATO 
Commanders. Under these circumstances, there is a need for technical inter-
operaƟ on in the area of logisƟ c security. StandardizaƟ on agreements contain 
resoluƟ ons related to poliƟ cs and standards for members of NATO. They cre-
ate the environment for security areas describing competences, doctrines, 
processes and technical requirements. Countries that are not members of 
NATO but which are taking part in NATO’s operaƟ ons are required to follow 
the procedures included in such publicaƟ ons.12
Such agreements and systems allow the Polish military conƟ ngent (PKW) to 
adapt to ensuing situaƟ ons and accomplish tasks which are required for dealing 
with natural disasters. This issue is presented in the following secƟ ons.
National and mandate responsibility of humanitarian 
operations in Pakistan
As the result of naƟ onal responsibility, the NSE (NaƟ onal Support Element) was 
responsible for running the material–technical economy and sponsoring and lo-
gisƟ c security of PKW Pakistan. A similar range of tasks based on material and 
fi nancial resources was carried out by the lead naƟ on, Spain.
These two areas of logisƟ c responsibility had to be separated at the very be-
ginning of the planned operaƟ on (conferences, debriefi ng, force generaƟ on etc.), 
which enabled its proper preparaƟ on. 
NaƟ onal responsibility disƟ nguished, in both preparaƟ on and during the op-
eraƟ on phase, two direcƟ ons because of the remit division of parƟ cular com-
mand posts. 
10 Doktryna logistyczna wojsk lądowych, Dowództwo Wojsk Lądowych, DWLąd. 33/2007, 
Warszawa 2007, s. 16
11 Doktryna logistyczna SZ RP, Szt. Gen… op. cit., s. A-4
12 Doktryna logistyczna Wojsk Lądowych, DWląd… op. cit., s. 19
Mariusz Skulimowski30
The fi rst was the responsibility of the Commander of the Economy Unit and in 
this case it was 10 BLog Commander. The range of duƟ es is detailed in the rules 
of material and fi nancial economy in Polish Military ConƟ ngents which carry out 
tasks abroad.
The OG Commander chosen by a superior isolates NSE and coordinates its ac-
Ɵ vity in terms of logisƟ c naƟ onal security. It secures weapons and military equip-
ment and supplies for the PKW via NSE. To fulfi ll the tasks given it has access to 
supplies of RP’s armed forces. Foreign transportaƟ on and the ability to buy the 
appropriate goods at home or abroad is also possible.13
The responsibility of the OG commander was based on both collecƟ ng and 
analysis of the logisƟ c level of PKW security on the basis of data (reports, orders, 
inquiries etc.) provided by the NSE commander.
An outcome of these analyses was obtaining weapons and military equip-
ment from military resources, in this parƟ cular case it rather means enabling the 
purchase of the required resources via NSE on the local market. 
The OG commander kept quanƟ taƟ ve – valuable record and quanƟ taƟ ve with 
the division into the PKW warehouses as well as collecƟ ve account. 
The OG commander’s task was to organize transport with supplies from the 
home country to NSE. However, due to the fact that the operaƟ on did not last 
long the transport was limited to a small supply of equipment before the end of 
the mission. 
AŌ er returning home, the OG commander seƩ led the conƟ ngent with NSE 
commander within all supply departments. 
The OG commander also fi nanced goods and services executed by NSE to the 
benefi t of PKW.
Another 10 BLog commander’s task was redeployment of the conƟ ngent to 
the fi eld of operaƟ on and then its safe return aŌ er accomplishing the mission. 
The commander of NaƟ onal Support Element was the second, directly lower 
rank of command who was responsible for task compleƟ on of PKW’s naƟ onal 
logisƟ c support. Therefore, one can state that the commander was directly re-
sponsible for naƟ onal and logisƟ c responsibility once the conƟ ngent reached 
Pakistan.
The NSE commander is responsible for direct compleƟ on of tasks of naƟ onal 
support of PKW. That is why (depending on needs) the commander sets up and 
runs warehouses with logisƟ c supplies, organizes the repair of weapons and mili-
tary equipment, buys supplies and contracts services in local market. Further-
more, the commander stores and transports supplies to PKW’s sub-units. The 
commander also gives the OG commander orders for supplies for a parƟ cular 
country. In consultaƟ on with the OG commander the NSE commander transfers 
soldiers, redundant weapons and military equipment and supplies home as well 
as states how much money is needed for goods at home and abroad.14
13 Zasady prowadzenia gospodarki materiałowej i fi nansowej w Polskich Kontyngentach 
Wojskowych realizujących zadania poza granicami państwa, Szt. Gen. Warszawa 2008, 
s. 7
14 Ibidem, s. 8
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NSE ran quanƟ taƟ ve records divided into:
– NSE collecƟ ve account,
– NSE and PJW’s warehouses and PKW’s collecƟ ve warehouses,
– PKW collecƟ ve account.
Warehouses with supplies for headquarters, sub-units that were taking part 
in the operaƟ on and for NSE were organized based on transport containers. 
The PKW needs in terms of naƟ onal logisƟ c security were made in the form of 
orders to NSE in a monthly system or even immediately if this was needed. 
NSE was responsible for organizing USE repairs and fi rst level medical aid. 
The constant contact with home regarding orders, supplies and personnel 
helped PKW logisƟ c support to be carried out smoothly. 
The mandate responsibility follows the funcƟ on of the operaƟ on, the head-
quarters’ goals and their capabiliƟ es. In this case aŌ er the earthquake quick ac-
Ɵ ons needed be undertaken because of the onset of winter and diﬃ  culƟ es it 
could bring to civilians and aid groups. 
Redeployment was fi nanced by parƟ cular conƟ ngents and all acƟ ons were 
controlled by the leading country which was responsible for fl ights arrival organi-
zaƟ on, to Islamabad airport for example, and later coordinaƟ on of convoys into 
fi elds of operaƟ on. Unfortunately, it was not always organized precisely and it 
happened that in fi eld of operaƟ on desƟ naƟ on, for example Arya, aŌ er the ar-
rival of fi rst transport the Spanish were establishing working contact with NSE.
As part of the mandate responsibility, from the logisƟ c point of view, one 
should include supplies of construcƟ onal elements and services that were imple-
mented for the aid projects. StarƟ ng with the rebuilding of roads, schools and 
fi nishing with construcƟ ng single temporary buildings for local Pakistani people 
who were injured in the cataclysm. 
From the Polish side the PKW commander was responsible for coordinaƟ on, 
managing tasks and supervision over mandate tasks. 
The PKW commander planned tasks and aid programs for the engineer sub-
unit from headquarters and Spanish sappers taking into account logisƟ c security. 
The Spanish side was engaged in fi nancing and logisƟ c security of the man-
date tasks and as lead naƟ on and direct representaƟ ve of NATO was given fi nan-
cial support from North AtlanƟ c Council representaƟ ves. 
The coordinaƟ on of logisƟ c security of mandate tasks and the realizaƟ on of 
PKW’s naƟ onal logisƟ c support could run smoothly subject to NSE’s thorough 
preparaƟ on. 
The NaƟ onal Element of Support was prepared by 10 BLog for the humanitar-
ian operaƟ on in Pakistan. Since this component was responsible for the security 
of the NATO Response Force and was of a diﬀ erent structure than the one that 
was to be secured, it required some structural changes. 
A quesƟ on arose what tasks this sub-unit faced, which could be foreseen at 
that Ɵ me with the informaƟ on available.
To answer the quesƟ on consultaƟ on with Spanish side was to be helpful, 
which specifi ed what the lead naƟ on could be oﬀ ered in terms of logisƟ cs. On the 
other hand, sub-units that took part in operaƟ on defi ned their logisƟ c needs. 
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Within a short period of Ɵ me NSE was obliged to complete a series of under-
takings that prepared the sub-unit for task compleƟ on abroad, such as:
– The process of structure reconstrucƟ on started and the aim was to achieve 
the most self–contained acƟ ons taking the distance, climate and unique fea-
tures of the locaƟ on into consideraƟ on. 
– The sub-unit was oriented of logisƟ c suﬃ  ciency, which in this case was valid, 
because the supplies from home to PKW were not fulfi lled at all, and was 
based on taking material and support from the lead naƟ on. 
– The next step was to prepare a schedule of delivery for PKW and calculate 
stocks for sub-units and the headquarters’ conƟ ngent.
– The next step was to enter PKW’s material into records from other military 
units, with autonomous sub-units that took part in the operaƟ on.
– Once the properƟ es were taken over, quanƟ taƟ ve – valuable records in (OG) 
were established and quanƟ taƟ ve one at NSE level in all support depart-
ments. 
– Training was organized for the logisƟ cs and for the use of the equipment, 
with the emphasis on specialist training (management of economic–fi nancial 
acƟ vity) which resulted from the sub-unit’s purpose.
– AddiƟ onally, on account of region’s character (a country with many acƟ ve Is-
lamic fundamentalists) the appropriate use of force was emphasized, medical 
training and local culture and tradiƟ ons.
– At the same Ɵ me the NSE’s personnel from the operaƟ on area provided with 
medical examinaƟ ons and prevenƟ ve vaccinaƟ ons. 
– The next step was to open PKW Pakistan account in 10 BLog and then accept 
the enƟ re conƟ ngent’s material for records (the iniƟ al posiƟ ons – opening 
balance). In order to achieve this economic units, that sent sub-units, had to 
prepare and then send quanƟ taƟ ve – valuable documentaƟ on to 10 BLog. 
These acƟ ons had to be based on parƟ cular and anƟ cipated tasks, which 
were to be executed by NSE, and on the range of duƟ es that occurred in those 
circumstances. 
The individual equipment that soldiers received was prepared according to 
the list of responsibiliƟ es for PKW Pakistan. In this case, taking into account the 
proximity to Afghanistan and the similarity in the situaƟ on the list of responsibili-
Ɵ es for PKW Afghanistan was used as an example. The open account also covered 
material that the logisƟ c brigade had prepared for the operaƟ on directly. In most 
cases material, before being regrouped into operaƟ on fi eld, was in 10 BLog build-
ing with the excepƟ on of equipment and material which due to the short depar-
ture Ɵ metable were received from the manufacturer and then directly delivered 
at the airport. 
The supplies were prepared for 30 days of independent acƟ on while taking 
into consideraƟ on the preparaƟ on of a contract with by the Spanish, as lead na-
Ɵ on were obliged to secure conƟ ngents with food and petrol immediately aŌ er 
reaching the acƟ on area by PKW. 
These undertakings led to forming, compleƟ ng and reaching readiness to ac-
Ɵ on by NSE PKW Pakistan in MSD region. 
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Redeployment of PKW Pakistan to operation area 
and reaching readiness operation
Redeployment of forces and supplies to a remote region is quite diﬃ  cult; it may 
become even more diﬃ  cult if the desƟ naƟ on is an unknown and remote country 
with poor communicaƟ on. That is why at the request of NSE commander several 
days before departure of forces a group was sent to reconnoiter the situaƟ on (lo-
cal market and area of operaƟ on) and help in organizing fi rst fl ight arrivals. 
The reconnaissance group that included several soldiers took two planes C – 
295 “CASA” taking two heavy–duty vehicles in order to be mobile. 
Meanwhile at home reorganizaƟ on to Pakistani airport in Islamabad began; 
this was the responsibility of 10 Blog, due to its experience in organizing such 
transports (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq). 
AŌ er lisƟ ng the equipment the amount of material was calculated that was to 
be regrouped. At the early phase of planning two types of transport were taken 
into consideraƟ on: sea and air.
The fi rst, cheaper one, was Ɵ me-consuming and was not suitable in situa-
Ɵ ons where rapid decisions had to be made, for example in the aŌ ermath of an 
earthquake. 
According to supervisors’ decision the redeployment was to be made with 
the use of An-124 planes “RUSŁAN” from Strachowica airport in Wroclaw. The 
advantage of this plane was that apart from cargo it could carry 10 people.
The redeployment of equipment was placed in one locaƟ on, that is in 10 
BLog’s barracks so that material could be described, weighed and prepared for 
departure. 
The PKW’s basic equipment in Pakistan included:
– 61 vehicles (including 10 truck trailers),
– 54 residenƟ al containers,
– 35 containers of diﬀ erent kind (transport, sanitary, technical).
The transport documentaƟ on was prepared by unit of logisƟ c brigade and 
NSE PKW Pakistan commander. 
With this type of transport two pieces of informaƟ on were important: ton-
nage and volume of the cargo, on the basis of which it could be stated how 
many planes would be needed. The calculaƟ ons showed that 12 planes An – 124 
“RUSŁAN” and one C – 295 “CASA” would be needed to transport soldiers. Zarząd 
Transportu i Ruchu Wojsk z Centrum Wsparcia Dowództwa Operacyjnego was 
responsible for ordering of air transport. 
Another task was to load material to containers safely. Easily damaged equip-
ment was given extra protecƟ on and then all the boxes, and containers were 
fastened with transport belts. 
All containers had descripƟ ons of what was inside of them. AddiƟ onally, on 
the inner side of container doors there was a very precise descripƟ on of the cargo 
carried. From the outside the containers were labeled according to rules and in 
the local language (Urdu). 
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Engineering vehicles and machines which were prepared for departure were 
described in the same way as containers and because of plane redeployment 
were tanked up in 1/3 tank. 
On the basis of NSE specifi caƟ ons the transport unit prepared PKW Pakistan 
transport documentaƟ on (customs declaraƟ on C – 302, cargo manifest and oth-
ers). 
According to the redeployment plan the transfer of containers and equip-
ment to 3rd air base in Wroclaw Strachowice started. 
The transport unit of the air base verifi ed the prepared documentaƟ on and 
the cargo. 
The redeployment Wroclaw–Islamabad was done in one or two planes daily. 
The NSE commander and some soldiers who were involved in organizaƟ on of 
transport from Islamabad to the operaƟ on area in Arya took the fi rst plane.
The fi rst plane at the Islamabad airport was awaited by the NSE oﬃ  cer who 
had reconnoitered the area, and who had arrived with rented local transporta-
Ɵ on to carry containers. The quality of this transportaƟ on was poor. However, in 
Pakistan it was considered to be of high quality. 
Since that there was no possibility to gather all the equipment at the airport 
the fi rst convoy from the fi rst plane that was under the supervision of the NSE 
commander headed towards the operaƟ on area in the city of Arya with a Paki-
stani military escort.
Arya is 140km away from Islamabad but since the area is mountainous and the 
roads are very narrow and winding it took 10–12 hours to cover the distance. 
AŌ er reaching the desƟ naƟ on the NSE commander and soldiers from the fi rst 
fl ight organized the arrivals of the next columns. The satellite connecƟ on with 
the NSE oﬃ  cer, who enabled other columns to leave Islamabad was essenƟ al and 
helped to prepare the base for the arrival of equipment, vehicles and soldiers. 
What is more, it also helped to be up to date with situaƟ ons such as malfunc-
Ɵ ons of local trucks so a new vehicle with crane and escort was sent to take the 
cargo. 
Well organized redeployment enabled all soldiers to have good sleeping con-
diƟ ons and social faciliƟ es. 
The engineering sub-unit arrived on the 6th and 7th day of operaƟ on and aŌ er 
fi nishing redeployment on the 11th day the sub-unit was ready to complete man-
date tasks. 
The deadline for redeployment was based on the An-124 “RUSŁAN” planes 
schedule and redeployment was fi nished on the 12th day from the take-oﬀ  of 
the fi rst plane. 
The logisƟ c unit was fi rst in the operaƟ on area and had Ɵ me to prepare logis-
Ɵ c security for incoming Polish sappers. It can be stated that once the last soldier 
of the engineering sub-unit arrived NSE was ready to secure them in all areas 
which were constantly improved in the subsequent days of the mission. 
Military Support of Humanitarian Operations in Pakistan 35
NSE’s tasks for the contingent within the framework 
of “Swift Relief” operation
NSE PKW Pakistan was responsible for the planning and organizaƟ on of the logis-
Ɵ c security of the conƟ ngent. In this situaƟ on the NSE commander was also the 
chief of container logisƟ cs and was responsible for logisƟ c security resulƟ ng from 
naƟ onal responsibility and coordinaƟ on of logisƟ c security of mandate tasks. 
The fi rst task was the organizaƟ on of transport equipment and soldiers from 
the airport in Islamabad to Kashmir (the city of Arya) which was menƟ oned ear-
lier in the text. 
AŌ er reaching the desƟ naƟ on the development of the camp began and the 
contact with the Spanish was established in terms of logisƟ c security for the lead-
ing country. 
The enƟ re logisƟ c system of PKW Pakistan could be divided into three areas. 
The fi rst one used the lead naƟ on’s logisƟ c support under signed bilateral agree-
ments.
The Spanish oﬀ ered PKW the following logisƟ c supports:
– Using the social center (sanitary container) on the fi rst days of the mission 
(the redeployment period),
– Full board (3 hot meals) in a canteen and packed food,
– Fuel (ON and petrol) on the basis of a signed agreement with a local contrac-
tor.
The second area of PKW logisƟ c system was coordinaƟ on and support of engi-
neering sub-unit in terms of mandate tasks which can be divided into:
– Transport tasks to the area of performed tasks,
– OrganizaƟ on of fi eld kitchens, 
– OrganizaƟ on of fi eld tanking places,
– The purchase of essenƟ al, minor equipment.
The most important task was PKW logisƟ c support resulƟ ng from naƟ onal re-
sponsibility where the following areas of acƟ on can be listed:
– OrganizaƟ on of living quarters on base (appendix 9) with:
• AccommodaƟ on of the enƟ re conƟ ngent on the basis of residenƟ al con-
tainers
• The social service on the basis of sanitary containers and fi eld baths,
• OrganizaƟ on of the fi eld laundry room,
• PreparaƟ on of plaƞ orms to move around the base (because of mud, 
rain),
• Power supply of the camp on the base of collected aggregates (the main 
and addiƟ onal ones),
• Provision of heaƟ ng and air condiƟ oning,
• OrganizaƟ on of leisure and recreaƟ on faciliƟ es for soldiers,
– PreparaƟ on of posts for PKW headquarters and sub-units’ commanders,
– OrganizaƟ on of warehouses on the basis of transport containers,
– PreparaƟ on of fi eld tanking area,
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– Medical security of 1st level and operaƟ ng of outpaƟ ent clinic and fi eld phar-
macy,
– OrganizaƟ on of repair post,
– PreparaƟ on of communicaƟ on points to maintain contact with home,
– Supply PKW with aqua ammonia,
– OrganizaƟ on of Christmas,
– Purchase of goods at the local market,
– Keeping records of PKW’s equipment,
– Security of PKW’s secret oﬃ  ce,
– Running PKW’s fi nancial business and services’ seƩ lement in favor of PKW 
that were carried out by LEAD NATION,
– Hiring translators and janitors to clean sanitary containers,
– And many others that occurred.
Last but not least NSE’s task was the preparaƟ on of the conƟ ngent to fi nish 
the mission and return home as presented below. 
Mission ending and return home of soldiers 
from Pakistani contingent
The PKW Pakistan superiors decided that aŌ er three months its acƟ vity ended 
similarly to other sub-units of ‘SWIFT RELIEF’ operaƟ on.
Because of the fact that, in this case, Ɵ me was not a decisive factor, aƩ enƟ on 
was focused on the fi nancial aspect of such reorganizaƟ on.
Financial analysis suggested using sea transport from Karachi harbor. In order 
to accomplish such an undertaking, material needed to be transported through 
all of Pakistan (from north to south) over a distance of 1700 km. 
Because of the specialist equipment, the possibiliƟ es of the local market as 
well as the Ɵ me of ship sailing to the harbor, redeployment was accomplished by 
combined transport (plane, train, road and ship).
Redeployment was divided into stages that included such means of transport 
which could transport material and people.
The fi rst stage included leading the forces out of Kashmir to the Pakistani mili-
tary base in Rawalpindi (approximately 20 kilometers to the south of Islamabad) 
along with Spaniards and other naƟ ons.
MulƟ naƟ onal convoys with escort, medical and technical security as well as 
contact with the transport coordinaƟ on centre were organized.
PKW staﬀ  and the engineering sub-unit (in majority) were regrouped by air to 
Rawalpindi with the use of a German transport helicopter. 
In order to organize and accomplish the redeployment, Spaniards used 
a Spanish civilian shipping company which has long-standing contract for provid-
ing any kind of services to the army (including the transport ones).
As lead naƟ on the Spanish oﬀ ered allies (including PKW) help in organizing 
wheeled transport from Arya to Rawalpindi, from Rawalpindi to Karachi and sea 
transport from Karachi to Szczecin. 
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AŌ er invesƟ gaƟ ng the Spanish company oﬀ er and making a reconnaissance 
of the market by NSE oﬃ  cers, it was decided by superiors that a shipping com-
pany as well as two Pakistani trains would have been hired separately. Neverthe-
less, sea transport would have been provided by the Spanish civilian shipping 
company.
AŌ er redeployment of people and equipment to Rawalpindi base, they were 
divided into parts in order to be regrouped further.
The PKW commander handed over command to the NSE commander and 
then along with his staﬀ  as well as the engineering sub-unit (excluding drivers) 
went to Istanbul from where he returned home by ‘CASA’ plane.
The remaining part of people and equipment was divided into two groups 
by the NSE commander. The fi rst one included containers and equipment which 
could be transported by rail transport. The second one included bulky vehicles 
(such as the bulldozer-loader ‘SŁ-34’, the MAN dump truck, the HIAB crane and 
others) which were prepared for road transport.
It was required to coordinate rail as well as road transport in such a way to 
reach Karachi and to be appropriately prepared before the ship sailed into the 
harbor. According to the calculaƟ ons rail transport should last three days and 
road transport four days.
The whole PKW’s material was loaded onto two trains and the NSE oﬃ  cer was 
chosen as the commander of the rail transport. The commander departed two 
days aŌ er the wheeled column.
Such an opƟ on enabled the NSE commander, who was the commander of 
wheeled equipment convoy at the same Ɵ me, to reach Karachi one day before 
the train in order to prepare its unloading.
The wheeled column with specialist bulky vehicles that had its own escort 
and a Pakistani one, its own medical and technical security as well as means of 
allowing contact between the column and satellite contact with home, went to 
Karachi.
The route was outlined with Pakistani approval and was divided into four 
stages (Rawalpindi – Lahore – Multan – Sukkur – Karachi). During these stages ac-
commodaƟ on, equipment refueling and the replacement of the Pakistani escort 
were organized.
AŌ er reaching port in Karachi, soldiers were quartered in Pakistani forces bar-
racks. Equipment was leŌ  in a guarded area, close to the port.
One day aŌ er the wheeled column reached the port, the trains with PKW 
material came. The material was placed in one spot and was prepared for sea 
transport. 
DisinfecƟ ng material before loading it onto the ship as well as disinfecƟ ng 
people at the airport aŌ er they landed in Wrocław was unusual.
This operaƟ on was accomplished by a Spanish veterinary team with the use 
of specialist equipment. The team also issued a special cerƟ fi cate related to this 
operaƟ on.
FormaliƟ es regarding reporƟ ng material and determining its implementa-
Ɵ on were accomplished along with Spanish soldiers who had reached Karachi by 
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train. By contrast, their bulky vehicles were transported from Islamabad to Spain 
by the use of air transport.
Because of the ship delay, it was decided to send soldiers who were not di-
rectly involved in loading the ship home by plane immediately.
A few hours before the ship sailed into the harbor, containers and PKW’s ve-
hicles were transported and placed in such a way that enabled the eﬃ  cient load-
ing of equipment in accordance with a plan prepared by the Spanish shipping 
company.
Loading equipment onto the ship was carried out quickly and without any 
problems which allowed the whole work to be fi nished within couple of hours.
It should also be added that from the beginning of the redeployment in Arya 
to unloading the ship in Szczecin, PKW property was insured by the Spanish com-
pany SLI.
AŌ er loading the ship, a group of soldiers under NSE commander’s command 
went to Karachi airport from where they fl ew home by ‘CASA’ plane.
In the stage of planning accomplishment of such an operaƟ on related to re-
deployment of 140 people, 61 vehicles, 89 containers from distant Kashmir in 
Pakistan to Poland appeared to be really diﬃ  cult and complex.
PracƟ cal accomplishment of this operaƟ on shows that such tasks can be car-
ried out based on experience and immense involvement of all people taking part 
in such an operaƟ on.
Conclusion 
The parƟ cipaƟ on of Polish forces abroad implies the need for implementaƟ on of 
modern logisƟ c soluƟ ons according to NATO standards and based on economic 
factors. Assumed and mutually coordinated acƟ ons that sustain logisƟ c potenƟ al 
in readiness outside the home borders are likely to succeed provided the theo-
reƟ cal knowledge gained is supported by some experience.
At this moment, there are many examples of such experience, for instance: 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Congo, Chad. 
Tasks that PKW Pakistan carried out aŌ er the earthquake that took place on 
the 8th of October 2005 were, in my opinion, fulfi lled properly and it may be dem-
onstrated by the graƟ tude that the army received from supervisors and allies 
from NATO. The most important is the graƟ tude and sincere thanks from the 
Pakistani people which cannot be replaced by any medals or honors. 
PreparaƟ on of logisƟ c support for an operaƟ on in such a remote and unique 
country should be preceded by detailed contacts with the leading country. The 
result of the meeƟ ngs should be refl ected in agreements and common contracts 
that regulate the logisƟ c support of forces performing tasks abroad. 
Due to organizaƟ onal aspects the fi nancing of some common undertakings 
should be carried out by the lead naƟ on despite the fact that it belongs to na-
Ɵ onal competence. Such a situaƟ on would ease some aspects such as redeploy-
ment and armies dislocaƟ ons so that there was no situaƟ on when under one 
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supervision a decision about Ɵ me and method of people’s dislocaƟ on was made 
individually. 
All changes that occur and are to happen in an army cannot cause situaƟ ons 
when a soldier going on a mission abroad is deprived of proper logisƟ c support. 
SaƟ sfacƟ on of commanders’ expectaƟ ons in terms of eﬀ ecƟ ve condiƟ ons of 
operaƟ on requires a serious aƫ  tude towards army logisƟ c problems. However, 
the commanders should also seriously approach logisƟ c problems (material, 
technical, medical, transport, personnel and services). It involves the need of re-
organizaƟ on of current systemic soluƟ ons. Although “Each reorganizaƟ on is sure-
ly passing the phase of disorganizaƟ on” as T. Kotarbiński used to say, one should 
aim to make the laƩ er phase as short and as liƩ le discouraging as possible. 

Mieczysław Bieniek 
Arab Spring – Dynamic 
Changes in the Middle East
The Arab Spring began on 18 December 2010.
The protests have shared techniques of mostly civil resistance in sustained 
campaigns involving strikes, demonstraƟ ons, marches, and rallies, as well as the 
eﬀ ecƟ ve use of social media to organize, communicate, and raise awareness in 
the face of state aƩ empts at repression and Internet censorship. 
Many Arab Spring demonstraƟ ons have met violent responses from authori-
Ɵ es, as well as from pro-government miliƟ as and counter-demonstrators. These 
aƩ acks have been answered with violence from protestors in some cases. A ma-
jor slogan of the demonstrators in the Arab world has been “the people want to 
bring down the regime.”
The Arab spring is widely believed to have been insƟ gated by dissaƟ sfacƟ on 
with the rule of local governments, though some have speculated that wide gaps 
in income levels may have had a hand as well. Numerous factors have led to 
the protests, including issues such as dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human 
rights violaƟ ons, government corrupƟ on, economic decline, unemployment, ex-
treme poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors, such as a large 
percentage of educated but dissaƟ sfi ed youth within the populaƟ on.
The catalysts for the revolts in all Northern African and Persian Gulf coun-
tries have been the concentraƟ on of wealth in the hands of autocrats in power 
for decades, insuﬃ  cient transparency of its redistribuƟ on, corrupƟ on, and espe-
cially the refusal of the youth to accept the status quo. Increasing food prices and 
global famine rates have also been a signifi cant factor, as they involve threats to 
food security worldwide and prices that approach levels of the 2007–2008 world 
food price crisis.
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Tunisia
Following the self-immolaƟ on of Mohamed Bouazizi, a series of increasingly vio-
lent street demonstraƟ ons through December 2010 ulƟ mately led to the ousƟ ng 
of long-Ɵ me President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. The demon-
straƟ ons were preceded by high unemployment, food infl aƟ on, corrupƟ on, lack 
of freedom of speech and other forms of poliƟ cal freedom, and poor living con-
diƟ ons. The protests consƟ tuted the most dramaƟ c wave of social and poliƟ cal 
unrest in Tunisia in three decades, and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, 
most of which were the result of acƟ on by police and security forces against dem-
onstrators. Ben Ali fl ed into exile in Saudi Arabia. 
A state of emergency was declared and a caretaker coaliƟ on government was 
created following Ben Ali’s departure, which included members of Ben Ali’s par-
ty, the ConsƟ tuƟ onal DemocraƟ c Rally (RCD), as well as opposiƟ on fi gures from 
other ministries. However, the fi ve newly appointed non-RCD ministers resigned 
almost immediately. As a result of conƟ nued protests, on 27 January Prime Min-
ister Mohamed Ghannouchi reshuﬄ  ed the government, removing all former 
RCD members other than himself, and on 6 February the former ruling party was 
suspended and on 9 March - dissolved. Following further public protests, Ghan-
nouchi himself resigned on 27 February.
On 23 October, ciƟ zens voted in the fi rst post-revoluƟ on elecƟ on to elect rep-
resentaƟ ves to a 217-member consƟ tuent assembly that would be responsible 
for the new consƟ tuƟ on. The leading moderate Islamist party, Ennada, won 37% 
of the vote, and managed to elect 42 women to the ConsƟ tuent Assembly.
Egypt
Inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and prior to his entry as a central fi gure in 
EgypƟ an poliƟ cs, potenƟ al presidenƟ al candidate Mohamed ElBaradei warned 
of a “Tunisia-style explosion” in Egypt.
Protests in Egypt began on 25 January 2011 and ran for 18 days. Beginning 
around midnight on 28 January, the EgypƟ an government aƩ empted, some-
what successfully, to eliminate the naƟ on’s Internet access, in order to inhibit 
the protesters’ ability to organize through social media. Later that day, as tens 
of thousands protested on the streets of Egypt’s major ciƟ es, President Hosni 
Mubarak dismissed his government, later appoinƟ ng a new cabinet. Mubarak 
also appointed the fi rst Vice President in almost 30 years.
On 10 February, Mubarak ceded all presidenƟ al power to Vice President Omar 
Suleiman, but soon thereaŌ er announced that he would remain as President un-
Ɵ l the end of his term. However, protests conƟ nued the next day, and Suleiman 
quickly announced that Mubarak had resigned from the presidency and trans-
ferred power to the Armed Forces of Egypt. The military immediately dissolved 
the EgypƟ an Parliament, suspended the ConsƟ tuƟ on of Egypt, and promised to 
Arab Spring – Dynamic Changes in the Middle East 43
liŌ  the naƟ on’s thirty-year “emergency laws”. A civilian, Essam Sharaf, was ap-
pointed as Prime Minister of Egypt on 4 March to widespread approval among 
EgypƟ ans in Tahrir Square. Violent protests however, conƟ nued through the end 
of 2011 as many EgypƟ ans expressed concern about the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces’ perceived sluggishness in insƟ tuƟ ng reforms and their grip on 
power.
Hosni Mubarak and his former interior minister Habib al-Adli were sentenced 
to life imprisonment on the basis of their failure to stop the killings during the 
fi rst six days of the 2011 EgypƟ an RevoluƟ on. His successor, Mohamed Mursi, 
was sworn in as Egypt’s fi rst democraƟ cally elected president before judges at 
the Supreme ConsƟ tuƟ onal Court. Fresh protests erupted in Egypt on 22 Novem-
ber 2012.
Libya
AnƟ -government protests began in Libya on 15 February 2011. By 18 February 
the opposiƟ on controlled most of Benghazi, the country’s second-largest city. 
The government dispatched elite troops and miliƟ a in an aƩ empt to recapture 
it, but they were repelled. By 20 February, protests had spread to the capital 
Tripoli, leading to a television address by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi , who warned the 
protestors that there country could descend into civil war. The rising death toll, 
numbering in the thousands, drew internaƟ onal condemnaƟ on and resulted in 
the resignaƟ on of several Libyan diplomats, along with calls for the government’s 
dismantlement.
Amidst ongoing eﬀ orts by demonstrators and rebel forces to wrest control 
of Tripoli from the Jamahiriya, the opposiƟ on set up an interim government in 
Benghazi to oppose Colonel Muammar Gaddafi ’s rule. However, despite iniƟ al 
opposiƟ on success, government forces subsequently took back much of the 
Mediterranean coast.
On 17 March, United NaƟ ons Security Council ResoluƟ on 1973 was adopted, 
authorizing a no-fl y zone over Libya, and “all necessary measures” to protect ci-
vilians. Two days later, France, the United States and the United Kingdom inter-
vened in Libya with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi  forces. A coaliƟ on 
of 27 states from Europe and the Middle East soon joined the intervenƟ on. The 
forces were driven back from the outskirts of Benghazi, and the rebels mounted 
an oﬀ ensive, capturing scores of towns across the coast of Libya. The oﬀ ensive 
stalled however, and a counter-oﬀ ensive by the government retook most of the 
towns, unƟ l a stalemate was formed between Brega and Ajdabiya, the former be-
ing held by the government and the laƩ er in the hands of the rebels. Focus then 
shiŌ ed to the west of the country, where biƩ er fi ghƟ ng conƟ nued. AŌ er a three-
month-long baƩ le, a loyalist siege of rebel-held Misrata, the third largest city in 
Libya, was broken in large part due to coaliƟ on air strikes. The four major fronts of 
combat were generally considered to be the Nafusa Mountains, the Tripolitanian 
coast, the Gulf of Sidra, and the southern Libyan Desert.
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In late August, anƟ -Gaddafi  fi ghters captured Tripoli, scaƩ ering Gaddafi ’s gov-
ernment and marking the end of his 42 years of power. Many insƟ tuƟ ons of the 
government, including Gaddafi  and several top government oﬃ  cials, regrouped 
in Sirte, which Gaddafi  declared to be Libya’s new capital. Others fl ed to Sabha, 
Bani Walid, and remote reaches of the Libyan Desert, or to surrounding countries. 
However, Sabha fell in late September, Bani Walid was captured aŌ er a grueling 
siege weeks later, and on 20 October, fi ghters under the aegis of the NaƟ onal 
TransiƟ onal Council seized Sirte, killing Gaddafi  in the process.
Yemen
Protests occurred in many towns in both the north and south of Yemen starƟ ng in 
mid-January 2011. Demonstrators iniƟ ally protested against governmental pro-
posals to modify the consƟ tuƟ on of Yemen, unemployment and economic condi-
Ɵ ons, and corrupƟ on, but their demands soon included a call for the resignaƟ on 
of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been facing internal opposiƟ on from his 
closest advisors since 2009.
A major demonstraƟ on of over 16,000 protesters took place in Sana’a on 27 
January 2011, and soon thereaŌ er human rights acƟ vist and poliƟ cian Tawakel 
Karman called for a “Day of Rage” on 3 February. Organizers were calling for 
a million protesters. In response to the planned protest, Ali Abdullah Saleh stated 
that he would not seek another presidenƟ al term in 2013. On 3 February, 20,000 
protesters demonstrated against the government in Sana’a, others parƟ cipated 
in a “Day of Rage” in Aden that was called for by Tawakel Karman, while sol-
diers, armed members of the General People’s Congress, and many protestors 
held a pro-government rally in Sana’a. Concurrent with the resignaƟ on of Egyp-
Ɵ an president Mubarak, Yemenis again took to the streets protesƟ ng President 
Saleh on 11 February, in what has been dubbed a “Friday of Rage”. The protests 
conƟ nued in the days following despite clashes with government advocates. In 
a “Friday of Rage” held on 18 February, tens of thousands of Yemenis took part 
in anƟ -government demonstraƟ ons in the major ciƟ es of Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden. 
Protests conƟ nued over the following months, especially in the three major ciƟ es, 
and briefl y intensifi ed in late May into urban warfare between Hashid tribesmen 
and army defectors allied with the opposiƟ on on one side and security forces and 
miliƟ as loyal to Saleh on the other.
AŌ er Saleh pretended to accept a Gulf CooperaƟ on Council-brokered plan 
allowing him to cede power in exchange for immunity only to back away before 
signing three separate Ɵ mes, an assassinaƟ on aƩ empt on 3 June leŌ  him and 
several other high-ranking Yemeni oﬃ  cials injured by a blast in the presidenƟ al 
compound’s mosque. Saleh was evacuated to Saudi Arabia for treatment, but he 
handed over power to Vice-President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi, who has largely 
conƟ nued his policies and ordered the arrest of several Yemenis in connecƟ on 
with the aƩ ack on the presidenƟ al compound. While in Saudi Arabia, Saleh kept 
hinƟ ng that he could return any Ɵ me and conƟ nued to be present in the poliƟ cal 
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sphere through television appearances from Riyadh starƟ ng with an address 
to the Yemeni people on 7 July. On Friday 13 August, a demonstraƟ on was an-
nounced in Yemen as “Mansouron Friday” in which hundreds of thousands of Ye-
menis called for Ali Abdullah Saleh to go. The protesters joining the “Mansouron 
Friday” were calling for establishment of “a new Yemen”. On 12 September, Saleh 
issued a presidenƟ al decree while sƟ ll receiving treatment in Riyadh authorizing 
Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi to negoƟ ate a deal with the opposiƟ on 
and sign the GCC iniƟ aƟ ve.
On 23 September, three months since the assassinaƟ on aƩ empt, Saleh re-
turned to Yemen abruptly, defying all earlier expectaƟ ons. Pressure on Saleh to 
sign the GCC iniƟ aƟ ve eventually led to his signing of it in Riyadh on 23 Novem-
ber, in which Saleh agreed to step down and set the stage for the transfer of 
power to his vice-president. A presidenƟ al elecƟ on was then held on 21 February 
2012, in which Hadi (the only candidate) won 99.8 per cent of the vote. Hadi then 
took the oath of oﬃ  ce in Yemen’s parliament on 25 February. By 27 February, 
Saleh had resigned from the presidency and transferred power to his successor; 
however he is sƟ ll wielding poliƟ cal clout as the head of the General People’s 
Congress party.
Syria
Protests in Syria started on 26 January 2011, when a police oﬃ  cer assaulted 
a man in public on Al-Hareeka Street in the old town of Damascus. The man was 
arrested right aŌ er the assault. As a result, protesters called for the freedom of 
the arrested man. Soon a “Day of Rage” was set for 4–5 February, but it was 
unevenƞ ul. On 6 March, the Syrian security forces arrested about 15 children in 
Daraa, in southern Syria, for wriƟ ng slogans against the government. Soon pro-
tests erupted over the arrest and abuse of the children. Daraa was to be the 
fi rst city to protest against the Baathist regime, which has been ruling Syria since 
1963. 
Thousands of protestors gathered in Damascus, Aleppo, al-Hasakah, Daraa, 
Deir ez-Zor, and Hama on 15 March, with recently released poliƟ cian Suhair Atas-
si becoming an unoﬃ  cial spokesperson for the “Syrian revoluƟ on”. The next day 
there was reports of approximately 3000 arrests and a few martyrs, but there 
are no oﬃ  cial fi gures on the number of deaths. On 18 April 2011, approximately 
100,000 protesters sat in the central Square of Homs calling for the resignaƟ on 
of President Bashar al-Assad. Protests conƟ nued throughout July 2011, the gov-
ernment responding with harsh security clampdowns and military operaƟ ons in 
several districts, especially in the north.
On 31 July, Syrian army tanks stormed several ciƟ es, including Hama, Deir 
Ez-Zour, Abu Kamal, and Herak near Daraa. At least 136 people were killed in the 
most violent and bloody day since the uprising started.
On 5 August 2011, an anƟ -government demonstraƟ on took place in Syria 
called “God is with us”, during which the Syrian security forces shot the protest-
ers from inside ambulances, consequently killing 11 people.
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By late November – early December, the Baba Amr district of Homs fell un-
der armed Syrian opposiƟ on control. By late December, the baƩ les between the 
government’s security forces and the rebel Free Syrian Army intensifi ed in Idlib 
Governorate. CiƟ es in Idlib and neighborhoods in Homs and Hama began falling 
under the control of the opposiƟ on, during this Ɵ me military operaƟ ons in Homs 
and Hama ceased and stopped.
By mid-January the FSA gained control over Zabadani and Madaya. By late 
January, the Free Syrian Army launched a full-scale aƩ ack against the govern-
ment in Rif Dimashq, where they took over Saqba, Hamoreya, Harasta and other 
ciƟ es in Damascus’s Eastern suburbs. On 29 January, the fourth regiment of the 
Syrian Army led by the president’s brother Maher al-Assad and the Syrian Army 
dug in at Damascus, and the fi ghƟ ng conƟ nued where the FSA was 8 km away 
from the Republican palace in Damascus. FighƟ ng broke out near Damascus In-
ternaƟ onal Airport, but by the next day the Syrian government deployed the Re-
publican Guards. The military gained the upper hand and regained all land the 
opposiƟ on gained in Rif Dimashq by early February. On 4 February, the Syrian 
Army launched a massive bombardment on Homs and commiƩ ed a huge mas-
sacre, killing 500 civilians in one night in Homs. By mid-February, the Syrian army 
regained control over Zabadani and Madaya. In late February, Army forces en-
tered Baba Amro aŌ er a big military operaƟ on and heavy fi ghƟ ng. Following this, 
the opposiƟ on forces began losing neighborhoods in Homs to the Syrian Army 
including al-Inshaat, Jobr, Karm el-Zaytoon and only Homs’s old neighborhoods, 
including Al-Khalidiya, Homs, Al-Khalidiya, remained in opposiƟ on hands.
By March 2012, the government began military operaƟ ons against the op-
posiƟ on in Idlib Governorate including the city of Idlib, which fell to the Army 
by mid-March. During the month, the government also recaptured Saraqib and 
Sarmin. SƟ ll, at this Ɵ me, the opposiƟ on managed to capture al-Qusayr and Ras-
tan. Heavy fi ghƟ ng also conƟ nued in several neighborhoods in Homs and in the 
city of Hama. The FSA also started to conduct hit-and-run aƩ acks in the pro-Assad 
Aleppo Governorate, which they were not able to do before. Heavy-to-sporadic 
fi ghƟ ng was also conƟ nuing in the Daraa and Deir ez-Zor Governorates.
By late April 2012, despite a cease-fi re being declared in the whole country, 
sporadic fi ghƟ ng conƟ nued, with heavy clashes specifi cally in Al-Qusayr, where 
rebel forces controlled the northern part of the city, while the military held the 
southern part. FSA forces were holding onto Al-Qusayr, due to it being the last 
major transit point toward the Lebanese border. A rebel commander from the 
Farouq Brigade in the town reported that 2,000 Farouq fi ghters had been killed 
in Homs province since August 2011. At this point, there were talks among the 
rebels in Al-Qusayr, where many of the retreaƟ ng rebels from Homs city’s Baba 
Amr district had gone, of Homs being abandoned completely. On 12 June 2012, 
the UN peacekeeping chief in Syria stated that, in his view, Syria has entered a pe-
riod of civil war.
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Bahrain
The protests in Bahrain started on 14 February, and were iniƟ ally aimed at achiev-
ing greater poliƟ cal freedom and respect for human rights; they were not in-
tended to directly threaten the monarchy. Lingering frustraƟ on among the Shiite 
majority with being ruled by the Sunni government was a major root cause, but 
the protests in Tunisia and Egypt are cited as the inspiraƟ on for the demonstra-
Ɵ ons. The protests were largely peaceful unƟ l a pre-dawn raid by police on 17 
February to clear protestors from Pearl Roundabout in Manama, in which po-
lice killed four protesters. Following the raid, some protesters began to expand 
their aims to a call for the end of the monarchy. On 18 February, army forces 
opened fi re on protesters when they tried to re-enter the roundabout, fatally 
wounding one. The following day protesters reoccupied Pearl Roundabout aŌ er 
the government ordered troops and police to withdraw. Subsequent days saw 
large demonstraƟ ons; on 21 February a pro-government Gathering of NaƟ onal 
Unity drew tens of thousands, whilst on 22 February the number of protestors at 
the Pearl Roundabout peaked at over 150,000 aŌ er more than 100,000 protest-
ers marched there and were coming under fi re from the Bahraini Military which 
killed around 20 and injured over 100 protestors. On 14 March, Saudi-led GCC 
forces were requested by the government and entered the country, which the 
opposiƟ on called an “occupaƟ on”.
King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa declared a three-month state of emergency on 
15 March and asked the military to reassert its control as clashes spread across 
the country. On 16 March, armed soldiers and riot police cleared the protesters’ 
camp in the Pearl Roundabout, in which 3 policemen and 3 protesters were re-
portedly killed. Later, on 18 March, the government tore down the Pearl Round-
about monument. AŌ er the liŌ ing of emergency law on 1 June, several large 
rallies were staged by the opposiƟ on parƟ es. Smaller-scale protests and clashes 
outside of the capital have conƟ nued to occur almost daily. On 9 March 2012, 
over 100,000 protested in what the opposiƟ on called “the biggest march in our 
history”.
The police response has been described as a “brutal” crackdown on peaceful 
and unarmed protestors, including doctors and bloggers. The police carried out 
midnight house raids in Shia neighborhoods, beaƟ ngs at checkpoints, and denial 
of medical care in a “campaign of inƟ midaƟ on”. More than 2,929 people were 
arrested, and at least fi ve people died due to torture while in police custody. On 
23 November 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry released 
its report on its invesƟ gaƟ on of the events, fi nding that the government had sys-
temaƟ cally tortured prisoners and commiƩ ed other human rights violaƟ ons. It 
also rejected the government’s claims that the protests were insƟ gated by Iran. 
Although the report found that systemaƟ c torture had stopped, the Bahraini 
government has refused entry to several internaƟ onal human rights groups and 
news organizaƟ ons, and delayed a visit by a UN inspector. 
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Henryk Ćwięk
Between Germany and Russia. 
The Problem 
of Poland’s Security 
in the 20th and 21st Centuries 
in View of Europe’s Situation. 
Selected Problems
The problem of Poland’s security is complex and diﬃ  cult to assess unequivo-
cally. If we inspect it from a historical perspecƟ ve we must take into consider-
aƟ on various instances of neglect. The sovereignty of the First Republic of Poland 
was successively limited by the naƟ on’s neighbors, and by the end of the 18th 
century Poland was crossed out from the poliƟ cal map of Europe. This was the 
consequence of the country’s feebleness, a regime that diﬀ ered from those of 
the rest of Europe, the specifi c poliƟ cal customs of Poland’s ruling class as well as 
economic underdevelopment. The country’s neighbors aƩ empted to infl uence 
Poland’s internal processes and foreign policies, despite the fact that only two 
hundred years earlier Poland had been among Europe’s great powers.
The Duchy of Warsaw, established in 1807, and – following the defeat of Na-
poleon – the Kingdom of Poland, under the rule of the Russian Tsar, did not allow 
Poland to regain its naƟ onality and sovereignty. Poland’s absence from the inter-
naƟ onal arena was, for some countries, a condiƟ on of equilibrium and stability 
established during the Congress of Vienna. Subsequent uprisings reminded the 
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world of pro-independence tendencies sƟ ll thriving within the country’s society. 
However, a shiŌ  of power and clashing interests of countries created the condi-
Ɵ ons for World War I and, as a result, an internaƟ onal poliƟ cal situaƟ on arose 
that made it possible for Poland to regain its independence.1
The outcomes of World War I were a shock to the present European system. 
Three great monarchies fell: Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia and the German Em-
pire. The victors, i.e. England, France and the United States, creates a new align-
ment of poliƟ cal power on the Old ConƟ nent. Its legal and poliƟ cal voice was 
expressed in the Treaty of Versailles; the Covenant of the League of NaƟ ons was 
its integral element. It was interpreted as a new system of common security. In 
pracƟ ce, however, it did not fulfi ll its expectaƟ ons. The causes for this are not 
limited to the insƟ tuƟ onal insuﬃ  ciencies of the League of NaƟ ons.2
In November of 1918 Poland regained its longed-for independence. The re-
establishment of Poland as a country, aŌ er 123 years of bondage, armed baƩ les 
and conspiracies was an important even in Europe’s history. The reborn Republic 
of Poland had to face many problems, and faced them as a result of military and 
diplomaƟ c acƟ ons. Poland was in a diﬃ  cult internaƟ onal situaƟ on as Germany 
and Russia did not agree with the Treaty of Versailles and aƩ empted it have it 
revised.3 The security of the Second Republic had a special signifi cance. In this 
situaƟ on it was necessary to employ intelligence to discover the intenƟ ons of 
the countries bordering Poland to both the east and the west.4 The Second Re-
public’s diplomacy conducted its operaƟ ons in diﬃ  cult condiƟ ons, aƩ empƟ ng to 
protect the very existence of the country.5 It was a task that must be interpreted 
in the context of hosƟ le and revisionary tendencies in the foreign policies of the 
neighboring superpowers. The Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs aƩ empted to ensure 
the safety of Poland via pacts with selected countries, uƟ lizing, inter alia, the 
common security system of the League of NaƟ ons. 
The “Versailles Dictate” psychosis, from which the Weimar Republic suﬀ ered, 
had an impact on Berlin-Warsaw relaƟ ons. The Germans considered their east-
ern border to be the eﬀ ect of a pact between France and Great Britain6. Poland’s 
safety was threatened by both its eastern and western neighbors. This is why 
the Second Republic’s secret services tried to determine the intenƟ ons of the 
1 R. Kuźniar, Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczpospolitej, Warszawa 2008, 
p.11.
2 A.D. Roƞ eld, Bezpieczeństwo centrum a peryferie: rosyjskie koncepcje polityczne [in:] 
Modernizacja Centrum Peryferie. red. W. Borodziej i S. Dębski, Warszawa 2009, pgs. 
377–378.
3 S. Dębski, Między Berlinem a Moskwą. Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941, 
Warszawa 2003, p. 55–88.
4 H. Ćwięk, W tajnej służbie II Rzeczypospolitej. Wywiad polski wobec Niemiec w latach 
1918–1939, Częstochowa 2009, p.11 and following.
5 R. Kuźniar, op. cit., pgs. 12–15.
6 P.P. Wieczorkiewicz, Polityka zagraniczna II Rzeczpospolitej na tle sytuacji europejskiej 
w latach 1918–1939 [in:] Z dziejów Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 1986, pgs. 
80–81.
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country’s potenƟ al opponents. The operaƟ ons of Poland’s secret services dur-
ing the interwar period was focused within one insƟ tuƟ on and answered to one 
enƟ ty – the Second Division of the General Staﬀ  of the Polish Army. The Division 
conveyed informaƟ on necessary to reach important decisions to the army com-
manders and government. The Second Division also counteracted espionage. 
It was a signifi cant aid to the ruling body and infl uenced the acƟ viƟ es of other 
government insƟ tuƟ ons. It was composed of several departments, and each de-
partment had a fi xed number of secƟ ons. The Second Division played the most 
important role – intelligence. The Department included “West” and “East” sec-
Ɵ ons, a radio-intelligence secƟ on and technical secƟ on. Reconnaissance of bor-
dering countries was conducted via branch oﬃ  ces supervised by the “West” and 
“East” secƟ ons, and located outside of the country. Russia and Germany’s hosƟ le 
aƫ  tude towards Poland charted the route for joint ventures.7
In July of 1919 General Hans von Seeckt presided over a special commiƩ ee 
which was to organize a new army in condiƟ ons of peace. The General tried to 
sidestep the limits of the Versailles condiƟ ons, not wanƟ ng to draw the aƩ enƟ on 
of the coaliƟ on and to enable Germany to endure unƟ l the country could regain its 
freedom and introduce mandatory military service. Von Seeckt organized a pro-
fessional Reichswehr – the miniature version of a great army. It was to include all 
the elements of the planned, but at for the Ɵ me being future, army. Armament 
was a signifi cant problem. General Seeckt considered modifying manufacturing 
plants for military producƟ on, yet German industry was under the control of the 
CoaliƟ on. A soluƟ on was to transfer producƟ on outside of the country. Russia 
turned out to be the most suitable country for that purpose. 
Russian leaders were eager for an alliance with Germany due to common 
enemies, yet their objecƟ ves were diﬀ erent. In 1920 Lenin spoke of the problem 
as follows: “[…] Germany wants revenge, we want a revoluƟ on. At this moment 
we have the same interests. But when our paths diverge Germany will be our 
greatest enemy. Time will show whether the rubble of Europe will become the 
foundaƟ ons for a German hegemony or a communist federaƟ on [...]”.8 The Sec-
ond Division of the General Staﬀ  determined that following the war Germany and 
Russia cooperated on: poliƟ cal, military and industry-related levels. Undoubtedly 
military cooperaƟ on was most signifi cant and it was the focus of Poland’s secret 
services. The Red Army and Reichswehr began cooperaƟ ng in 1919/1920. Ger-
many sold military equipment that remained from the period of the First World 
War. 
Poland’s war with Bolshevik Russia in the years 1919-1920 animated Ger-
man-Russian contacts.9 In July of the same year, during the peak of the Bolshevik 
7 J. Wieliczka, Reichswehra a Armia Czerwona. Nawiązanie kontaktów i pierwsze poro-
zumienia 1919–1923, “Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego”, 1994, z. 112, 
pgs. 73–74.
8 Ibidem, p.74.
9 L. Grosfeld, Polska a stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1919–1939, Warszawa 1988, pgs. 
5–7.
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oﬀ ense in Poland, the German government and leaders aƩ empted to establish 
whether Russian armies would stop at the border with Germany or conƟ nue on-
wards. Germany perceived the perspecƟ ve of returning to its prewar eastern bor-
der and a change in the Versailles order. This concept was propagated not only 
in military circles, especially Hans von Seeckt. Chancellor Joseph Wirth was an 
advocate of the German-Bolshevik alliance – whose blade was directed towards 
Poland. In July of 1920 the German government proclaimed neutrality. It avoided 
direct involvement with the Russians, fearing the reacƟ on of western countries. 
Neutrality was linked with, inter alia, prohibiƟ on of the transportaƟ on of military 
resources and materials through Germany. Polish secret services discovered that 
many German oﬃ  cers and specialists served in the Red Army. Russians were us-
ing German weapons, ammuniƟ on and aircraŌ . 
AŌ er the end of the Polish-Russian war military cooperaƟ on between the Re-
ichswehr and the Red Army further developed. In September of 1921 both parƟ es 
conducted secret negoƟ aƟ ons to assist Germany in the development of its arms 
industry. Generals OƩ o Hasse and Leonid Krasin parƟ cipated in the negoƟ aƟ ons. 
The Kruppa Plant constructed Factory No. 8 in Moscow, which was to manufac-
ture arƟ llery guns, while the German Bresol built a poisonous gas plant in Trakai. 
Both sides also signed an agreement to help Germany manufacture ammuniƟ on 
in Tula, Petrograd as well as other locaƟ ons. In October of 1921 a conference was 
held in Berlin, parƟ cipated by a Russian delegaƟ on, as well as General Seeckt. He 
accepted the necessity for Germany to assign considerable funds to arm the Red 
Army. Russia turned to Seeckt for military assistance in the aƩ ack on Poland. He 
supported their plans and assured that Germany would remain neutral. The Gen-
eral ordered that the Junkers plants in Dessau commence manufacturing aircraŌ  
for the Russian Army, so that it might prepare for its aƩ ack on Poland.
At the start of 1922 the German government, thanks to the support of Chan-
cellor J. Wirth, alloƩ ed the Reichswehr150 million marks to be invested in the 
military industry within the territory of Russia. In order to manage the funds cor-
rectly, Germany created an expenditure agency – Sondergruppe “R” (Russland) 
– which was directed by Major Fischer. He also maintained ongoing relaƟ ons with 
the heads of both armies concerning military investments in Russia.10.
The Treaty of Rapallo, signed on the 16th of April 1922, created the framework 
for the ulƟ mate normalizaƟ on of Russian-German relaƟ ons. ArƟ cles 1 and 2 of 
the treaty revoked all Russian claims for compensaƟ on arising from ArƟ cle 166 of 
the Treaty of Versailles, as well as German claims for compensaƟ on for property 
and rights arisen through the applicaƟ on of Russian laws and measures. ArƟ cle 3 
pertained to reassuming diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons. ArƟ cle 4 contained a clause accord-
ing to which both countries would be perceived as favored. ArƟ cle 5 obligated 
10 M. Pirko, Ręka w rękę z Reichswehrą przeciw Polsce, część I, “Wojsko i Wychowanie”, 
Warszawa 1992, nr 2, s.46–49; A. A. Achtamzjan, Wojennoje sotrudniczestwo ZSRR 
i Germanii w 1920–1933, (po nowym dokumentam), [in:] Nowaja i nowiejszaja istoria, 
1990, pgs. 3–25.
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both countries to treat their mutual economic needs with goodwill. Both parƟ es 
also exchanged undisclosed annotaƟ ons.11
AŌ er the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo cooperaƟ on between Germany and 
Russia (and later the Soviet Union) conƟ nued to develop. Many agreements were 
signed. Germany obtained a few dozen trade and industry concessions in the 
Soviet Union. The fi rst gave Germany the right to purchase Russian products and 
sell them abroad. Industry concessions were made to aƩ ract foreign capital in 
order to restore the Russian economy. Germany played the largest role in this 
process. German plants became the main source of loans for the Soviet Union. 
The interest of industry circles would not have been as great were it not for the 
development of military cooperaƟ on. During the early 1920s the AssociaƟ on for 
the Support of Industrial Undertakings (Gefu) was formed, with headquarters in 
Berlin and Moscow. Germans alloƩ ed appropriate funds to cover the investment. 
The Junkers Company was given the responsibilityfor the manufacture of 300 
fi ghter aircraŌ  a year in Fili near Moscow, of which 60 were sold to the Russians, 
and the remaining aircraŌ  were used by the Reichswehr for training purposes. 
The Kruppa plant erected an arƟ llery manufacturing plant in Moscow, and in 
Manych, located near Rostov-on-Don, a tank manufacturing plant. German engi-
neers were employed in all plants. Supervision was also conducted by Germans. 
The equipment was tested in Soviet tesƟ ng ranges.12
Contact between Germany and Russia grew increasingly close. Ambassador 
Ulrich von Brockdorﬀ –Rantzau maintained close relaƟ ons with Commissar Geor-
gy Vasilyevich Chicherin, which was interpreted by Moscow’s diplomaƟ c corps as 
an apparent aƩ empt to handle certain maƩ ers via the informal route. The fact 
that Germany applied the principles of the Treaty of Rapallo in other republics in 
November of 1922 was viewed as the country’s approval of the emerging Soviet 
Union. 
Both countries saw the signifi cance of military cooperaƟ on. A discussion re-
garding the Reichswehr’s cooperaƟ on with the Red Army, conducted in the sum-
mer of 1922, brought the two countries closer. Admiral Hintze and Colonel Bauer 
drove to Moscow, while air force commanders Swieczin and Lazariev, traveled to 
Berlin to discuss air force cooperaƟ on. Russian leaders procured addiƟ onal funds 
for armament from the budget. As an example, 35 million rubles in gold were as-
signed to the air force. In August of the same year Major Fischer arrived in Mos-
cow to discuss important military arrangements. Germany wanted to conduct 
acƟ viƟ es in Russia that they were prohibited to conduct under the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. This included the following: acquiring military technical knowledge, con-
ducƟ ng tacƟ cal tests with the use of various types of weapons as well as educat-
ing groups of qualifi ed specialists who could later assist in military operaƟ ons. 
Germany wanted the Red Army to provide its own military bases, suitable 
for air force, armored vehicle and war gas tesƟ ng, as well as freedom to conduct 
11 J. Krasuski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1919–1932, Poznań 1975, pgs. 29–31.
12 A. Skrzypek, Nie spełniony sojusz? Stosunki sowiecko-niemieckie 1917–1941, Warsza-
wa 1992, pgs. 29–31.
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technical trials with the use of various weapons and the possibility of exchang-
ing experience and informaƟ on. The Russians received payment in exchange for 
leasing bases, access to technical trial results as well as theoreƟ cal and technical 
informaƟ on.13
Germany strove to strengthen its infl uence over the Red Army. Frequent mili-
tary contacts assisted in this aim. German oﬃ  cers trained the Soviet Army’s staﬀ ; 
in test ranges, during shared maneuvers and in training faciliƟ es. They provided 
them with professional equipment and weapons. In 1924 a special bureau was 
formed in Berlin which helped acquire “white oﬃ  cers” for service within the So-
viet Union. The Second Division obtained informaƟ on that the bureau helped in 
procuring approximately 800 persons – to be employed in the Red Army. This 
group was mainly comprised of aviaƟ on, arƟ llery and technical oﬃ  cers. They 
were obligated to change their last names and cease all anƟ communist propa-
ganda. The leaders of the Soviet Union oﬀ ered each a salary and a sum of 3 thou-
sand Deutsche Marks in gold, and a promoƟ on of one rank. German military 
commanders conducted a recruitment process for service in the Soviet Union. 
They searched for oﬃ  cers and non-commissioned oﬃ  cers who knew Russian. 
At the beginning of the 1920s instructors were in great demand. Annually, a few 
hundred persons began work as instructors. Germans held responsible posiƟ ons 
as advisors of the Red Army’s command. They also parƟ cipated in organizaƟ onal 
changes introduced by their allies. A German military center operated in Moscow 
– it served as an advisory agency for the Red Army14. 
Investments in the Junkers plants were of great importance to German-Soviet 
cooperaƟ on in the fi eld of aviaƟ on. An aircraŌ  manufacturing plant was erected 
in Fili near Moscow. German infl uences encompassed Soviet aviaƟ on plants in 
Samara, Saratov, Taganrog and Oleksandrivsk. The Junkers plant was liquidated 
in the mid-1920s. Only maintenance faciliƟ es owned by the Russian-German 
DeruluŌ  remained. The aviaƟ on plant was liquidated as a result of diﬀ erent ap-
proaches by the two countries to producƟ on condiƟ ons. Germany, due to its 
considerable defi cit, terminated its credit agreement with the Soviets. Personnel 
and equipment were transported back to Germany. Yet the Soviets commenced 
their own producƟ on.15 An important joint venture was the German test center 
and aviaƟ on school established in Lipetsk in the mid-1920s,16 fi nanced by Ger-
many. A large complex of producƟ on halls, workshops, hangars, and training 
and residenƟ al buildings was built within the vicinity of two runways, nota bene 
modernized by the Reichswehr. The aviaƟ on center and school were created and 
maintained in great secrecy. AdministraƟ ve supervision over the structures was 
carried out by Germans. Approximately 200 Germans were employed there in 
total, of which almost half was composed of technical personnel and instructors. 
13 J. Wieliczka, op. cit. pgs. 80–81; J. Erickson, The Soviet High Command, Standford 
1966, p. 155.
14 CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka…, op. cit., pgs. 37–45.
15 A. Pepłoński, Wywiad polski na ZSRR 1921–1939, Warszawa 1996, p. 314.
16 CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka…, op. cit., pgs. 55–59.
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During the summer months approximately 70 persons were trained to become 
fi ghter aircraŌ  pilots. 
We should also menƟ on cooperaƟ on in the area of training and develop-
ment of higher-ranked commanders. Generals and higher-ranked oﬃ  cers of the 
Red Army took part in special training and aƩ ended military schools in Germany. 
Special courses were also organized for the oﬃ  cers of the General Staﬀ . Among 
parƟ cipants were Georgy KonstanƟ novich Zhukov and Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukh-
achevsky. High-ranked German oﬃ  cers, including Generals Werner Blomberg and 
Kurt Hammerstein, parƟ cipated in the Red Army’s operaƟ ons.17 In the 1920s the 
Soviet Union saw the alliance with Germany as a form of security, stability and 
mutual benefi ts – not adventure or risk. Funds and technical support were need-
ed in order to industrialize the country. Advisors were needed to form a strong 
Red Army, and – on the internaƟ onal stage – a counterbalance for English-French 
pressure. All this could be oﬀ ered by Germany, and the Soviet Union was pre-
pared to pay the necessary price. In the mid-1930s Germany had a staﬀ  of several 
thousand educated oﬃ  cers. Many well-known air force or armored weapons of-
fi cers were trained in Soviet schools, including von Blomberg, who later became 
the Minister of War. We should interpret the close Ɵ es that linked Germany and 
their Russian comrades within this very context – which later had tragic conse-
quences for many oﬃ  cers of the Red Army.18 In autumn of 1926 the Soviet Union 
delegated 25 Reichswehr oﬃ  cers to examine oﬃ  cer training methods employed 
in Russian universiƟ es. Some parƟ cipated in Soviet military operaƟ ons. Germany 
invited a few dozen Soviet oﬃ  cers to return the favor. Some parƟ cipated in the 
Reichswehr maneuvers, whilst others became acquainted with the organizaƟ on 
of the German General Staﬀ . 
In the second half of the 1920s a test range was formed east of Kazan, in the 
Izhevsk over the Kama River. The range was erected by the Reichswehr and called 
the Kama.19 Here Germans conducted training, tests with the use of tanks and 
compared the strength of weapons manufactured in various countries. Training 
was intended for tank commanders as well as campaign and tank formaƟ on lead-
ers – both German and Russian. The Reichswehr’s oﬃ  cers, allowed leave from 
service for the Ɵ me-being, comprised most of those who aƩ ended the training. 
Training was conducted by German oﬃ  cers and engineers. Training cycles en-
compassed theoreƟ cal and pracƟ cal courses conducted from the end of April un-
Ɵ l the beginning of December. During the winter courses were conducted in the 
Mechanized Army Training Center in Berlin. 
Tanks manufactured by various plants (Rheinmetall, Krupp, Daimler and Ess-
lingen) were tested on the Kama test range. The plants also manufactured armor 
as well as opƟ cal and radio equipment. Components were transported to Szc-
zecin, and later via the sea to Leningrad. The assembly plant was located in the 
17 L. Grosfeld, op. cit., pgs. 7–8.
18 S. Haﬀ ner, Diabelski pakt. Z dziejów stosunków niemiecko-rosyjskich 1917–1941, Lu-
blin 1994, pgs. 92–98.
19 CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka…, op. cit., pgs. 49–54.
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test range. Polish intelligence had informaƟ on about the range’s users.20 Apart 
from Kama, one more test range was operaƟ onal in the Soviet Union – the Ka-
torg – where experiments were conducted with tanks and armored weapons. 
Its organizaƟ on resembled that of the Kama.21 The Tom test range is also worth 
noƟ ng – as it was here that tests were conducted with the use of military gas. 
The range was composed of several plants (Tomysłowskij Kombinat) that manu-
factured explosives, poisonous gases as well as arƟ llery missiles. Apart from test 
ranges, there were also several arƟ llery ranges. Many experiment faciliƟ es were 
formed for the needs of the German military industry. In Professor Konrich’s labo-
ratory, located in the Berlin Hygiene InsƟ tute, aƩ empts were made, inter alia, to 
treat mustard gas wounds. Professor Flury conducted biological experiments in 
Würzburg. Research concerning poisonous gases was conducted in the InsƟ tute 
of Chemistry at the Berlin InsƟ tute of Technology, under the supervision of Pro-
fessor Werner.22
As German engineers and mechanics were traveling to the Soviet Union to 
work, a special training course was organized in Berlin in 1931. They were to as-
semble aircraŌ  engines purchased in Germany and train Soviet mechanics and 
workers. The Second Division obtained informaƟ on about the universal coop-
eraƟ on between both countries, confi rmed – inter alia – by German shipments. 
Krupp Plants sold steel blocks to the Soviet Union, where they were made into 
steel plates for heavy arƟ llery. Russians also ordered modern equipment from 
German plants.23 An important element of cooperaƟ on between the Reichswehr 
and the Red Army was the exchange of informaƟ on among high-ranking oﬃ  cers 
concerning the armies of other countries.24 Materials that interested both par-
Ɵ es were prepared by designated military experts. CooperaƟ on of this type com-
menced in the second half of the 1920s. Guidelines established during this period 
show that the Soviet Union prepared informaƟ on concerning military industry, 
military orders and items manufactured for the military needs of other countries. 
Germany focused on a reconnaissance of personnel and the mobilizaƟ on poten-
Ɵ als of foreign countries. German-Soviet friendship lasted as long as the Weimar 
Republic. In 1933, a Ɵ me of radical poliƟ cal changes in Germany, relaƟ ons be-
tween the two countries were no longer as friendly. An alliance with France was 
to guarantee Poland safety during the interwar period, despite fl uctuaƟ ng rela-
Ɵ ons between Warsaw and Paris25. Of lesser signifi cance were Poland’s military 
and poliƟ cal associaƟ ons with Romania. Germany’s strong posiƟ on in the West, 
a consequence of the Locarno conference, was further enhanced by a nonaggres-
sion and neutrality pact signed with the Soviet Union in 1926. 
20 A. Pepłoński, op. cit., pgs. 318–319.
21 CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka…, op. cit., pgs. 52–55.
22 CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Doświadczalny obóz “Tomka”, Opracowanie Oddziału II SG, 
pgs. 1–6.
23 A. Pepłoński, op. cit., pgs. 319–320.
24 CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka…, op. cit., pgs. 45–47.
25 P.P. Wieczorkiewicz, op. cit., p. 80.
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In 1922 a period began that lasted 12 years: a period of struggle between Hit-
ler and Stalin. Both dictators had an extremely strong will, poliƟ cal skills, imagina-
Ɵ on, courage, a great resistance and were capable of being cruel with no scruples. 
Both held supreme power in their countries.26 Previously, German policies con-
cerning the East and Russian policies concerning the Weimar Republic were the 
outcome of poliƟ cal confl icts and consideraƟ ons. Even Lenin had problems with 
his own party. In the new reality of Germany, only Hitler’s decisions maƩ ered; 
in the Soviet Union only Stalin had supreme power. In order to comprehend the 
genesis of the cruelty of this era we must understand the personaliƟ es of both 
dictators. This undoubtedly, on the one hand, simplifi es the maƩ er, and on the 
other – complicates it, as it is easier to assess the mechanisms of one person’s be-
havior than to comprehend the sum of views and interests that impact on a given 
poliƟ cal regime. Yet what was really on the minds of Hitler and Stalin, what they 
really wanted to accomplish, has not been fully explained or documented. 
Hitler’s rise to power in January of 1933 caused a signifi cant deterioraƟ on 
in German-Soviet relaƟ ons.27 ReacƟ ons of the Soviet press concerning poliƟ cal 
changes in Germany were restrained. At fi rst IzvesƟ a did not comment on the 
groundbreaking changes in Germany. Pravda wrote of the great wall dividing the 
ideologies of communism and fascism. Soviet newspapers, in accordance with 
the government’s direcƟ ves, refrained from assessing and portraying Hitler and 
his foreign poliƟ cs. 
German diplomats operated in accordance with predefi ned principles. The 
Ambassador of the Third Reich to Moscow, Herbert von Dirksen, as well as the 
Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, KonstanƟ n von Neurath, assured Soviet poliƟ cians 
and diplomats that Germany wanted to maintain their current policies concern-
ing the Soviet Union, and aƩ acks on communist ideology were only a fragment of 
the Reichstag’s pre-elecƟ on campaign. 
Many months passed before Russia understood that Hitler was not a typical 
right-wing poliƟ cian, and that their friendship with the Germans had come to an 
end. It was possible that many had read “Mein Kampf” only aŌ er Hitler’s rise to 
power. Some assessed it negaƟ vely. Despite the friendship ulƟ mately crumbling, 
some threads remained for a limited period. In May of 1933 a delegaƟ on of high-
ranked oﬃ  cers, under the command of General von Bockelberg, arrived in Mos-
cow to conduct a meeƟ ng with the Red Army’s staﬀ . The visit was conducted in an 
atmosphere of mutual understanding and good will. Events were planned for the 
guests in a posiƟ ve atmosphere. All members of the Soviet Union’s War Council 
were present. Voroshilov expressed the desire to maintain relaƟ ons between the 
two armies. Before Bockelberg and his associates, who received a warm fare-
well, managed to arrive in Berlin, Russia had also rejected the proposal to parƟ ci-
pate in all military training conducted in Germany. The Soviets believed that they 
had received reliable informaƟ on concerning von Papen providing informaƟ on 
26 S. Haﬀ ner, op. cit., p. 106.
27 A. Skrzypek, op. cit., pgs. 56–57.
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on Russian-German cooperaƟ on to the French Ambassador to Berlin, André 
François-Poncet.28
Hitler’s verbal aƩ acks on the Soviet Union were in unique contradicƟ on to the 
development of trade relaƟ ons between the two countries. According to Hans 
von Herwarth, Germany had no reason to feel anxious knowing that export to 
Germany was being conducted without complicaƟ ons. Hitler was perfectly aware 
of this contradicƟ on and was eager to maintain it. In 1935 the Minister of Econo-
my and the Head of the Bank of the Third Reich, Hjalmar Schacht oﬀ ered Russia 
a substanƟ al loan. Russia accepted the loan but, to the surprise of the Germans, 
intended to use it to fund military equipment. Hitler, however, did not agree to 
such a soluƟ on. The discrepancy between the words and the acƟ ons of the Chan-
cellor of Germany were explained by the priority of economic development over 
the purity of Nazi doctrine. Schacht paid a great deal of aƩ enƟ on to the develop-
ment of the arms industry. Hermann Göring, who could not be accused of pro-
Soviet sympathies, as the representaƟ ve for the four-year plan, appreciated the 
benefi ts of trade with the Soviet Union. Oﬃ  cials delegated to the Department of 
Foreign Aﬀ airs saw defi nite benefi ts of the improvement in German-Russia rela-
Ɵ ons. Göring’s cousin, the ministry aƩ orney in the oﬃ  ce of the representaƟ ve of 
the four year plan, was an ardent advocate of trade with the Soviet Union as the 
Russians paid part of their dues in gold. Germans were anxious about their bal-
ance of payments, burdened by foreign loans.29
Growing confl ict between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union took the shape 
of an ideological baƩ le between fascism and communism. The Nazis eradicated 
all opposiƟ onal groups during this Ɵ me. The confl ict was further emphasized by 
criƟ cism of the Soviet Union’s poliƟ cal regime (this criƟ cism went beyond the 
norms accepted in internaƟ onal relaƟ ons), as well as the promoƟ on of maxims 
which were aimed against the integrity of the Soviet Union as a country and were 
oŌ en emphasized in the speeches of many prominent Nazis.30
Polish intelligence could determine that Soviet leaders employed restricƟ ons 
regarding German professionals.31 In November of 1937 approximately 400 spe-
cialists were arrested. DiplomaƟ c intervenƟ ons brought no results. A few dozen 
were deported back to Germany following an interrogaƟ on which determined 
that they were guilty of espionage, sabotage and maintained secret contacts with 
German diplomacy. Among those deported was an oﬃ  cial of the German consul-
ate in Kiev. Soviet leaders also demanded that Rudolf Sommer, the General Con-
sul of the Reich in Leningrad, be removed from his posiƟ on, accusing him of espi-
onage and sabotage. Soviet security agencies employed various methods during 
proceedings. Those detained were forced into admiƫ  ng to crimes they had not 
commiƩ ed. They were informed that Germany was not interested in their fate. 
28 S. Haﬀ ner, op. cit., pgs. 102–104.
29 H. Herwarth, Między Hitlerem a Stalinem. Wspomnienia dyplomaty i ofi cera niemiec-
kiego, Warszawa 1992, pgs. 168–169.
30 A Skrzypek, op. cit., pgs. 68–69.
31 A Pepłoński, op. cit., p. 320.
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During the invesƟ gaƟ on all contact with the detained was cut oﬀ . If someone had 
a Russian friend, they would fi nd out that she was arrested, confessed and had 
given incriminaƟ ng evidence. At Ɵ mes certain individuals were confronted with 
the prisoners, allegedly before deportaƟ on or execuƟ on. OŌ en prisoners were 
blackmailed by being told that their wives would receive compromising photo-
graphs. Prisoners were interrogated for many hours during the day and oŌ en 
also at night. When this gave no results – harsher methods were used. Everyone 
confessed to the crimes they were accused of – sooner or later. Nazis, as revenge, 
planned to arrest Soviet ciƟ zens residing in Germany, but to treat them quite dif-
ferently. DiplomaƟ c circles criƟ cized this idea.32
Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky’s trial aƩ racted the interests of Polish se-
cret services, as well as the physical liquidaƟ on of the Red Army’s oﬃ  cers – of 
all ranks. Both the party and the economic-administraƟ ve apparatus were the 
subject of waves of ruthlessly conducted repression, which peaked in 1937.33 In 
June of that year the people were informed of the alleged treason of the army 
commanders. The trial was confi denƟ al and short. ExecuƟ ons took place the day 
aŌ er the verdict. Those executed included: Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, 
Ion Jakir, August Kork, Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich, Vitaly Markovich Primakov, 
Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna and Robert Eideman. Following these execuƟ ons, tens 
of thousands of oﬃ  cers of higher and middle rank were executed. This massa-
cre during peaceƟ me was an unprecedented event in the history of the civilized 
world. As a result of the so-called purges of 1930 approximately 90 percent of 
higher-ranked oﬃ  cers were replaced, as well as over half of middle-ranked com-
manding oﬃ  cers. The command of the Soviet Armed Forces was disorganized. 
Stalin accused his vicƟ ms of secret contact with the German government. 
AŌ er rising to power, Adolf Hitler announced preparaƟ ons for the plan to re-
vise the borders. Even during the beginning of his command Hitler emphasized 
that in order to regain poliƟ cal power the Third Reich must construct a powerful 
army that would enable the country to “gain new living space in the East and Ger-
manize it ruthlessly”.34 The Reich Chancellor undertook acƟ ons to quickly prepare 
the country for war35. During one of the fi rst government deliberaƟ ons Hitler de-
clared that armament would be of absolute priority36. Marshal Józef Piłsudski 
carefully observed the development of poliƟ cal events in the Third Reich. He 
believed that “[…] Hitler is rather an Austrian, by no means a Prussian. This fact 
32 H. Herwarth, op. cit., p. 173–174.
33 A. Pepłoński, op. cit., p. 301; J. Smaga, Narodziny i upadek imperium ZSRR 1917–1991, 
Kraków 1992, pgs. 106–108; A. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 84; More on the topic: P. P. Wie-
czorkiewicz, Łańcuch śmierci. Czystka w Armii Czerwonej 1937–1939, Warszawa 
2001.
34 W. Kozaczuk, Wehrmacht 1933–1939, Warszawa 1978, p. 98.
35 M. Zgórniak, Europa w przededniu wojny. Sytuacja militarna w latach 1938–1939, Kra-
ków 1993, p. 19.
36 S. Żerko, Niemiecka polityka zagraniczna w przededniu II wojny światowej [in:] Kryzys 
1939 roku w interpretacjach polskich i rosyjskich historyków, red. S. Dębski i M. Narin-
ski, Warszawa 2009, p. 88.
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creates a new situaƟ on as old Prussian tradiƟ ons were greatly permeated with 
hatred towards Poland[...]”.37 Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs Józef Beck, during delib-
eraƟ ons of the Sejm Foreign Aﬀ airs CommiƩ ee in mid-February of 1933 empha-
sized that “[…] our aƫ  tude towards Germany and its maƩ ers will be exactly the 
same as Germany’s aƫ  tude towards Poland”.38
Poland’s policy regarding Germany and the Soviet Union has special signifi -
cance.39 It was not unƟ l 1926 that Poland managed to sign an agreement with 
Germany concerning the regulaƟ on of border relaƟ ons. In 1934 a nonaggression 
declaraƟ on was signed by Germany and Poland. It was a limited-term truce. Mar-
shal Piłsudski had no doubts concerning Nazi Germany’s intenƟ ons. At the same 
Ɵ me, relaƟ ons with the Soviet Union developed diﬀ erently. Poland did not ac-
knowledge the country unƟ l the end of 1923. A nonaggression pact was signed 
nine years later. Agreements with the Third Reich and the Soviet Union caused 
Warsaw’s lack of interest in France’s aƩ empts to extend the Locarno principles to 
cover Eastern Europe. 
IdenƟ fi caƟ on of Germany’s intenƟ ons was of especial signifi cance for Po-
land. The acƟ viƟ es of the Second Republic’s intelligence in the fi rst part of the 
1920s leŌ  much to be desired. The situaƟ on changed in 1926 when RiƩ meister 
Jerzy Sosnowski organized an intelligence facility in Berlin under the codename 
“In. 3”. Its agents stole the most important secrets from the German Ministry 
of War. The commanding staﬀ  of the Second Division gained access to informa-
Ɵ on concerning the expansion of German armed forces and the Reichswehr’s 
cooperaƟ on with the Red Army.40 The seeds of the future German military power 
were planted in the Soviet Union. An intelligence agency by the codename “I.A.” 
funcƟ oned within the German capital – and played an observaƟ on-informaƟ on 
role. It facilitated the work of other agencies. It also uƟ lized its own agency. In 
the years 1929-1930 the agency uncovered: German-Soviet cooperaƟ on and 
armament of the Weimar Republic. Polish intelligence strived to discover the 
development potenƟ al of the Third Reich’s army. In Germany, the West SecƟ on 
conducted deep intelligence with unlimited scope.41 It was assisted by domesƟ c 
agencies. The West SecƟ on supervised the operaƟ ons of agencies uƟ lized during 
peace and war condiƟ ons. The Third Reich was divided into regions within which 
Polish intelligence agencies operated. They were present in all German industry 
and economy centers. Many agencies were located within the oﬃ  ces of Polish 
diplomats. An agency was, usually, led by an intelligence oﬃ  cer commissioned 
and engaged by the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs.42
37 Cyt za: P. P. Wieczorkiewicz, Polityka zagraniczna..., op. cit., p. 87.
38 Ibidem.
39 R. Kuźniar, op. cit., p 14.
40 More on the topic: H. Ćwięk, Rotmistrz Sosnowski. As wywiadu Drugiej Rzeczypospo-
litej, Kraków 2010, passim.
41 CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 62, Sprawozdanie prac dokonanych przez Referat “Zachód” 
w 1932 r. oraz program prac na 1933r., z 16 I 1933 r., k. pgs. 35–45.
42 L. Gondek, Wywiad polski w Trzeciej Rzeszy 1933–1939, Warszawa 1982, pgs. 64–72.
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In March of 1935 the Third Reich introduced mandatory military service. The 
Reich had freed itself from the obligaƟ ons of the Treaty of Versailles and cre-
ated the foundaƟ ons for unlimited development of its armed forces.43 The tempo 
imposed by the Nazis for armament and preparaƟ on for the ulƟ mate war re-
quired an eﬀ ecƟ vely funcƟ oning system of terror and propaganda in Germany. 
The naƟ on had to be a submissive and eﬀ ecƟ ve tool in the hands of the Nazi 
party and its commander. Polish intelligence prepared to assess the increasing 
military potenƟ al of the Third Reich. Plans were made to obtain German military 
documents. During this period Germany was reorganizing its armed forces and 
quickening the tempo of armament. Poland aƩ empted to discover the direcƟ ons 
in which Germany’s transformaƟ ons were heading. To accomplish this, Poland 
searched for valuable agents – i.e. agents who had access to organizaƟ onal, train-
ing and mobilizaƟ on informaƟ on. Resident spies were staƟ oned in Germany who 
facilitated the operaƟ ons of agents. Upon the liquidaƟ on of the “In. 3” facility 
Polish intelligence in the Third Reich suﬀ ered a crisis, accompanied by the slower 
operaƟ ons of the secret services.44 The Second Division had diﬃ  culty in dividing 
its work between peace operaƟ ons and war preparaƟ ons. During the period of 
peace, intelligence was concerned with forms of baƩ le with the enemy. Informa-
Ɵ on was collected, andits synthesis, elaborated by agencies, provided the basis 
for the decisions of the Commander in Chief. During the period of greater danger 
from the Third Reich, inner branch oﬃ  ces intensifi ed their operaƟ ons.45
Germany’s Plans concerning Czechoslovakia did not provoke anegaƟ ve reac-
Ɵ on from Minister Beck46. Warsaw’s policies during the Sudeten crisis and the 
ulƟ matum to take over the disputed territory of Śląsk Zaolziański had a negaƟ ve 
impact on Poland’s image on the internaƟ onal stage and exacerbated the coun-
try’s situaƟ on. Some compared the Republic to a hyena preying on the vicƟ m of 
the Munich Agreement. They believed that Minister Beck was disloyal, deceiƞ ul 
and in league with Hitler. Many prominent individuals of the western world be-
lieved that Poland did not deserve any assistance if threated by German aggres-
sion. Even Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, who was acƟ ve in Munich, assessed 
Poland’s acƟ ons with disdain. The Foreign Oﬃ  ce also criƟ cized Poland’s acƟ ons. 
The German diplomats who were unaware of Hitler’s plans suggested that the 
country uƟ lize the favorable condiƟ ons and demand the surrender of Gdansk 
to the Reich and its joining to East Prussia.. Ernst von Weizsäcker assured the 
Head of the Abwehr, Wilhelm Franz Canaris, that Great Britain and France would 
remain neutral in the case of a Poland-Germany confl ict.47 Hitler’s plans were 
43 M. Wojciechowski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933–1938, Poznań 1980, s. 164; 
W. Kozaczuk, Bitwa o tajemnice. Służby wywiadowcze Polski i Rzeszy niemieckiej 
1922–1939, Warszawa 1978, pgs. 374–375.
44 L. Gondek, op. cit., p. 61.
45 CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 63, Sprawozdanie z działalności Ekspozytury nr 3, za lata 1935–
1936, z 18 II 1936 r., k. pgs. 27–50.
46 P.P. Wieczorkiewicz, op. cit., pgs. 94–95.
47 S. Żerko, op. cit., pgs. 102–103.
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carried out by Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. On the 24th of September 1938 
von Ribbentrop presented Ambassador Joseph Lipski with a program that was 
to seƩ le disputes in Polish-German relaƟ ons. Minister Beck did not accept the 
proposiƟ ons and demands issued by the Chancellor of the Third Reich. Hitler’s 
declaraƟ on of a nonaggression pact with Poland, issued in the Reichstag in 1939, 
and Beck’s later answer before the Sejm concerning the demands listed therein, 
led to tension between Warsaw and Berlin.
Important supplements to informaƟ on gained by the Polish intelligence were 
the reports and plans elaborated by Lieutenant Colonel Antoni Szymański, a mili-
tary aƩ aché in Berlin. His work was supervised by the Second Division of the Gen-
eral Staﬀ .48 In the spring of 1939 Szymański received interesƟ ng informaƟ on from 
an Estonian military aƩ aché, Lieutenant Colonel Ludwik Jacobsen, who was pres-
ent in the oﬃ  ce of operaƟ ons of General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Military 
Staﬀ , on the 28th of March 1939. When Halder leŌ  for a few moments Jacobsen 
noƟ ced a map (scale of 1: 300 000) of the area from the Elbe River to the east, be-
yond the Bug River. It marked three areas of the Wehrmacht’s concentraƟ on: in 
East Prussia, in Pomerania and Silesia, as well as marked direcƟ ons of aƩ ack: the 
Cracow-Lvov axis, from Szczecin through Pomerania to East Prussia, and through 
the Narew River to the east past the Bug. There could be no doubts concerning 
the reliability of this informaƟ on.49
The spring of 1939 was a period of feverish preparaƟ on of an agency strategic 
network in Germany.50 This was linked with the acƟ vaƟ on of work conducted by 
SecƟ on West, which took place following personnel changes. From March unƟ l 
August of 1939 the Independent West Sector (Samodzielny Referat “Zachód”) 
increased its military staﬀ  in Germany twice. In mid-March of 1939 the oﬃ  cers 
of this secƟ on were staƟ oned in: Königsberg, Lyck, Marienwerder, Steƫ  n, Ham-
burg, Dusseldorf, Berlin, Leipzig, Munich, Breslau and Vienna. In the period be-
fore the start of World War II the General Staﬀ  of the Polish Armed Forces had 
conducted a relaƟ vely good reconnaissance of German armed forces grouped 
around the Polish border, though the informaƟ on was superior for some areas.51 
The reconnaissance was conducted parƟ cularly well for the East Prussia area. 
Intelligence had informaƟ on concerning the deployment of large acƟ ve units and 
defensive units. 
In April of 1939 a pact was formed concerning BriƟ sh assurances for Poland, 
altered in August into a pact of mutual assistance between the two countries. 
48 More on the topic: H. Ćwięk, Polityczno-militarne przygotowania Trzeciej Rzeszy do 
wojny w raportach aƩ aché wojskowego w Berlinie płk. Antoniego Szymańskiego, Czę-
stochowa 2007; A. Szamański, Zły sąsiad. Niemcy 1932–1939 w oświetleniu polskiego 
aƩ aché wojskowego w Berlinie, Londyn 1959.
49 R. Majzner, Polski wywiad wojskowy wobec polityki III Rzeszy 1933–1939, Toruń 2006, 
pgs. 194–195; A. Szymański, op. cit., pgs. 161–162; H. Ćwięk, Polityczno-militarne..., 
op. cit., p. 425.
50 L. Gondek, op. cit., p. 97.
51 A. Woźny, Niemieckie przygotowania do wojny z Polską w ocenach polskich naczelnych 
władz wojskowych w latach 1933–1939, Warszawa 2000, pgs. 303–311.
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In May of the same year a military protocol was signed, staƟ ng that in the event 
of German aggression France would oﬀ er Poland military aid. The Molotov–Rib-
bentrop Pact, signed on the 23rd of August 1939, concerned the preparaƟ ons for 
yet another parƟ Ɵ on of Poland. On the 1st of September 1939 Poland conducted 
armed resistance in a hopeless, from a military point of view, situaƟ on, thus forc-
ing England and France to declare war on Germany. Five years later, Germany 
signed an act of uncondiƟ onal surrender.52 The new internaƟ onal order proposed 
by Stalin, based on a division into zones of infl uence, remained intact unƟ l the 
year 1989.53
Following the lost campaign of September 1939, Poles fought alongside France, 
their ally, and later Great Britain. Their input in the victory of the Allies during 
World War II is underesƟ mated. Poles contributed to the victory against the Third 
Reich not only by parƟ cipaƟ ng in baƩ les.54 Special menƟ on should be made of 
their success on the secret front.55 Facing the threat of war from Hitler’s Germany, 
the heads of the Polish Cipher Bureau, located in Pyry near Warsaw, provided their 
allies – the French and BriƟ sh – with informaƟ on concerning the Enigma and repli-
cas of plans of the machine.56 Poland’s victory over the German Enigma cipher had 
excepƟ onal signifi cance for countries comprising the AnƟ -Hitler coaliƟ on during 
World War II. Thanks to Polish eﬀ orts, the Allies were able to decipher the secret 
correspondence of the Third Reich.57 Polish-BriƟ sh-American radio intelligence co-
operaƟ on had a signifi cant impact on the outcome of the war. 
Various concepts of global security were created following the end of World 
War II. The Charter of the United NaƟ ons, signed in 1945, defi ned the founda-
Ɵ ons of the global security system. During the Cold War the division of the world 
into two opposing zones found its expression in the North AtlanƟ c Treaty, signed 
in 1949, and the Warsaw Pact, formed in 1955. The fall of this bilateral system 
caused poliƟ cians to search for new forms of security. Intermediary forms were 
created; responsibiliƟ es were defi ned. An example is the OrganizaƟ on for Se-
curity and Co-operaƟ on in Europe (OSCE). A diﬀ erent category of security was 
formed within the structures linked with the North AtlanƟ c Alliance, e.g. the Part-
nership for Peace, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine commiƩ ees, and 
others.58
52 J. Nowak-Jeziorański, Kryteria bezpieczeństwa [in:] Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzyna-
rodowego państwa, red. S. Dębski, B. Górka-Winter, Warszawa 2003, p. 154.
53 S. Dębski, Układ monachijski i pakt Ribbentrop–Mołotow siedemdziesiąt lat później 
– problemy, interpretacje, oddziaływanie [in:] Kryzys 1939 roku w interpretacjach pol-
skich i rosyjskich historyków, red. S. Dębski, M. Narinski, Warszawa 2009, p. 15.
54 A. D. Roƞ eld, Polska w niepewnym świecie, Warszawa 2006, pgs. 329–330.
55 More on the topic: Polsko-brytyjska współpraca wywiadowcza podczas II wojny świa-
towej, t. I Ustalenia Polsko-Brytyjskiej Komisji Historycznej, red. T. Dubicki, D. Nałęcz, 
T. SƟ rling, Warszawa 2004; A. Pepłoński, Wywiad polskich sił zbrojnych na Zachodzie 
1939–1945, Warszawa 1995.
56 D. Kahn, Łamacze kodów. Historia kryptologii, Warszawa 2004, p. 1150; M. Grajek, 
Enigma. Bliżej prawdy, Poznań 2007, pgs. 132–133.
57 W. Kozaczuk, Bitwa…, op. cit., pgs. 202–203.
58 More on the topic: A.D. Roƞ eld, Bezpieczeństwo…, op. cit., pgs. 384–399.
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TransformaƟ ons taking place in Poland during the early 1980s led to funda-
mental changes within Europe. Contrary to popular Western opinion, the begin-
ning of the end of totalitarian rule on the Old ConƟ nent was not the destrucƟ on 
of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989, but the acƟ viƟ es of the democraƟ c 
opposiƟ on in Poland. The voice of free people in a country under bondage had 
more power than the greatest armies or the various forces uƟ lized by the Soviet 
Union or its dependent countries comprising the Warsaw Pact. PoliƟ cal changes 
commenced on the Vistula River led to the demise of the Yalta order. Central and 
Eastern European countries had regained their independence. It was the end of 
the bilateral world.59
Regime transformaƟ ons commenced in Poland in the late 1980s created the 
opportunity to construct new foundaƟ ons for the construcƟ on of a naƟ onal se-
curity system.60 The naƟ on’s poliƟ cal situaƟ on was complex. The dynamics of 
processes taking place on the internaƟ onal arena during this period resembled 
a great unknown. A few factors determined Poland’s security policy. The most im-
portant factor was the existence of the Eastern Block, the Soviet army staƟ oned 
within Poland’s territory and the specifi c approach exemplifi ed by Western Euro-
pean countries. The security policy was to be managed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s 
government – but Mazowiecki did not yet have any experience in the fi eld. The 
Department of Foreign Aﬀ airs was led by Krzysztof Skubiszewski. He faced the 
challenge of taking command of a completely sovereign foreign policy, in com-
pletely new condiƟ ons.61 At the start of the 1990s Poland was searching for an-
swers how to create the foundaƟ ons for a new form of naƟ onal security. PoliƟ cal 
elites were aware that an unique opportunity to solve naƟ onal security issues 
had been created – and that the opportunity would allow Poland to free itself 
from the role of hostage or object of foreign expansion. 
Ever since the 1990s Poland’s security policy included cooperaƟ ng or creaƟ ng 
a new alliance with the Soviet Union.62 We can state that support for this concept 
from the Solidarity movement was a tacƟ cal element, resulƟ ng from the exisƟ ng 
internaƟ onal situaƟ on. Among the various poliƟ cal consideraƟ ons – stemming 
from various poliƟ cal modes of thought – the concept that Moscow would with-
draw from its sphere of infl uence in Central Europe was not taken under consid-
eraƟ on. It was also taken for a fact that some sort of pact with Russia was neces-
sary to ensure the safety of the new geopoliƟ cal situaƟ on. We must also menƟ on 
the misgivings that appeared subsequent to Germany’s reunifi caƟ on. Members 
of the far-leŌ  strongly supported an alliance with Poland’s eastern neighbor. This 
approach was not accepted by the poliƟ cians determining Poland’s security poli-
cy. At that Ɵ me Moscow did not aƩ ach any especial signifi cance to relaƟ ons with 
59 A. D. Roƞ eld, Polska… op. cit., pgs. 19–20.
60 R. Kuźniar, Droga…, op. cit., p. 86.
61 R. Grodzki, Polska polityka zagraniczna w XX i XXI wieku. Główne kierunki – Fakty – Lu-
dzie – Wydarzenia, Zakrzewo 2009, pgs. 151–153.
62 R. Kuźniar, Polityka bezpieczeństwa w polskiej polityce zagranicznej [in:] Polska polity-
ka bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000, red. R. Kuźniar, Warszawa 2001, pgs. 71–77.
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Poland. The Kremlin’s priority was to stop the disintegraƟ on of the Soviet Union 
and maintain relaƟ ons with the United States. 
During this Ɵ me Poland had many diﬀ erent concepts concerning the naƟ on’s 
security: not only diverse, but also discordant. Military circles viewed the concept 
of “armed neutrality” as appealing. It was advocated by Piotr Kołodziejczyk, the 
present Minister of Defense. He believed that assuming the posiƟ on of “armed 
neutrality in the heart of Europe we will be a bridge between the West and the 
Soviet Union, also from the military perspecƟ ve”.63 Considering Poland’s geo-
poliƟ cal situaƟ on, the concept of neutrality was unacceptable. It would have to 
take into account Poland assuming a defense strategy in all possible direcƟ ons, 
which was impossible due to the level of development of the country’s techno-
logical and economic potenƟ al. The concept was not supported by the head of 
the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs. A more appealing opƟ on was the concept of des-
ignaƟ ng on a geostrategic map of Europe countries from within Poland’s region 
that would serve as a buﬀ er zone between the East and the West. This process 
was accompanied by a conscious emphasis of Central Europe’s idenƟ ty. The con-
cept was not developed due to unfavorable geopoliƟ cal circumstances as well 
as confl icts – not only due to historical reasons – but mainly lack of enthusiasm 
for the concept on the part of other European countries. Many controversies 
were caused by President Lech Walesa’s concept of forming a “NATO bis”. The 
idea assumed the creaƟ on of a quasi-system of common security under NATO’s 
leadership; its members were to be primarily Central European countries and the 
Ukraine. This safety zone was to fi ll in the void in the area and make it possible 
for further countries to join NATO in the future. The concept proposed by the 
President of the Second Republic of Poland was not supported by Prime Minister 
Skubiszewski, and also did not gain the support of other poliƟ cians throughout 
the world. 
We must also menƟ on Poland’s acƟ vity in the OrganizaƟ on for Security and 
Co-operaƟ on in Europe following the year 1989. The insƟ tuƟ on was to serve as 
a shield from potenƟ al threats in the security zone.64 As early as the year 1990, 
Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki presented the direcƟ ons of Poland’s Euro-
pean policies before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and 
the proposal to create a European Co-operaƟ on Council for the states compris-
ing the Final Act of the OrganizaƟ on for Security and Co-operaƟ on in Europe. 
Yet the Prime Minister did not explain its security funcƟ ons. These issues were 
outlined by Minister Skubiszewski in a speech in the Sejm, presented on the 26th 
of April 1990. The Council, as the OSCE’s permanent poliƟ cal organ, was to op-
erate via three commiƩ ees, one of which was to focus on poliƟ cal and security 
issues. Skubiszewski emphasized that the priority of Poland’s foreign policy was 
to co-create a European security system in which the OSCE would play an im-
portant role. In mid-1990 he observed “the development of a new, cooperaƟ on-
based European security system within the framework of the OSCE”, which was 
63 Ibidem, p.74.
64 R. Kuźniar, Droga…, op. cit., pgs.88–92.
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to safeguard Europe so that the conƟ nent would not become “a grey, neutral 
or buﬀ er zone”65. The acƟ viƟ es of Polish diplomacy confi rmed the role that the 
OSCE was to play in the country’s security policy. 
The Third Republic’s poliƟ cians noted that Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision not 
to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine allowed them to transfer confl icts regarding 
Europe’s safety from the poliƟ cal-military level to a purely poliƟ cal one.66 They 
believed that during the development of new poliƟ cal and economic forms in 
Central and Eastern Europe there would be no armed intervenƟ on from Russia. 
Poland was situated between the poliƟ cally stable West and the weakened East, 
undergoing a crisis, and thus developed in an atmosphere free from threats, but 
also in a region of decreased security standards. Polish diplomacy aƩ ached great 
signifi cance to pacts what were to lower Europe’s military potenƟ al and limit the 
use of force.67 The reform of armed forces was yet another important maƩ er. The 
issues that needed to be addressed in Poland included the number of soldiers, 
the army’s organizaƟ on, equipment, dislocaƟ on and defense doctrine.68
The fall of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 enabled many poliƟ cal 
changes to take place throughout Europe. These changes played an important 
role in the transformaƟ on of Poland’s security policy.69 New countries were being 
formed on the rubble of the Soviet empire, which encouraged both Poland and 
the North AtlanƟ c Alliance to determine its roles in the European security sys-
tem. The Alliance’s poliƟ cians and military staﬀ  resolved that the most important 
organizaƟ on to ensure the region’s stability was the North AtlanƟ c CooperaƟ on 
Council. Yet it did not ensure the security of the North AtlanƟ c countries; it only 
made security, arms control and defense industry restructure consultaƟ ons pos-
sible. Poland aƩ empted to determine the role of its new neighbors in its security 
strategy. RelaƟ ons with NATO played a focal role in the Third Republic’s foreign 
policies – as a guarantee of the naƟ on’s security. The concept of evoluƟ onary 
changes in the confi guraƟ on of powers was accepted by Poland’s government. 
The process of adapƟ ng the North AtlanƟ c Alliance depended on the evoluƟ on 
of the internaƟ onal situaƟ on and changes taking place inside the country. We 
can state that the process lasted unƟ l the year 1990, although it became more 
realisƟ c two years later. NATO’s members, in accordance with the guidelines of 
the New Strategic Concept of the AtlanƟ c Alliance passed in 1991, carried out 
their policies of conducƟ ng careful dialog and developing cooperaƟ on with its 
partners and Russia.70 The prospects of extended security created a new situaƟ on 
65 Cyt. za: Ibidem, pgs.88–89.
66 P. Mickiewicz, Polska droga do NATO. Implikacje polityczne i wojskowe, Toruń 2005, 
pgs. 68–69.
67 R. Kuźniar, Droga…, op. cit., pgs. 89–91.
68 P. Mickiewicz, op. cit., pgs. 68–69.
69 Ibidem, pgs. 91–93.
70 More on the topic: R. Zięba, Bezpieczeństwo państw zrzeszonych w NATO i Unii Euro-
pejskiej [in:] Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie, red. R. Zięba, War-
szawa 2008, pgs. 269.
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in Central and Eastern Europe. It indicated that countries in this region would ac-
cept all criteria in force within the Trans-AtlanƟ c community: poliƟ cal pluralism, 
principles of democracy, respect for human rights and the rights of minoriƟ es, 
respect for poliƟ cal freedom and freedom of the media. Confl icts between coun-
tries were resolved during the Alliance and Union expansion process.71
Poland joined NATO during a period of signifi cant changes in the internaƟ onal 
security network. These changes were not due to Poland’s membership or the 
expansion of NATO. Certain unfavorable phenomena and threats had begun ap-
pearing. This included terrorism moƟ vated by a fundamentalist version of Islam, 
danger of the spread of weapons of mass destrucƟ on and the consequences of 
the process of “failing and failed states”. These occurrences had an impact on 
NATO’s security strategy and the Alliance as a whole. Since the year 2001, new 
security threats have served as a type of jusƟ fi caƟ on for the US to undertake re-
naƟ onalizaƟ on measures and militarize foreign and security policies, as well as to 
strengthen infl uences. Poland, together with other members of the Alliance, has 
had to make diﬃ  cult decisions.72
Polish-German relaƟ ons deserve our aƩ enƟ on. Even during the prelimi-
nary transformaƟ on phase in 1989 they were of especial signifi cance for Po-
land. Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki had elected a special representaƟ ve, 
Mieczysław Pszon, for contacts with the West German Chancellery, even before 
all government posiƟ ons had been fi lled. Pszon was an expert on Germany and 
an advocate of Polish-German reconciliaƟ on.73 Mazowiecki viewed reconciliaƟ on 
with Germany as one of his poliƟ cal prioriƟ es. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of 
Foreign Aﬀ airs, wanted to frame this reconciliaƟ on and cooperaƟ on in treaƟ es. 
The obstacles faced by Polish diplomacy were not easy to overcome. We must 
take into consideraƟ on the substanƟ al baggage of the past and the diﬀ erences in 
potenƟ al and development of both countries.74
The visit of West Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Poland was of especial 
signifi cance for German-Poland relaƟ ons. On the 9th of November 1989 the Ger-
man Chancellor and Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki parƟ cipated in an 
ecumenical mass in Krzyżowa in Lower Silesia, where a symbolic reconciliaƟ on 
took place. News came from Berlin that East Germany’s government had agreed 
for its ciƟ zens to cross the border. The demoliƟ on of the Berlin Wall had begun to 
take place. Chancellor Kohn ended his visit in Poland to parƟ cipate in the histori-
cal event. He returned to Warsaw in two days to conƟ nue discussions, in a slightly 
diﬀ erent mindset. Eleven agreements and pacts were signed by both countries as 
a result of the meeƟ ng.75
The reunion of the two German countries posed a serious problem. Tadeusz 
71 A. D. Roƞ eld, Polska…, op. cit., pgs. 25–32.
72 R. Kuźniar, Droga…, op. cit., pgs. 216–219.
73 J.A. Majcherek, Pierwsza dekada III Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 1999, p. 204.
74 R. Kuźniar, Droga…op. cit., pgs. 54–55.
75 R. Zięba, Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie, Warszawa 
2010, pgs. 39–45.
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Mazowiecki’s government was the fi rst – among the countries of the Warsaw 
Pact – to acknowledge the right for Germany to reunite, with the observaƟ on 
that the country would not be a threat to other European naƟ ons. Poland did 
not expect a swiŌ  reunifi caƟ on process. Yet by the end of November of 1989 
Chancellor Kohl formulated a 10-point plan to reunite Germany and Europe. The 
plan included the creaƟ on of confederaƟ on structures by East and West Germa-
ny, and, in eﬀ ect, the establishment of the German naƟ on. The plan did not take 
into considerƟ on issues concerning the borders on the Odra and Nysa Łużycka 
Rivers, which was criƟ cized by the Polish government. Many European poliƟ cians 
wondered about Germany’s future. Great Britain and France, despite the fact 
that they supported the reunifi caƟ on process, did not hide their anxiety. Moscow 
accepted the changes taking place in Germany. The United States also oﬀ ered 
its support. The problem of creaƟ ng one German naƟ on surfaced in January of 
1990. It was then that the so-called “2+4 Group” was formed. It encompassed 
the representaƟ ves of two German naƟ ons and four superpowers who were to 
decide the fate of Germany.76
The achievements of the Polish-German poliƟ cal reconciliaƟ on process were 
expressed in a treaty during the Europe reunifi caƟ on period of 1989-1991. Con-
tacts and mutual relaƟ ons, marked with distrust for many years, improved great-
ly and took on new meaning. In November of 1990, West Germany and Poland’s 
Ministers of Foreign Aﬀ airs signed a German-Polish Border Treaty. Poland was 
interested in the development of bilateral cooperaƟ on in various fi elds. Minister 
Skubiszewski emphasized the signifi cance of Poland and Germany’s common in-
terests. On the 17th of June 1991 the Polish–German Treaty of Good Neighborship 
and Friendly CooperaƟ on was signed in Bonn. It is seen by many as a “consƟ tu-
Ɵ on” of relaƟ ons between Poland and United Germany.77
Military cooperaƟ on played an important role in the establishment of Polish-
German partnership.78 The united Germany greatly supported Poland during the 
country’s accession to the European Union, despite the fact that other countries 
did not always view this as a favorable event. Germany promoted the interests of 
the Visegrád Group, especially Poland. We must emphasize that Germany’s com-
mitment went beyond obligaƟ ons outlined in treaƟ es and was acknowledged 
throughout the diﬃ  cult accession process. Yet there were some confrontaƟ ons 
during the negoƟ aƟ ons.79
The policies of the Poland-Germany partnership, the background for which 
were the concepts of reconciliaƟ on and common interest, encountered certain 
obstacles during the period when Poland was preparing to join the European 
Union.80 It was the result of growing problems in the fi eld of Polish-German 
76 J. A. Majcherek, op. cit., pgs. 205–206.
77 W. M. Góralski, Polska – Niemcy: Trudny proces pojednania [in:] Dokąd zmierza świat, 
red. A. D. Roƞ eld, Warszawa 2008, p. 428.
78 R. Zięba Główne kierunki…, op. cit., pgs. 63–64.
79 R. Łoś, Gerhard Schröder. Blaski i cienie władzy, Łódź 2008, pgs. 278–279.
80 R. Zięba, Główne kierunki…, op. cit., p. 70.
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relaƟ ons. An event that served as a spark was the acƟ vity of expelled German 
groups; aŌ er the failure of legal regulaƟ ons included in treaƟ es that structured 
relaƟ ons between the two countries, aƩ empts were made to revise history and 
recall German-held grievances against Poland81. The FederaƟ on of Expellees was 
parƟ cularly acƟ ve in May of 1998. This was subsequent to the inauguraƟ on of 
sƟ pulaƟ ons concerning Poland’s accession to the European Union. Erika Stein-
bach, the head of the federaƟ on, appealed to Poland and the Czech Republic to 
“compensate expelled Germans for the wrongs done to them”. In 1999 a deci-
sion was made to create the “Center of the 15 Million” in Berlin, an insƟ tuƟ on 
that was to commemorate the fate of the Germans who were expelled following 
World War II. In September of 2000 the Center Against Expulsions FoundaƟ on 
was formed. Its objecƟ ve was to create a museum dedicated to Germans ex-
pelled from Central and Eastern Europe in Berlin, as well as to those who had 
been repatriated from East Germany to West Germany. The insƟ tuƟ on also in-
tended to show that Germans had been unlawfully expelled. The acƟ viƟ es of the 
FederaƟ on of Expellees were categorically criƟ cized by Poland. 
Diversity in Polish-German relaƟ ons was the result of opposing views concern-
ing various challenges, leading to antagonism.82 Poland and Germany’s member-
ship of NATO and the European Union has determined the poliƟ cal direcƟ ons of 
both countries. An important maƩ er is defi ning naƟ onal and European interests. 
The strategic objecƟ ves outlined by Germany do not leave any doubts. Transat-
lanƟ c partnership is an important area of Germany’s foreign poliƟ cs. Yet strate-
gic similariƟ es of Polish and German diplomacies had a specifi c dimension.83 The 
concept of an ideal European army was analyzed rather in theoreƟ cal, and not 
substanƟ al, categories. Europe’s security policy needs to be assessed in a broad 
perspecƟ ve, and not in a bilateral context. 
Poland’s current poliƟ cal situaƟ on greatly diﬀ ers from that of the Second 
Republic.84 The Polish naƟ on – for the fi rst Ɵ me in a thousand years of history 
– is not experiencing a territorial confl ict with any of its seven neighbors and is 
maintaining good relaƟ ons with these countries, though not with all of them. 
Polish-German relaƟ ons have undergone a great change. Poland’s western neigh-
bor, a tradiƟ onal enemy, has become Poland’s ally and most important economic 
partner. Germany has accepted Poland’s boarder along the Odra and Nysa Rivers, 
and – as a member of European and AtlanƟ c defense structures – has become 
an ally. In contemporary Europe, Germany’s security is integrally linked with Po-
land’s security. A change of moods in the above relaƟ onship impacts – to a point 
– on the quality of cooperaƟ on. Yet Poland’s relaƟ ons with Russia have devel-
oped quite diﬀ erently.85 Russia sees Poland as a NATO neophyte that betrayed its 
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former ally; while Poland treats Russia as its greatest challenge and a source of 
dangers. We should add however that the dynamics of Polish-Russian relaƟ ons 
within the past two decades indicates that the countries are not condemned to 
constant confl ict. 
Terrorism, as well as its derivaƟ ves, poses a signifi cant threat to internaƟ on-
al safety in the 21st century.86 ExisƟ ng threats to world peace and stability are 
the legacy of the past decades. The arms race began in a period – which lasted 
half a century – when the world was divided and the interests of superpowers 
clashed throughout the globe. Well-armed, well-trained and equipped groups 
of parƟ sans and soldiers were acƟ ve during this period. The superpowers are 
responsible for the armed military forces uƟ lized by countries and organizaƟ ons 
which pose a threat to global stability. 
Summary
The issue of Poland’s security in the 20th and 21st centuries is complex and dif-
fi cult to assess. Poland is a country with a tragic past that has paid a great price 
for neglecƟ ng security as it is broadly understood. In the 18th century, the First 
Republic of Poland had been crossed out from the poliƟ cal map of the Old Con-
Ɵ nent. 
In 1918, following 123 years of bondage, Poland regained its longed-for inde-
pendence. Yet the safety of the Second Republic was based on unstable founda-
Ɵ ons. The Weimar Republic and later the Third Reich on the one side and Bol-
shevik Russia and later the Soviet Union on the other did not accept the Treaty 
of Versailles and aƩ empted to revise it. CooperaƟ on, especially military coopera-
Ɵ on, between the two countries was directed against Poland. In September of 
1939 the Second Republic of Poland fell under the occupaƟ on of the Third Reich 
and the Soviet Union. At the end of the Second World War, Poland was under the 
infl uence of its eastern neighbor.
Following a regime transformaƟ on in 1989, the Third Republic of Poland be-
came a sovereign naƟ on. For the fi rst Ɵ me in history there are no territorial con-
fl icts with its neighbors, although not all relaƟ ons are fully saƟ sfactory. Poland is 
a member of the European Union and NATO. The North AtlanƟ c Treaty Organi-
zaƟ on guarantees protecƟ on from tradiƟ onal threats, although the regulaƟ ons 
of ArƟ cle 5 of the Washington Treaty give cause for refl ecƟ on. The EU, on the 
other hand, protects Poland – to an extent – from the outcomes of globalizaƟ on 
processes. Terrorism and its derivaƟ ves are a signifi cant threat to internaƟ onal 
security, causing jusƟ fi ed unease throughout the world.
(1918–2008), red. A. D. Roƞ eld i A. W. Torkunow, Warszawa 2010, pgs. 669–688.
86 More on the topic: R. Borkowski, Terroryzm ponowoczesny. Studium z antropologii po-
lityki, Toruń 2006; B. Bolechów, Terroryzm w świecie podwubiegunowym, Toruń 2003; 
M. Sageman, Sieci terroru, Kraków 2008; M. LeviƩ , Hamas, Kraków 2008.
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Introduction
Security is a broad concept. The aspect of security is linked with its opposites: the 
semanƟ c concept of risk (or threat), accident, dangerous occurrence, vicƟ m, loss, 
damage, level of damage. Related concepts are those of risk, the level of risk, 
defense, protecƟ on from threats, prevenƟ on, etc. Both the term ‘security’ and 
the term ‘threat’ have a wide range of meanings. Security is associated with the 
relevant data, informaƟ on, knowledge, experience, training, procedures,, and 
strategies for the prevenƟ on and minimizaƟ on of threats and the losses incurred. 
Security is linked to measures, costs, and expenditure, which depend on the size 
and scale of the threat. Security, threat assessment, prevenƟ on, the costs have 
a logical relaƟ on. The level, structure, and dynamics of threats in space and Ɵ me 
should be adequately responded to by methods of security strategy, and the na-
ture of their applicaƟ ons.
The issue of security
The individual aspects of security from a structural point of view can be assessed 
in diﬀ erent ways. The security of mankind but also the individual can be generally 
subdivided as follows:
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• Against threats from space — for example, comets or asteroids. In the period 
from 16 July to 22 July 1994 the core of the Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 broke 
into more than 20 parts and hit the southern hemisphere of Jupiter, which 
allowed the fi rst direct observaƟ on of a collision of two celesƟ al bodies in the 
solar system.1 In the following years, astrononomers noted the impact of this 
celesƟ al body on Jupiter, one of the craters was the size of the Earth.2 Up to 
900 asteroids have a diameter greater than 1 km, while a potenƟ ally danger-
ous one is 990 m (data according to the staƟ sƟ cs of the Minor Planet Center 
in Cambridge, MA, USA).3
“In parƟ cular, asteroids near the planet are in themselves a big potenƟ al for 
science. But they are not only for science but also for the normal life of people. 
Although it may seem that they sƟ ll are the greatest threat to the existence of 
mankind and all life on Earth. And maybe someƟ me in the future they will be-
come a rich source of minerals and the launch pad for exploring the universe.”4
• Against threats of natural forces on the planet Earth. The earthquake and tsu-
nami in March 2011 in Japan killed thousands of people and damaged the 
nuclear reactors in Fukushima, with the result that hydrogen escaped into 
the atmosphere and dangerous radioacƟ ve substances polluted the sea. AŌ er 
the reactor explosion four Japanese prefectures were contaminated by radio-
acƟ city. Many people were evacuated. Several countries halted imports of 
foodstuﬀ s from Northern Japan. Japan, according to the experts of the IAEA, 
underesƟ mated the threat posed by earthquakes and tsunamis for nuclear 
installaƟ ons in the country. In reply, the Government of Japan stressed that 
it would propose a special independent authority, which would in the future, 
oversee the crisis measures and prevenƟ on, and was not under the control of 
the Ministry of the Economy, as its predecessor had been, which is not a suit-
able situaƟ on.5 
• Against human behavior:
– Against the violence and destrucƟ on that can result from the use of nuclear, 
biological, chemical,6 seismic and other weapons in possible future confl icts. 
1 ZEM‚ MARS A JUPITER. [online]. (Cited 31.5.2011). Available on the Internet: hƩ p://
www.wesmir.weblahko.sk/ZEM-_-MARSA-JUPITER.html.
2 ŠKREKA, M. 2009. Zrážka s Jupiterom. [online]. 22.7.2009. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available 
on the Internet: hƩ p://astrin.planetarium.sk/zobraz.php?id=64.
3 HUSÁRIK, M. 2008. ASTEROIDY. Astronomický ústav SAV, Tatranská Lomnica. [online]. 
2008. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.astro.sk/~choc/08_
casu/zbornik/husarik/husarik.pdf.
4 Ibid.
5 MAAE: Japonsko podcenilo hrozbu tsunami. In 24hod.sk. [online]. 1. júna 2011. (Cited 
3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.24hod.sk/maae-japonsko-podceni-
lo-hrozbu-tsunami-cl162801.html.
6 DURDIAK, J. – GÁFRIK, A. – PULIŠ, P. – SUŠKO, M. 2005. Zbrane hromadného ničenia 
– aktuálna bezpečnostná hrozba. MO SR, InšƟ tút bezpečnostných a obranných štúdií 
MO SR. BraƟ slava. 2005. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: hƩ p://
www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=67.
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The nuclear powers are: the USA, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, the 
People’s Republic of China,7 Israel, India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(it is possible that atomic weapons are owned by the South African Republic 
and Taiwan). It is known that interconƟ nental ballisƟ c missiles are owned by 
the USA, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, and probably by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. The military atomic programs of other States are un-
clear. North Korea has an advanced nuclear program as does Iran. 
– Against reckless mismanagement of resources, whether human, fi nancial, 
material, energy, food, water, soil, forests, etc.
– Against unforeseen consequences of human acƟ viƟ es. An example of this 
was an accident involving two submarines. In February the French submarine 
Le Triomphant and the BriƟ sh submarine Vanguard collided with each other. 
They are responsible for the naƟ onal security of their respecƟ ve countries. Le 
Triomphant is capable of carrying 16 nuclear missiles, and Vanguard may have 
in its inventory 48 of them.8 Submarines have sunk. The Russian submarine 
Kursk sank on the boƩ om of the of Barents sea on 12 August 2000; all sailors 
of the crew perished.9 On April 9, 1963, the nuclear submarine Thresher sank 
also. This military submarine crashed to the boƩ om of the Wilkenson Trench 
in AtlanƟ c Ocean during its training. All 129 US Navy sailors on board per-
ished.10
– Harm to the natural planet, causing an increase in the greenhouse eﬀ ect, the 
loss of biodiversity, polluƟ on of the environment, etc.) before the geneƟ c ca-
pabiliƟ es of man, restricƟ ons, limits, mutaƟ ons and geneƟ c modifi caƟ on of 
products, environmental impacts caused by man (chemical, agricultural, en-
ergy, industrial producƟ on, e.g. processing of waste, etc.).
– Against accidents, whether due to improper or hazardous work pracƟ ces (fall-
ing under the remit of Health and Safety) or accidents at home or while trav-
elling.
According to the results of our survey,11 respondents assume the biggest 
threats to be waste (20.5%), industry (20.2%), mining (19.9%), energy supply 
(15.6%), transport (15.3%) and fi nally agricultural producƟ on (8.5%). 
7 ŠIPEKY, M. 2004. Defi novanie asymetrie. 2.11.2004. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011) Avail-
able on the Internet: hƩ p://www.valka.cz/clanek_10821.html.
8 SZALAI, P. 2009. Francúzi a BriƟ  tajili atómovú nehodu v AtlanƟ ku. 16.2.2009. [online]. 
(Cited 3. 6. 2011). The arƟ cle was published in the newspaper SME daily. Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://www.sme.sk/c/4311923/francuzi-a-briƟ -tajili-atomovu-neho-
du-v-atlanƟ ku.html. 
9 BÉZA, M. 2000. Ruské ponorky. K-141 Kursk. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://www.military.cz/russia/navy/submarin/oscarclass/kursk/kursk.
htm.
10 Námorné katastrofy. 9.10.2008. [online]. (Cited 4.6.2011). Available on the Internet: 
hƩ p://www.priestor.estranky.sk/clanky/tragedie-zeme/namorne-katastrofy.
11 VARHOĽÁK, P. 2010. Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: Týždeň 
vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník 
prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29.11.–3.12. Ružomberok : VERBUM, 
2011. pp. 156–166.
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From the perspecƟ ve of the threats caused by human in our survey (the diﬀ er-
ences are not so great)12 our respondents viewed the largest: polluƟ on of world 
drinking water and ozone depleƟ on (9.95%), air polluƟ on (9.83%), the threat of 
the disappearance of organisms and biocenoses (9.66%), the greenhouse eﬀ ect 
(9.53%), radioacƟ ve contaminaƟ on of the natural environment (9.21%), acid rain 
(9,19%), destrucƟ on of natural ecosystems (9.11%), polluƟ on and erosion of the 
soil (8.83%), over salƟ ng (7.53) and wetness, soil, and fi nally weathering (6.87%). 
Respondents considered the greatest natural threats to be fl oods (20%), followed 
by avalanches (18%), wind (17%), earthquake (16%), tsunami (15%) and fi nally 
volcanic acƟ vity (14%).13 It has been asked whether it is possible to ensure the 
safety of countries and naƟ onal insƟ tuƟ ons, by accepƟ ng a measure of outsourc-
ing and privaƟ zaƟ on. The extreme case of privaƟ zaƟ on is that of naƟ onal defense, 
and is a controversial proposal in the light of future developments, threats, tur-
moil, and the eﬀ ecƟ veness of security needed to counteract this. The privaƟ za-
Ɵ on of security at the level of individual countries and alliances on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, organizaƟ ons with a global scope, for example, terrorist 
groups, have led to the privaƟ zaƟ on of wars and military confl icts. 
“The role of private security and military organizaƟ ons as a tool of interven-
Ɵ on in confl ict scenarios increased constantly and exponenƟ ally  aŌ er the Cold 
War, in many cases, a return to order and stability in confl ict zones and [a means 
of carrying out] peacekeeping operaƟ ons and [distribuƟ ng] humanitarian aids. 
Nevertheless, its real contribuƟ on to ensuring peace is quesƟ onable”.14 
The phenomenon of the privaƟ zaƟ on of war has historic precedents and once 
again is becoming popular 
“PrivaƟ zaƟ on of war was the objecƟ ve reality of poliƟ cal developments. Glo-
balizaƟ on, informaƟ on technology, democracy and devoluƟ on of power were 
the cause of the privaƟ zaƟ on of war. The trend towards the privaƟ zaƟ on of war 
should be a cause of concern for global, naƟ onal and personal security”.15 
DecentralizaƟ on of power in the 21st century shows the Table 1.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 MACIAS, A. 2011. PrivaƟ zaƟ on of Security: a Strategy for Peace or War? [online]. (Cited 
4.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/
uploads/2011/04/maciaswpaper.pdf.
15 YUZHI, Zhang – HUIPING, Liu 2010. On the Basic Reasons of Private War. In Canadian 
Center of Science and EducaƟ on. Journal of PoliƟ cs and Law, vol. 3, no. 2; September 
2010. pp. 134–138. (Cited 4.6.2011) [online]. Available on the Internet: hƩ p://ccsenet.
org/journal/index.php/jpl/arƟ cle/view/7195/5542
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Table 1 DevoluƟ on of power in the 21st century 
Privacy Members of the Public The third sector
Super State TransnaƟ onal CorporaƟ on
Intergovernmental 
organizaƟ ons
Non-governmental 
organizaƟ ons
Country DomesƟ c corporaƟ ons
The Central Government 
in 21st century
NaƟ onal 
oganizaƟ ons
Sub-naƟ onal 
organizaƟ on Local business Local Government Local groups
Source: YUZHI, Zhang – HUIPING, Liu 2010. On the Basic Reasons of Private War. In Cana-
dian Center of Science and EducaƟ on. Journal of PoliƟ cs and Law, vol. 3, no. 2; September 
2010. pp. 134 – 138. (Cited 4. 6. 2011) [online]. Available on the Internet: hƩ p://ccsenet.
org/journal/index.php/jpl/arƟ cle/view/7195/5542. 
Possible approaches  to the view of the relaƟ onship and the focus of safety-
related systems in response to a post in aggregate form16 are illustrated in fi g-
ure 1.
European security 
In terms of European security strategy from 2003 threats to European security 
include: the proliferaƟ on of weapons of mass destrucƟ on, environmental deg-
radaƟ on, climate change, limited access to energy resources, the threat of Eu-
ropean energy crisis, failure or collapse of computer technologies, technological 
accidents, natural disasters, epidemics, or pandemics and humanitarian crisis, 
terrorism, regional confl icts, the collapse of state authority, organized crime, an 
ageing populaƟ on in the countries of the EU, illegal migraƟ on, the threat to the 
European social model due to the infl uence of the unforeseen consequences of 
globalizaƟ on, the radicalizaƟ on of society from ethnic and social causes, corrup-
Ɵ on and money laundering.17 
Table 2 shows the threat to European security.
16 VEBER, J. a kol. 2010. Management kvality, environmentu a bezpečnosƟ  práce. Legis-
laƟ va, systémy, metody, praxe. 2. aktualizované vydání. Praha : Management Press, 
2010. BALABÁN, M. 2009. Vize evropské bezpečnosƟ  v globálním kontextu (refl exe 
bezpečnostních analýz a prognóz ve světě, v EU a v ČR 2003 – 2009). In Bezpečnost 
a obrana v evropském kontextu. Univerzita obrany. Ústav strategických a obranných 
studií. Sborník z mezinárodní konference. Brno : IDET, 6.–7. května 2009. Libor FRANK, 
Petr HLAVÁČEK (eds.), 2009.
17 BALABÁN, M. 2009. 
Michal Pružinský, Peter Varhol’ák76
Leadership
System
management
The subject of
interest
Typical issues
Benefits for
Quality
management
Environmental systems Security
management
Managing the
defense
Quality of the
products
(products and
services)
Environmental
surroundings (more
closely around the man
and the wider world)
Security,
protection, health,
law and order,
The management
of the defense of
the country,
alliances and their
rights, interests
The customer,
the consumer
The company, Man,
humanity
Staff Member,
Man
Citizen, Ally
Food
Products.
The need
for service
vehicles
Water, air, climate,
soil, forces, living
organisms, working
and living
environment,
conquering the
cosmos, threats from
the cosmos
At work, in the
transport sector,
in the
household from
fires, water and
accidents
Defense,
security, peace,
national
interests, rights,
obtaining,
maintaining
resources
Management
resources
Human, financial, capital, material, energy, raw materials, research, development,
manufacturing, technology, information, knowledge, etc.
Outsourcing
and
privatization
Security and privatization, outsourcing national security, quality management in
social security, in defense of the country, in the conduct of the war, etc.
Figure 1 RelaƟ ons, and the focus of safety-related systems
Source: custom processing
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Table 2 Threats of European security 
  Threats18 Trends  EvaluaƟ on by
 and evaluaƟ on19 the results of 
  quesƟ onnaire 
  survey20
The proliferaƟ on of 
weapons of mass de-
strucƟ on
Slowing their spread, conƟ nuaƟ on of 
the persistence of threats from Iran, 
terrorist organizaƟ ons and their smug-
gling
15.4%
DegradaƟ on of the envi-
ronment climate change 
Global limits are exceeded, parƟ cularly 
in climate change, harm to the nitrogen 
cycle and loss of biodiversity, degrada-
Ɵ on conƟ nues, 
14.2%
Limited access to energy 
resources, the threat of 
European energy crisis
The situaƟ on aŌ er the shuƫ  ng-down 
of nuclear power plants; this is com-
plicated by by the possible knock-on 
eﬀ ect of German plans to phase out 
nuclear energy by 2022; this may lead 
to an increase in prices and higher 
dependency on Russia
13.6%
The failure or collapse of 
computer technologies
Cyber-aƩ acks create diﬃ  cult situaƟ ons, 
they are beginning to be seen as an act 
of war,, the case of Wikileaks; virtual 
network as a Trojan horse, problems 
aﬀ ecƟ ng naƟ onal security.
13.5%
Technological accidents
Extensive projects with aggressive in-
vesƟ gaƟ on of fi nancial resources from 
the calculaƟ on of damages resulƟ ng 
from accidents.
13.4%
Natural disasters Nature is more powerful than man 12.5%
The epidemic, or pan-
demic
The case of E-coli is a warning, showing 
possible mulƟ dimensional threats (ter-
rorism, mutaƟ ons, hygiene)
10.1%
Humanitarian crisis
The world reacts too late, oŌ en ineﬀ ec-
Ɵ vely, and someƟ mes not at all, there 
are many vicƟ ms; someƟ mes humani-
tarian crises are man-made.
7.3%
18 Selected from: BALABÁN, M. 2009. 
19 Own project of authors (see below).
20 The fi rst eight items are sorted in descending order according to the percentage of re-
spondents of survey of 58 Master degree students in eight teams (see: VARHOĽÁK, P.: 
Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: Týždeň vedy a umenia na 
Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa 
európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29.11.–3. 12. Ružomberok: VERBUM, 2011. S. 156–166).
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Terrorism
Despite countermeasures by gover-
ments, the problem of terrorism does 
not lessen, the asymmetries persist
Regional confl icts Persist, without any decease in the intensity of the threat
The collapse of State 
authority
The huge defi cit results in popular pro-
tests in countries such as Greece and 
wars in African countries 
Organized crime
Dealing with organized crime some-
Ɵ mes may be beyond the capabiliƟ es 
of state bodies.
An ageing populaƟ on in 
the countries of the EU
There is a defi nite trend, which may be 
limited by immigraƟ on; this, however, 
can have other negaƟ ve eﬀ ects.
Illegal migraƟ on The trend is increasing, challenging the Schengen principles 
The threat to the Euro-
pean social model (social 
security)
The trend reinforces social inequality, 
there no reducƟ on in unemployment 
but rather a deepening of the problem; 
compeƟ Ɵ on is intensifying, and the 
mission of non-governmental organiza-
Ɵ ons is more socially quesƟ onable.
RadicalizaƟ on of part of 
society from ethnic and 
social causes
The Trend is increasing, and the situa-
Ɵ on is deterioraƟ ng; measures to coun-
teract this trend are inadequate and 
soluƟ ons are ineﬃ  cient.
Processed according to the: BALABÁN, M. 2009. Vize evropské bezpečnosƟ  v globálním 
kontextu (refl exe bezpečnostních analýz a prognóz ve světě, v EU a v ČR 2003–2009). In 
Bezpečnost a obrana v evropském kontextu. Univerzita obrany. Ústav strategických a ob-
ranných studií. Sborník z mezinárodní konference. Brno : IDET, 6.–7. května 2009. Libor 
FRANK, Petr HLAVÁČEK (eds.), 2009.
Source of authors: VARHOĽÁK, P. 2010. Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. sto-
ročie. In: Týždeň vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomber-
ku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29. 11. – 3. 12. Ružomberok : 
VERBUM, 2011. ISBN 978-80-8084-682-4. pp. 156 – 166.
From the point of view of energy security issues in the security strategies for 
low energy sources can be considered as a global challenge to mankind this cen-
tury. The earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 in Japan caused a nuclear disas-
ter in Fukushima, which greatly aﬀ ected the nuclear energy situaƟ on all over the 
world, but in parƟ cular in Japan itself. Germany will close all of its 17 nuclear pow-
er plants at the latest by the year 2022, as agreed by the coaliƟ on of Chancellor 
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Angela Merkel.21 This can cause a knock-on eﬀ ect, followed by problems in the 
procurement of energy for exisƟ ng prices. The industrial sector has reservaƟ ons 
regarding this policy. According to the President of the Federal AssociaƟ on of 
German industry, Hans-Peter Keitela, it risks weakening Germany as an indus-
trial naƟ on; car manufacturer and head of Daimler Dieter Zetsche has evoked the 
possibility of fi nancial risk; energy group RWE is considering a legal defense. The 
coaliƟ on has also agreed to speed up the construcƟ on of new power plants using 
fossil fuels, energy storage and transmission networks. According to news agency 
Reuters the country intends to reduce the consumpƟ on of electricity by by about 
10% by 2020, and double the percentage of renewable energy in the energy use 
of the country from 17 percent (the approximate current fi gure) to 35 percent.22 
According to Reuters Agency, the Slovak Prime Minister stated that extensive de-
commissioning of nuclear power staƟ ons in Europe on the basis of a possible EU 
decision would lead to a huge increase in gas prices.23 
In table 3 are some of the characterisƟ cs of possible strategies. Various com-
binaƟ ons of privaƟ zaƟ on are possible. It is emblemaƟ c that most countries in 
war confl icts now have oŌ en due to oil and natural gas, but also water and other 
scarce or valuable raw materials.
Table 3 Matrix of strategic approaches to the source of energy
Combined 
strategies
Resource 
strategies Priority
Shortcom-
ings Threats To OpportuniƟ es
Slovak Repub-
lic, EU ecolog-
ical trends
Combus-
Ɵ on of 
wood
Avail-
ability 
depends 
on the 
quality 
of the 
soil
The geo-
graphical 
restricƟ on
Felling forests, 
erosion
Sustainability, 
expansion
Slovak Re-
public, EU, 
People’s 
Republic of 
China, replac-
ing kernel
The com-
busƟ on of 
coal, etc
A global 
view 
of the 
availabil-
ity 
The geo-
graphical 
restricƟ on
Greenhouse ef-
fect, the break-
down in hun-
dreds of years
Use in chem-
istry
21 Nemecko končí s jadrom, zatvorí všetky jadrové elektrárne? ČTK. 30. mája 2011. [online]. 
(Cited 30.5.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://spravy.pravda.sk/nemecko-konci-s-
jadrom-zatvori-vsetky-jadrove-elektrarne-pmi-/sk_svet.asp?c=A110530_083222_sk_
svet_p23.
22 Ibid.
23 Grékom miliardové injekcie nepomôžu, tvrdí Radičová. 30.5.2011. [online]. (Ci-
ted 30.5.2011) SITA, TASR. Available on the Internet: hƩ p://ekonomika.sme.sk/
c/5915446/grekom-miliardove-injekcie-nepomozu-tvrdi-radicova.html.
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States of the 
EU, in the fu-
ture People’s 
Republic of 
China, North 
America
Combus-
Ɵ on of 
petroleum 
products, 
natural 
gas, shale 
oil.
High 
usability, 
high rate 
of indis-
pens-
ability 
(for avia-
Ɵ on)
The geo-
graphical 
restricƟ on
Greenhouse 
eﬀ ect, limited 
availability, pol-
luƟ on of surface 
water, the seas,
Use in chem-
istry, more 
eﬃ  cient com-
bined technol-
ogies (cars)
Slovak Repub-
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Slovak security in the Euro-Atlantic framework
The issue of the security of the Slovak Republic is condiƟ onal on a historical di-
mension, experience and knowledge of the elites, public opinion, moral and ethi-
cal orientaƟ on, the strength of their own State, economy, law, morality, etc. In 
the State administraƟ on and territorial self-government the following general 
shortcomings were idenƟ fi ed:24 
• the system of state administraƟ on and territorial self government is insuf-
fi ciently eﬀ ecƟ ve and transparent, 
• the heads of staﬀ  are have inadequate managerial ability and other skills that 
are necessary for execuƟ ve management, 
• the lack of cooperaƟ on of the ministries, 
• the low level of communicaƟ on and cooperaƟ on between the central author-
iƟ es of State administraƟ on and territorial self-government,
• the misunderstanding of procedural control (procedural control = the focus 
on the causes that lead to the result; funcƟ onal management = focus on re-
sults), 
• lack of fi nancial moƟ vaƟ on of human resources,
• Insuﬃ  cient educaƟ on and training of human resources.
Problems in improving the quality of insƟ tuƟ onal capaciƟ es can be seen in:
1. lack of fi nancial moƟ vaƟ on of human resources, 
2. lack of educaƟ on and training of human resources, 
3. lack of opƟ mizaƟ on of the acƟ viƟ es carried out by human resources.
Slovak Prime Minister Iveta Radičová, during her visit to Slovenia pointed to 
the fact that the economic crisis is far from over, and that the Eurozone and other 
EU member countries are looking for the appropriate tools and resources to spur 
economic growth and address its implicaƟ ons. In interviews with the Slovenian 
24 Národný strategický referenčný rámec Slovenskej republiky na roky 2007–2013. Minis-
terstvo výstavby a regionálneho rozvoja Slovenskej republiky. BraƟ slava, 29. jún 2007. 
[online]. (Cited 30. 5. 2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.bing.com/searc
h?q=N%C3%A1rodn%C3%BD+strategick%C3%BD+referen%C4%8Dn%C3%BD+r%C
3%A1mec+Slovenskej+republiky+na+roky+2007+%E2%80%93+2013.+Ministerstvo
+v%C3%BDstavby+a+region%C3%A1lneho+rozvoja+Slovenskej+republiky.&src=IE-
SearchBox&FORM=IE8SRC. p. 27.
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press she indicated that ciƟ zens did not realize the gravity of the problems facing 
the EU and the Eurozone. She further stated:
“Pushing the expectaƟ ons, which I’m afraid, in the coming years simply will 
not be able to be fulfi lled.”
It is therefore necessary to consolidate public fi nances, or implement painful 
reforns for the ciƟ zens
“If we do, the crisis will have a much more serious impact. It is our duty, de-
spite the misunderstanding and oŌ en Ɵ mes the resistance of the public to pro-
mote these measures seriously.”25
In view of the defense of the State, the concept of Defense (EU, NATO), which 
alone has the power to defend the sovereignty, the nature of the State ConsƟ tu-
Ɵ on, and the lives and property of people, the situaƟ on is not simple, while the 
importance of security in the current turbulent environment is growing: 
“…under the pressure of current security threats, in the event of future large-
scale crises and confl icts, it will be just the armed forces, which, as the military 
tool of crisis management, in the case of the failure of diplomaƟ c eﬀ orts, will 
represent the most eﬀ ecƟ ve means to deal with the external security problems, 
as well as the prevenƟ on and eliminaƟ on of security crises and confl icts in today’s 
world. And even though the security risks and threats by State or non-State actors 
can never be removed or at least eliminated completely, the adopƟ on of eﬀ ecƟ ve 
and eﬃ  cient measures with as much funding as possible reduces the negaƟ ve 
eﬀ ects of possible security crises, including armed confl icts, for the developed 
States of the world, including the Slovak Republic.”26
QuesƟ ons and problems relaƟ ng to our defense should be assessed by ex-
perts in this domain, taking ino account the analysis of domesƟ c and foreign rela-
Ɵ ons.
It is necessary to refuse further “reforms”, which basically almost always 
meant a reducƟ on in military numbers of the area without any concept, only in 
order to meet poliƟ cal orders27:
• Various, diverse, fast and expensive reorganizaƟ on – Models of the Armed 
Force 2010, 2015, 2020, as the new minister (12) and three in one parliamen-
tary term, it is faster and beƩ er “redeployment”, but can be incomplete.28 
• None of the exisƟ ng text of the “models” - Model of the Armed Forces 
2010, 2015 and 2020 – are realisƟ c from the fi nancial point of view, as ther 
resources alloƩ ed were signifi cantly lower than originally planned, creaƟ ng 
25 Grékom miliardové injekcie nepomôžu, tvrdí Radičová. 30. 5. 2011. 
26 IVANČÍK, R. 2011. Financovanie obrany v kríze. [online]. (Cited 2. 6. 2011) Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/TransatlanƟ cke-listy-
1_2011.pdf.
27 ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. Strategické hodnotenie obrany: Kde sme a kam smerujeme? 
[online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://cenaa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/04/TransatlanƟ cke-listy-1_2011.pdf 
28 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. Armáda je v  ?! 24.04.2011. [online]. (Cited 2. 6. 2011) Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://www.despiteborders.com/clanky/data/upimages/miklus2.pdf 
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a huge gap between the resources invested in defense and what had been 
planned.29 
• It has been known since 2005 that the army will have problems, only for this 
fact to be kept ‘under the lid’.30
• So far, the biggest problems – in addiƟ on to the frequent lack of systemaƟ za-
Ɵ on – were just unrealisƟ c fi nancial projecƟ ons and, consequently, unrealisƟ c 
planning.31
• In addiƟ on to the progressive reducƟ on of budgets for the army, there was 
a very rapid and extremely massive staﬀ  release of the most experienced sol-
diers (oŌ en even against their will), and the freezing of resources to the arma-
ment of troops, including its modernizaƟ on.32
• It is not the fi rst Ɵ me that such a process has been implemented by the 
Slovak Republic (preparaƟ on of strategy documents, preparaƟ on of Model 
of the Armed Forces of the SR 2010 and 2015), but is this current model 
acceptable?33
• The Army Joint-Chiefs of Staﬀ  lost the competence parƟ cularly in the area of 
actual (not paper) decision-making on fi nancing and procurement of equip-
ment necessary for the performance of its tasks.34
• These competencies were taken over by the oﬃ  cials of the Ministry of De-
fense – transferred to the Minister of Defense, and the head of the Ministry 
Staﬀ , which means that decisions are oŌ en made without the consent of the 
army.
• It is also necessary to state that defense cuts result in resources for the army 
being spread too thin.35
• The fi rst impression given is of a relaxed and someƟ mes unprofessional ap-
proach on the part of those poliƟ cians responsible for naƟ onal defense, and 
of lack of understanding on the part of ciƟ zens as to the the desirability of 
the existence of a naƟ onal army and its membership of NATO, the EU and the 
fulfi llment of its commitments.
• As the system does not funcƟ on, the integrated Ministry of Defense of the 
Slovak Republic, bears the main responsibility for solving the long-term crisis 
in the military.
• It is also necessary to ask what responsibility the Security Council (the for-
mer Council of Defense of the State), CommiƩ ee on Defense and the Security 
29 ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. 
30 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
31 ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. 
32 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
33 BARTKO, F. 2011. Strategické hodnotenie obrany: prostriedok na vyriešenie problémov 
OS SR? [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://cenaa.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2011/04/TransatlanƟ cke-listy-1_2011.pdf.
34 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
35 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
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Council of the SR, but also of the Government of the Slovak Republic have in 
this domain.
• Defense is not only a maƩ er of the Armed Forces (as is oŌ en simplifi ed and 
wrongly understood, and as has also been presented within the objecƟ ves 
and procedures of the SHO (Strategic Defense Review)), but is the responsi-
bility of the State and all its components.36 Thus, this will be a real means of 
addressing the SHO (strategic defense review) of the current situaƟ on, when 
not only are the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in a criƟ cal situaƟ on, 
but the quesƟ on of the security system of the State and the credibility of the 
Slovak Republic within the framework of NATO and the EU has not yet been 
answered, and it is this credibility which is rapidly decreasing due to the fail-
ure of the commitments undertaken by the State.
• It is perhaps also worth examining the level of preparedness and the ability 
of the competent representaƟ ves of the State (legislaƟ ve and execuƟ ve), who 
bear responsibility for defense and security.37
• We agree that the security policy and defense of the Slovak Republic was psy-
chologically perceived as isolated from the rest of the world, and the country 
was perceived as a “small state”.38
• It would be of benefi t to inform the public of the exact purpose of the armed 
forces.
• AŌ er more than 18 years, we have reached a criƟ cal point and that cannot be 
overcome in the short term and in this and other extreme defi cit years.
• Defense (the Army) in the Slovak Republic is not suﬃ  ciently important, not 
even from the perspecƟ ve of the NaƟ onal Government the Security Council 
and the Ministry of Defense), despite internaƟ onal commitments and prom-
ises made to NATO and the EU.
• A huge issue is crisis communicaƟ on in the framework of soluƟ ons of non-
military threats (System of warnings to the populaƟ on, communicaƟ on be-
tween the stakeholders of the integrated rescue system (IZS), Armed Forces 
of the Slovak Republic and crisis staﬀ s at all levels, technical equipment), the 
coordinaƟ on of the deployment and management of the forces and means of 
IZS and Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, the ability of the Government 
authoriƟ es to analyze in parƟ cular, threats to the populaƟ on, to prepare con-
Ɵ ngency plans, and respond properly to the management of crises aŌ er their 
the emergence.39
• The immediate cause was the economic crisis, which forced severe restric-
Ɵ ons and drasƟ c cuts in public spending, aﬀ ecƟ ng defense and requiring re-
forms to the structure of the armed forces.40
36 BARTKO, F. 2011. 
37 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
38 ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. 
39 BARTKO, F. 2011. 
40 VALÁŠEK, T. 2011. Obranné reformy v NATO. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/TransatlanƟ cke-listy-
1_2011.pdf.
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• There is also a lack of coordinaƟ on between individual member states of 
NATO. With a few excepƟ ons, each country examines its situaƟ on in isola-
Ɵ on.
• There is no guarantee that NATO virtually disappear from some important 
types of experience or technology.
• Over 80% of all military equipment purchased (the allies) from domesƟ c 
fi rms, only 13% of the orders is not open to foreign suppliers and 95% of all 
military equipment is owned by the States, not the common property.
• Even though military operaƟ ons take place today mostly under the control of 
NATO, the EU or the United NaƟ ons, each country educates soldiers virtually 
on its own.
• Among 1.6 million troops in the European countries of NATO, only a few thou-
sand serve in integrated internaƟ onal units. The remaining armed forces are 
formed by the government in a way that has essenƟ ally remained unaﬀ ected 
for centuries: the emphasis is on maximum autonomy.
• War is fought today virtually only on the basis of coaliƟ ons or alliances.
• AŌ er the whole of the successful reforms in the years 2000–2005, since 2006 
the Armed Forces have not received support from successive Prime Ministers. 
For the fi rst Ɵ me in the history of the independence of the Slovak Republic, 
not only was there a reducƟ on in defense spending, but also a gradual change 
in percepƟ on of the armed forces on the part of the public. The comment by 
the then Prime Minister, that the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic are 
costly and unnecessary, contributed to this.41
• Frank Boland – “Status of the Slovak army is especially criƟ cal,” NATO mem-
bership is not free and therefore the Alliance conƟ nues to set aside its re-
quest for the defense of the resources to the amount of 2% of GDP.
• Lack of courage of the leaders, and managers, unjusƟ fi ed secrecy, lobbying 
pressures, and lack of vision. Contributed greatly to the current state.
• Military educaƟ on been aﬀ ected by the liquidaƟ on of several academies.
• A signifi cant part of research & development, tesƟ ng and repair was elimi-
nated.
A search for a plan for the development of the security of Slovakia in the Alli-
ance framework is on the agenda. The following issues have been raised:
• An analysis of the current situaƟ on and a summit of Nato oﬃ  cials and states 
would certainly provide a necessary and posiƟ ve input into the issue of ne-
glected security. Detailed comprehensive professional unbiased and non-po-
liƟ cal analysis across departments is very necessary. The quesƟ on is whether 
it is even feasible. If not, the situaƟ on, in principle, cannot be changed for the 
beƩ er. Despite this risk, the analysis must be made.
• On the basis of the analyses, which should not last long, because the Act is 
to be as soon as possible, it is necessary to adopt clear strategic decisions on 
the highest level and convince senior management of the State, ministries 
41 IVANČÍK, R. 2011.
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(including the Ministry of Finance), public administraƟ on and self-govern-
ment, and of course the populaƟ on, because they will pay, that they should 
pay the cost of this.
• While poliƟ cal markeƟ ng thinks about short-term goals, markeƟ ng concern-
ing the security of the state and prevenƟ on is a recent phenomenon, 
• For the above reasons it is necessary to substanƟ ally improve the system of 
communicaƟ on in all relevant levels and areas.
• Of all changes that need to be made, the most crucial is to introduce transpar-
ency regarding the fl ow of money and informaƟ on.
• SubstanƟ al conclusions deriving from the strategic decisions should be en-
shrined in the management documents (ConsƟ tuƟ on, laws, a statement of 
the Government, etc.). The performance of related tasks should be control-
lable by ciƟ zens on the basis of deducƟ ons of relevant structures.
• One of the main components of the soluƟ on should be a binding intenƟ on of 
the ExecuƟ ve to commit in jusƟ fi able terms a necessary fi nancial budget. The 
remedy does not only lie in the earmarking of larger funds for security. This is 
a necessary condiƟ on, but is not in itself suﬃ  cient.
• How much money should be spent and for what purpose should not depend 
on dictates, business plans or poliƟ cal markeƟ ng but rather on honest analy-
sis and a minimum of consent across the relevant poliƟ cal and professional 
markets.
“In the countries of the North AtlanƟ c Alliance funding at the level of 2% of the 
GDP of the country is regarded as suﬃ  cient. This means that the more resources 
the Government and Parliament set aside in favor of the Ministry of Defense, 
and thus also for the benefi t of the armed forces, thus providing an improved 
defense, the more State can ensure that its armed forces achieve the highest pos-
sible level of capabiliƟ es. Of course, this is true if the allocated resources are used 
economically, eﬃ  ciently and eﬀ ecƟ vely, in accordance with the set tasks, objec-
Ɵ ves and prioriƟ es of the sector, country, group and in accordance with the ap-
plicable legislaƟ on”.42
• Yet the state managed to build a professional army, however Ɵ ny and weak. 
The need for suﬃ  cient fi nancial security stems from the following argument:
“In the case of the Slovak Republik the economics of defence are a challenge 
not only because of the defense of its territory and security assistance to the civil-
ian populaƟ on in the event of natural disasters or industrial disasters, but also 
due to the implementaƟ on of internaƟ onal commitments and eﬀ orts to conƟ nue 
the reconstrucƟ on of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic towards relaƟ vely 
small, but professional and modernly equipped armed forces with suﬃ  cient com-
bat potenƟ al, which are able to meet the requirements for compaƟ bility and in-
teroperability with the armed forces of the allies”.43
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.
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• It is quesƟ onable whether the enƟ re breadth of the issues of security, de-
fense and protecƟ on in condiƟ ons of modern threats and contexts has been 
taken into account, namely that this issue combines factors of supranaƟ onal 
and naƟ onal defense. The quesƟ on is whether the new streamlined and ef-
fi cient authority, with suﬃ  cient competence, connected to the sources of 
scienƟ fi c and scienƟ fi c-technical intelligence informaƟ on, could be formed, 
which would with Ɵ me coordinate the issues comprehensively and ensure 
adequate, uniform and secure communicaƟ on between the individual de-
partments, public administraƟ on and Government.
“The white paper, in so far as it is to fulfi ll its purpose, cannot be “only” a doc-
ument of the MOD, it must be a document with which go along the whole (or ma-
jority) of the poliƟ cal spectrum of the State, and which will have a binding charac-
ter for shaping and implemenƟ ng not only the security policy of the State against 
the outside world, but especially for all the components of the State, which by law 
(or by common consent) entails obligaƟ ons and tasks in the fi eld of security and 
defense of the Slovak Republic. This means the document is approved by the Na-
Ɵ onal Council of the Slovak Republic and then it is valid for the enƟ re Slovak Re-
public. The white paper must be a document also for ordinary ciƟ zens, who also 
have their obligaƟ ons and responsibiliƟ es towards the defense of the State”.44
To respect the status of security and defense and the related fi nancing and 
funding science and research. 
Table 4 illustrates the relaƟ onship between GDP (gross domesƟ c product) of 
Slovakia, and expenditure on defense and expenditure on science and research. 
In theory and in pracƟ ce there is a known link between the costs and invest-
ments for defense and security, on the one hand, and the costs and investments 
for science and research in general (and defense and security in parƟ cular). The 
connecƟ on is confi rmed well in our case.
Chart 1 shows the relaƟ ons between the GDP, expenditure on defense and 
security, science and research, as indicated in table 4. It is obvious that GDP has 
increased but expenditure on defense and security and science and research as 
a percentage of GDP shows a constantly decreasing trend. CorrelaƟ on (by Ex-
cel funcƟ on of Corel) between GDP growth for the defense spending shows this 
decrease. The decline in defense spending as a percentage of GDP for the years 
1993 to 2011 represents a value of -0.8658, which is a very high negaƟ ve value 
(the maximum should not exceed -1).
44 BARTKO, F. 2011. 
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Table 4 cost of GDP (gross domesƟ c product) of Slovakia, and expenditure on 
defense and expenditure on science and research
 Year GDP in the Defense Science Expenditure Expenditure on
 Bill. EUR45 in% and research on defense Science and research
  GDP46 in% GDP47 in the Bill. EUR in the Bill. EUR
1993 17.022 2.34 1.45 0.398315 0.246819
1994 18.081 2.31 0.96 0.417671 0.173578
1995 26.11 2.51 0.98 0.655361 0.255878
1996 28.205 2.31 0.97 0.651536 0.273589
1997 29.393 2.13 1.13 0.626071 0.332141
1998 30.698 1.93 0.82 0.592471 0.251724
1999 30.704 1.7 0.68 0.521968 0.208787
2000 31.136 1.62 0.65 0.504403 0.202384
2001 32.191 1.61 0.64 0.518275 0.206022
2002 33.725 1.8 0.57 0.60705 0.192233
2003 35.332 1.77 0.58 0.625376 0.204926
2004 37.173 1.79 0.51 0.665397 0.189582
2005 39.614 1.7 0.51 0.673438 0.202031
2006 47.451 1.62 0.49 0.768706 0.23251
2007 47.451 1.51 0.46 0.71651 0.218275
2008 50.481 1.49 0.47 0.752167 0.237261
2009 48,068 1.49 0.48 0.716213 0.230726
2010 49.19 1.26 0.619794
2011 51.885 1.08 0.560358
2012 0.99
2013 0.91
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, InsƟ tute of Financial Policy of the Mini-
stry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the StaƟ sƟ cal Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic. And the 
sources of the footnotes seen from table 4 and calculated in the last two columns.
45 Ekonomika Slovenska 2011. REÁLNA EKONOMIKA. Vývoj ukazovateľov reálnej eko-
nomiky Slovenskej republiky v období od roku 2005 do roku 2011. EuroEkonóm.sk 
ekonomická príručka moderného ekonóma. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the 
Internet: hƩ p://www.euroekonom.sk/ekonomika/ekonomika-sr/ekonomika-sloven-
ska-2011; Ekonomické indikátory. Hrubý domáci produkt (HDP) v rokoch 1993–2011 
(mil. EUR). [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://openiazoch.zo-
znam.sk/zivot/makro/ukazovatele.asp?iid=HDP&year=ALL.
46 IVANČÍK, R. 2011.
47 VINCÚR, P. 2009. Základné determinanty sociálno-ekonomického rozvoja v dlhodo-
bom horizonte. Podiel výdavkov na vedu a výskum za HDP v SR za roky 1993. – Zdroj: 
ŠÚSR 1994-2008. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.
prog.sav.sk/subory/konf20/Vincur.pdf; Národný program reforiem Slovenskej repub-
liky 2011–2014. apríl 2011. PRÍLOHA č. 1 – Národné ciele stratégie Európa 2020. [onli-
ne]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/
nrp/nrp_slovakia_sk.pdf.
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Graph 1 GDP in mulƟ ples of 10 Bill. EUROS, expenditure on defense and security, 
science and research in % (for the years 2012, 2013, the preliminary plans for the 
Defense)
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, InsƟ tute of Financial Policy of the Mi-
nistry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the StaƟ sƟ cal Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic. And 
the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4.
Chart 2 shows the relaƟ onship between expenditure on defense and security, 
science and research, as indicated in table 4. It is clear that the expenditure on 
defense and security, science and research has demonstrated a constantly de-
creasing trend. CorrelaƟ on (Excel funcƟ on of Corel) as a percentage of GDP on 
defense and science and research for the years 1993 to 2009 represents the value 
of 0.860018, which is a very high posiƟ ve value (the maximum can reach 1).
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Chart 2 the comparison of expenditure on defense and science and research as 
% of GDP, 
Source: the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, InsƟ tute of Financial Policy the 
Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the StaƟ sƟ cal Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic. And 
the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4.
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Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, InsƟ tute of Financial Policy of the Mi-
nistry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the StaƟ sƟ cal Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic. And 
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Conclusion 
A high level of security and defense may be a guarantee for the long life of the 
ciƟ zens of the State. The departments are safe when they work properly. How-
ever, the realizaƟ on of this aim requires many things. The level of 2% of GDP in 
fi nancing defense and security was a reality in the 1997-1998 and the level of 
1.5% of GDP in 2007-2008 (table 4). Today it is likely that this will decrease fur-
ther. Under the infl uence of the crisis and the lack of fi nancial resources, as well 
as the dominance of the requirements for funding in the sectors of Slovakia but 
also in Europe, hopes for an increase in funding are opƟ misƟ c. Growth of 1.5% in 
this electoral term would be a posiƟ ve achievement. The elite should recognize 
the relaƟ onship between defense and security, and science and research in the 
private sector, because the argument from the period of the formaƟ on of the 
Slovak Republic is true only in so far as available resources and the willingness of 
the seller to sell military techniques and technologies. And it is not, nor has never 
been understood.
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Czesław Dzwigaj
My 11th of September 
a Paris Retrospection
This is only a short refl ecƟ on, an essay about one’s own entrusted safety. Only 
the belief that I yearn to feel safe in the place where I live, where I work and 
carry out my dreams or create naƟ onal values. Only the certainty that as a ciƟ zen 
of this country – in which I was born and the burden of which I carry with due 
responsibility together with a full load of imponderablilia – I am aware of the 
pride and responsibility for the safety of my loved ones, my colleagues at work, 
and fi nally, my naƟ on in all aspects of its trends and direcƟ ons. This is also an 
awareness of my own safety and the safety of all of Europe’s ciƟ zens, a shared 
feeling of tradiƟ ons stemming from the history of the Mediterranean World, its 
Roman Catholic legacy, encompassed in every aspect of our philosophy of life and 
humanism, which we must pass on to future generaƟ ons. It is a responsibility for 
the safety of the world. Every one of us – whether an hermit living in a symbolic 
cave of the home or an intellectual journeying through the jungle of numerous 
universiƟ es – through contact with various forms of media (not just the Internet 
or television), is already a global recluse, and must be aware of the fact that, just 
like a microbe, he impacts the psyche of the enƟ re populaƟ on, not only his own, 
and is thus responsible for it – whether he wants to or not.
This is why, regardless of the possibiliƟ es, but fi rst and foremost taking into 
consideraƟ on the conƟ nuously expanding technical possibiliƟ es, we are respon-
sible for the safety of our enƟ re planet. What remains is the safety of the so-called 
hyperspace, the interplanetary space, which is unimaginably signifi cant, but is-
sues linked with this topic, over which we shall yet bow our heads in thought, let 
us leave for a slightly later Ɵ me. 
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September 11th 2001 – Paris. Since noon I had been exploring the Musée 
d’Orsée, admiring the works of impressionists acƟ ve in the 1870s. I was already 
familiar with these works. They had been formerly located in a pavilion in the 
Tuilleries Gardens, between the Place de la Concorde and the Arc de Triomphe. 
In my opinion they presented themselves much beƩ er in that vicinity than here, 
on the third fl oor of a former train staƟ on converted into a museum. But on 
the ground fl oor a large, nineteenth century French sculpture suits the space 
perfectly. Individual stands are also nicely arranged – presenƟ ng various trends 
of 19th century French art. If you visit the museum with a guide – you will not un-
derstand anything. If you are visit it on your own, in your own way – this, by the 
way, pertains to every museum – you will remember the experience for the rest 
of your life, although you are sure to overlook many signifi cant works of art. This 
is because museum curators and art historians are a specifi c breed; like a scrupu-
lous housekeeper they need to have everything in order, neatly folded, Ɵ died up 
and vacuumed on the outside. There is no sense in arguing with their views and 
principles, or – God forbid – presenƟ ng new arguments, meaning a diﬀ erent view 
of a given phenomenon in art.
It is approximately 4 pm, perhaps 5 – European Ɵ me. My brain, fi lled to the 
limits of its possibiliƟ es with a rush of arƟ sƟ c visions, has stopped taking in fur-
ther outside sƟ muli – this means that if one of my readers manages to perceive 
works of art for four, fi ve hours, and is capable of discerning where he has been 
and what he has viewed, what he has contemplated and what conclusions he 
had drawn, and is furthermore aware of where he is, I can only congratulate him; 
that he is sƟ ll alive and that he has managed to arrive at his desƟ naƟ on, his base 
– meaning his hotel or some other nest of respite. As for myself, despite many 
years of training, I “tune out” aŌ er three, four hours of viewing and contempla-
Ɵ on. Flabbergasted, brimming with the mist of painƟ ngs I have viewed, I end up 
at my hotel. Water, shower, silence, despite the fact that I have (or rather – we 
have) a room near a rather busy boulevard. Can you feel, dear reader, that calm-
ing hum of warm water fl owing into the bathtub, enveloping your body, making 
your thoughts driŌ  lazily, indiﬀ erently, wherever, in whichever place on earth, in 
whichever hotel, apartment, room you happen to fi nd yourself in? C’est la vie. 
I confess that aŌ er this point I usually have great arƟ sƟ c ideas. 
But in the meanƟ me, the river of thoughts fl ows unknowingly, I would even 
say reminiscently, conceptually. Various quesƟ ons present themselves; what to 
do, to be my own Ɵ me. You fi ll this Ɵ me thanks to your potenƟ al, but you keep liv-
ing in what will be, in the future. Dreams? Perhaps so, as well as images of those 
that have passed on, but have leŌ  behind such wonderful works of art, and thus 
conƟ nue to live on with us, and we live on with them. How cunningly they have 
outsmarted their Ɵ me.
Somewhere near the open door of the bathroom the television is turned on 
and droning. A blissful state of traveling, sightseeing, of being a Pole and a Euro-
pean. A blissful state, with the enƟ re world open to exploraƟ on. A Ɵ me of free-
dom has come. 
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– Good Lord, a war! How will we return home? The World Trade Center! A war 
in New York!
I see the terrifi ed eyes of my companion running to the bathroom, her horri-
fi ed voice uƩ ering the abovemenƟ oned sentences. I could have reacted only in 
one way. 
– They’re showing some kind of science fi cƟ on movie on TV. Give it a rest, 
we’ve watched enough nonsense about water dams breaking and fl ooding enƟ re 
towns, imagined earthquakes, unforeseeable volcano erupƟ ons and whatnot. 
– For the love of God, it’s a war! Where is Paris, where is Cracow? How will we 
get back? – the terror in my interlocutor’s voice kept rising. 
Submerged in warm water that enveloped me with its delicate velvet not only 
physically, but also Ɵ ckled my mind, calling to mind the painƟ ngs of old masters, 
especially the large one depicƟ ng a Funeral at Ornans, by Gustav Courbet, before 
which I had just a few hours ago contemplated the adequacy of the forms of ex-
pression uƟ lized by the arƟ st to convey pompa morƟ s, the mood of the given mo-
ment. Was the recalled image an adequate representaƟ on of what had actually 
happened in New York, and an adequate expression of a situaƟ on when death 
strikes the bodies of many blue-collar workers entwined forever, as well as pilots, 
who disappear into the ether of fl ammable aircraŌ  fuel and suicide torpedoes – 
was it the cowardice of desperate persons, or the only way out for Icaruses, who 
– in the given situaƟ on – chose the ulƟ mate gravitaƟ onal fl ight of death, running 
from mimeƟ sm of pain? And what were to say those who believed in the strength 
of the fi ght that went down in fl ames? And the dust of hope, grey, common as 
fl our, like daily bread, enveloping those who wanted to bring help and those who 
helped. And this dust and rubble devoured them, as well as those who bravely 
sought to escape it – caught them and shaƩ ered all hope. 
I yelled once more: 
– My dear lady, they’ve fi nally made a good movie, that’s all there is to it. 
Please stop panicking. 
Back then I was a cigareƩ e smoker. Golden Americans. The warm steam given 
oﬀ  by the water, the smoke of a cigareƩ e symbolizing American freedom and 
safety neutralized the nervous behavior of the person bearing Job’s news, be-
ing aired by sagging as far as reliability went – even back then – sources of mass 
informaƟ on. This dreamlike state, I admit, did not last long. Only as long as the 
cigareƩ e. Well, maybe as long as it took to thoroughly dry my enƟ re body and 
all of its limbs with a towel. There was also the disdainful moment, full of irony, 
that it took to sit in my hotel chair and piƟ fully, indulgently “have a gander” at 
the television screen. Sudden consternaƟ on: damn, unfortunately, this was not 
a science fi cƟ on movie. It was a direct, maybe indirect by now, censored visual 
and verbal announcement from New York. 
With disbelief, with calmness, but surely – I became aware that there is no 
longer a safe place on this Earth. This thought began drilling holes in my psyche. 
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I had been there not long ago. I had walked through those streets. Rockefeller 
Center. I had been at that very spot, had even kneeled in a church pew – a church 
located right next to those famous twin towers, so characterisƟ c of the Manhat-
tan skyline. I had personally felt good in the shade cast by the church’s interior, 
and not on the street, overwhelmed by the tall, large-scale, inhuman towers. 
OŌ en, when the clouds lowered themselves (and I’ve seen this on several occa-
sions), I had the feeling that the towers were devouring them – that this architec-
tural-engineering concept was striving towards the clouds. I will truthfully admit 
that I do not “feel” New York, I do not understand the fascinaƟ on of those who 
love this organized anthill. As far as human adjustment to this gigantomania is 
concerned, I prefer the Sears Tower in Chicago, or even Hong Kong – nameless, 
brimming with bird-human cages.
For the fi rst Ɵ me in my life, I felt personally threatened. No, I was not afraid. 
But just as two skyscrapers had shaƩ ered, metaphysically returning to Mother 
Earth in clouds of dust consuming more vicƟ ms than can be readily counted, 
I also felt the uncertainty of the cloud of danger. Not physical danger. A danger 
that lives in the consciousness and paralyzes the thoughts concerning the cer-
tainty of personal goodness. Of being a person that aims towards – regardless 
of circumstances – beauty and good. That moment in the hotel room in Paris on 
the 11th of September 2001, late aŌ ernoon European Ɵ me, gave proof to the evil 
that lurks on the dark side of every human being. At this moment my mind’s eye 
saw images of Hitler’s concentraƟ on camps, confi rmed a few years later by pho-
tographs in Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. At this moment I saw Treblinka, its large 
grounds with crematoria. Here fl eeƟ ng images of people jumping from windows 
on the television screen, there countless eyes looking at life from a thousand pho-
tographs. Tormentors with a diﬀ erent concept and ideology. Terrorists and Nazis, 
cursed idiots, but human in every dimension. Born, fed by their mother’s milk, 
full of childhood, joy, hope, beauty, love. The children of the Ɵ mes, deeply gazing 
into eyes, charming smile of good. This pertains to both groups. The killers and 
their vicƟ ms. Yet the source and beginning of the road was the same. The same 
for each of us. What happens along the road? The crossover is impercepƟ ble, and 
we later stand across from each other, without sense, without logic’s boundar-
ies. Where does the point begin, beyond the feeling of safety diminishes? AŌ er 
the fact of terrorism? Or maybe earlier, during a perfectly decent conversaƟ on, 
while taking a break from everyday chores, or perhaps when our own imagined 
aspiraƟ ons are unsuccessful. Or maybe on a completely diﬀ erent level, in indoc-
trinaƟ on that we are subjected to slowly as if it were a dose of poison, which 
inoculates us day by day, only to later kill the humanity in us. Not only us – but 
everything that surrounds us. 
11th of September 2001. New York, Paris, the beginning of the 21st century, 
basically a breakthrough, convenƟ onal date. The start of the third century. Were 
the campaigns, wars and baƩ les carried out in past centuries only an illustrated 
history of toy soldiers clad in various uniforms, a rank ancillary to the enƟ re sys-
tem, serving the commander. OŌ en a great commander, behind whom marched 
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an enƟ re logisƟ c front in various types and parades. Very liƩ le is wriƩ en or said 
about it, though oŌ en the enƟ re theatre of war depended on it; Victory depend-
ed on it. 
There is talk about the number of vicƟ ms, injured, these are numbers, but 
fi rst and foremeost about the genius aƩ esƟ ng to the great strategic concept of 
the commander or those in command. Let us recall only the defense and failure 
of ancient Troy, the Greek marches predaƟ ng Christ, the heroism of the Spartans, 
the ingenuity of the Jewish naƟ on, the refusal to surrender at Masada, and even 
the mutual killing of its Zealot defenders, in order not give Rome the saƟ sfac-
Ɵ on of victory in the Judean Desert, the conquests of Ancient Rome, et cetera. 
Let us recall the logisƟ cs, meaning the establishment of the Cracow Merchants’ 
CongregaƟ on in 1410, which supplied the knights fi ghƟ ng in Grunwald, which 
opposed the Teutonic Order. Let us use our arƟ sƟ c imaginaƟ on and the magic 
of hearing the boom of the cannons and the clank of snare drums of Napoleon’s 
armies riding on horseback with their enƟ re fl eets with supplies, passing not only 
through Europe – from Spain to Austria, but also Egypt and Moscow. Let us recall 
the strategies behind naƟ onal uprisings of our forefathers. The Kosciuszko Upris-
ing, Kosciuszko on the Cracow Square, November of 1830, January of 1863, the 
strange year 1846, with Jacob Szela, and later World War I. Its staƟ onary war the-
atre and brother aiming at his own brother’s heart, who unknowingly was forced 
to stand on the opposite side of the barricade. The Soviet War of 1920. The en-
emy at Warsaw’s gates – it is certain that before the concept of Bolshevism all of 
Europe stands open; the selfsame Europe we travel through today as if it were 
our home town, familiar since childhood, without the need to explain anything 
by showing our passports. 
And the cataclysm of World War II. The insanity of ideology. People did not 
count; their feelings did not count. Love, everyday toils, the touch of a hand, fam-
ily homes. Someone who is a mother, a father, knows what it means to touch the 
clumsy, Ɵ ny fi ngers of a child. For each of us the small world we remember on 
a given day, in a given moment, unforgeƩ able, usually in our memory throughout 
our lives. This is the world of New York and Paris, which was bright and sunny. 
Full of joy. 
On that day I understood the need for higher security measures that have 
been internaƟ onally implemented by socieƟ es, responsible persons and deci-
sion-makers with regard to the millions of people travelling all over the globe. We 
do this in order not to limit personal freedoms, equality and respect for personal 
dignity, but to simultaneously maintain maximum security measures and prevent 
the unforeseeable consequences of acts of terrorism, which, usually, aﬀ ect in-
nocent people. 
And here we reach the crux of the maƩ er of so-called security; not only na-
Ɵ onal security but also internaƟ onal security. What measures to use, how to pre-
pare the right people, what staﬀ  members to call in order not to limit the person-
al freedoms of the individual, who has to undergo a certain type of invigilaƟ on, in 
various forms, and has to be aware of the obligaƟ on to submit to various rigors, 
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must understand without force that this is not a limitaƟ on of personal freedoms. 
On the other hand, where does the limit to invigilaƟ on and prevenƟ on lie, both 
on the physical, psychological and sociological levels, but also – most importantly 
– on the ideological level. These boundaries are fl uid and easily blurred, within 
not only the Ɵ meframe of decades, but also months. What only a few months 
ago was unacceptable, punishable both in the naƟ onal and internaƟ onal legal 
system, becomes an enforceable law. With Ɵ me a so-called feedback takes place, 
and what was once a crime becomes a logical acƟ on. What can be done to feel 
safe while aƩ ending a lecture, while siƫ  ng in a café garden overlooking the Cra-
cow square, or, e.g., at the Place du Tertre in Paris, and not to have the conscious-
ness that something may suddenly happen resƟ ng on one’s shoulders, or, if you 
prefer, at the back of your mind. How can one feel safe while carrying out a public 
funcƟ on, as a diplomat, MEP or a senator. How can one feel safe at home, on 
their street, on the crosswalk while crossing the street in the arms of their closest 
loved one. Each of us surely knows the answer to these quesƟ ons, depending 
on actual or imagined circumstances. In my opinion there is no one, unequivo-
cal answer. As they say, circumstances are dynamic and unforeseeable. Thus the 
answers also cannot be comparable, or unambiguous, or instrucƟ onal. 
Yet this essay should have a moral or end with a generally-accepted conclu-
sion. So this general conclusion is: limited confi dence. When we enter the pe-
destrian crosswalk in front of a car we must have limited confi dence that the 
driver’s refl exes will not fail. But perhaps technology will fail – the brakes will not 
work – and what will happen then? Limited confi dence at the airport: someone 
leŌ  behind a briefcase or backpack. Our refl ex is to yell and call the person who 
forgot their luggage. Yet what could happen, if the baggage or briefcase has been 
leŌ  behind on purpose? How many good Samaritans, those who did exactly that, 
have passed on? But how to have limited confi dence in our loved one, the person 
closest to us? Is it appropriate to formulate such a quesƟ on at all? 
But on memorable 9/11 the four pilots handling the planes were fully reli-
able employees, entrusted with the fate and lives of a few hundred passengers. 
These pilots operated planes, inter alia, from Boston to New York. Others hit the 
Pentagon, others did not make it to the White House, but were destroyed in mid-
air. Nota bene, two refl ecƟ ons: one concerns the passengers on board the fl ight 
that was to hit the White House. The cell phone transcripts of a reporter who 
was aware of the situaƟ on show her sending informaƟ on to family members and 
then, a heroic deed – not believing that her life could be saved, which was indeed 
true – allowed security services to locate the plane and take it down. A great 
fi gure; a woman aware of her heroism. 
Yet there is the other side of the coin. The reverse. A person, hitherto anony-
mous, who makes the decision to shoot down the passenger plane, on board of 
which are a few dozen passengers, including the aforemenƟ oned journalist, as 
well as the terrorist piloƟ ng it. A death sentence mulƟ plied by the number of 
deaths of innocent people. The decision maker’s trauma – incalculable. A choice 
of the lesser of two evils. Let us ponder a quesƟ on. There is a threat, like the one 
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in the case being described. Could the person holding the responsible posiƟ on 
make the right decision within, let’s say, a dozen or so minutes: yes or no? We 
have to ask the quesƟ on: are the regulaƟ ons and procedures in force capable 
of logically substanƟ aƟ ng the right decision? In my opinion – no. Because it is 
always the person who maƩ ers: his knowledge, state of mind, and – above all – 
his humanitarianism. 
It may seem to us that the higher we are in the hierarchy of a given govern-
ment service or company, the greater the honor. Unfortunately I believe the op-
posite to be true: the greater the moral and civil responsibility of our everyday 
tasks, unnoƟ ceable in the burden of Sisyphean, thankless at Ɵ mes downright 
absurd duƟ es. Yet in extreme situaƟ ons the posiƟ ve awareness of these acƟ ons 
reveals itself, the aptness of these seemingly stupid regulaƟ ons, and fi rst and 
foremost, intuiƟ on and experience. 
I did not understand this unƟ l 2002, when treading upon wooden plaƞ orms 
I gazed upon the remains of the World Trade Center. When I read the lists of 
names of those who had disappeared into the ether and those who had faced the 
hard concrete of New York’s sidewalks. The fence of a nearby church had been 
covered with signs and photos of those who had given their lives to save others. 
I entered the church. I kneeled in the same pew as a few months before. I prayed 
for the dead and said to myself: you cannot live only parƟ ally trusƟ ng yourself, 
your friend, the enƟ re world. And yet…! There is something to it, that without 
this parƟ al trust you can also no longer live.
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Memorials are the message from those who have gone 
for us and for the future generaƟ ons
Fig. 1.Krakow, Rakowicki Cemetery – For VicƟ ms of Genocide. Source: author’s collecƟ on
My 11th of September a Paris Retrospection 101
Fig. 2. Zawiercie – Those for which God, Honor and Fatherland. Source: author’s collec-
Ɵ on
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Fig. 3. Krakow, Fr. Peter Skarga. Source: author’s collecƟ on
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Fig. 4. Bochnia, General Leopold Okulicki “Niedźwiadek” (The LiƩ le Bear). Source: author’s 
collecƟ on
Fig. 5. Augustow, Obelisk. Source: author’s own collecƟ on
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Fig. 6. Tarnow, King Ladislaus Łokietek (the Short). Source: Author’s collecƟ on
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Fig.7. Krakow, The Monument of Józef Piłsudski, the fi rst Polish Marshal. Source: author’s 
collecƟ on

Janusz Liber
Counterintelligence Support 
to Military Operations
US Armed Forces are deployed all over the world. In 2007 there were 737 US Mili-
tary Bases in the world with more than 2,500,000 U.S. personnel serving across 
the planet.1
AddiƟ onally US soldiers have taken part in every kind of military operaƟ ons 
such as Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan. Since the Second World War 
US military personnel have faced the threat of terrorism for several decades, and 
examining previous aƩ acks can provide valuable insight into the problem. 
The security environment requires that deployed military units, forward-
based acƟ viƟ es, and forward operaƟ ng bases protect themselves against threats 
designed to interrupt, interfere with, or impair the eﬀ ecƟ veness of joint op-
eraƟ ons. Base and lines of communicaƟ ons (LOCs) security must be properly 
planned, prepared, executed, and assessed to prevent or miƟ gate hosƟ le acƟ ons 
against US personnel, resources, faciliƟ es, equipment, and informaƟ on.2 Threat 
acƟ viƟ es can be generally described and categorized in three levels. Each level 
or any combinaƟ on of levels may exist in the operaƟ onal area, independently or 
simultaneously.3
Typical Level I threats4 include enemy agents and terrorists whose primary 
missions include espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Enemy acƟ vity and indi-
vidual terrorist aƩ acks may include random or directed killing of military and civil-
ian personnel, kidnapping, and/or guiding special purpose individuals or teams 
1 hƩ p://www.alternet.org/story/47998.
2 Joint Security OperaƟ ons in Theater, Joint PublicaƟ on 3-10, 03 February 2010, p. VII.
3 Ib. p. VII.
4 Ib. p. VII.
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to targets. Level II threats5 include small-scale, irregular forces conducƟ ng uncon-
venƟ onal warfare that can pose serious threats to military forces and civilians. 
These aƩ acks can cause signifi cant disrupƟ ons to military operaƟ ons as well as 
the orderly conduct of local government and services. Level III threats6 may be 
encountered when a threat force has the capability of projecƟ ng combat power 
by air, land, or sea, anywhere into the operaƟ onal area. Level III threats neces-
sitate a decision to commit a tacƟ cal combat force (TCF) or other signifi cant avail-
able forces to counter the threat. 
Commanders use intelligence to anƟ cipate the baƩ le, visualize and under-
stand the full spectrum of the operaƟ onal environment, and infl uence the out-
come of operaƟ ons. Intelligence enables commanders at all levels to focus their 
combat power and to provide full dimensional force protecƟ on across the range 
of military operaƟ ons.7 In war, intelligence focuses on enemy military capabili-
Ɵ es, centers of gravity (COGs), and potenƟ al courses of acƟ on (COAs) to provide 
operaƟ onal and tacƟ cal commanders the informaƟ on they need to plan and con-
duct operaƟ ons.8
The aƩ ack against the US Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon serves as a use-
ful starƟ ng point for examining Department of Defense intelligence acƟ viƟ es.9 On 
October 23, 1983 a vehicle packed with the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT 
penetrated the security perimeter of the US Marine conƟ ngent at Beirut Inter-
naƟ onal Airport, crashed into the BaƩ alion Landing Team Headquarters Building, 
and exploded. The explosion destroyed the building and killed 241 Marines.10 
On June 25, 1996 a truck bomb exploded outside the perimeter of Khobar Tow-
ers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The explosion destroyed a building used to house 
US military personnel, and resulted in the deaths of 19 Air Force members.11 On 
October 12, 2000 the USS Cole was aƩ acked while the ship was refueling in the 
port of Aden, Yemen. 
Commanders at all levels depend on Ɵ mely, accurate informaƟ on and in-
telligence on an adversary’s disposiƟ ons, strategy, tacƟ cs, intent, objecƟ ves, 
strengths, weaknesses, values, capabiliƟ es, and criƟ cal vulnerabiliƟ es.12 The 
intelligence process is comprised of a wide variety of interrelated intelligence 
5 Ib. p. VII–VIII.
6 Ib. p. VIII
7 Joint and NaƟ onal Intelligence Support to Military OperaƟ ons, Joint PublicaƟ on 2-01, 
05 January 2012, p. IX.
8 Ib. p. X.
9 Michel T. Imbus, IdenƟ fying Threats, Improving Intelligence and Counterintelligence 
Support to Force ProtecƟ on, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 2002, p. 7.
10 US Department of Defense. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut InternaƟ onal 
Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. Washington D.C.: Commission on Beirut Inter-
naƟ onal Airport Terrorist Act, 20 December 1983, 3,32. 
11 US Department of Defense. Force ProtecƟ on Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and 
Khobar Towers. Washington D.C.: Downing Assessment Task Force, 30 August, 1996, 
VIII. 
12 Joint and NaƟ onal Intelligence, op. cit. p. XVI.
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operaƟ ons: planning and direcƟ on, tasking and collecƟ on, processing and exploi-
taƟ on, analysis and producƟ on, disseminaƟ on and integraƟ on, and evaluaƟ on 
and feedback. These intelligence operaƟ ons must focus on the commander’s 
mission and concept of operaƟ ons.13
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)14 is a major producer and manager 
of foreign military intelligence for the Department of Defense and is a princi-
pal member of the United States Intelligence Community. Established on Octo-
ber 1, 1961, and designated a combat support agency in 1986, DIA’s mission is 
to provide Ɵ mely, objecƟ ve, all-source military intelligence to policymakers, to 
U.S. armed forces around the world, and to the U.S. acquisiƟ on community and 
force planners to counter a variety of threats and challenges across the spectrum 
of confl ict. It performs all military intelligence and counterintelligence funcƟ ons 
to collect, process, retain, or disseminate informaƟ on.15 The main aim of these 
acƟ viƟ es is to provide adequate, Ɵ mely and reliable intelligence and counterin-
telligence for Military Departments and other agencies as directed by competent 
authoriƟ es.16
Intelligence disciplines are well-defi ned areas of intelligence planning, collec-
Ɵ on, processing, exploitaƟ on, analysis and producƟ on, and disseminaƟ on using 
a specifi c category of technical or human resources.17 Intelligence sources can 
be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors, and are grouped ac-
cording to one of the seven major intelligence disciplines: geospaƟ al intelligence 
(GEOINT); human intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT); measure-
ment and signature intelligence (MASINT); open-source intelligence (OSINT); 
technical intelligence (TECHINT); and counterintelligence (CI).18 Intelligence has 
two objecƟ ves: to reduce uncertainty by providing accurate, Ɵ mely, and relevant 
knowledge about the threat and the surrounding environment, and to assist in 
protecƟ ng friendly forces (including Department of Defense personnel, family 
members, resources, faciliƟ es and criƟ cal informaƟ on) through counterintelli-
gence.19
The Defense Intelligence Community is headed by the DIA, through its Direc-
tor (who chairs the Military Intelligence Board), and it coordinates the acƟ viƟ es of 
the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force intelligence components.20 The DIA 
13 Ib. p. XVI.
14 hƩ p://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/gov-orgs/dia, An Overview 
of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111.
15 Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER5240.01 DoD Intelligence AcƟ viƟ es, Au-
gust 27, 2007. 
16 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint PublicaƟ on 1, 02 May 2007 
IncorporaƟ ng Change 1, 20 March 2009, p. III-11.
17 Joint Intelligence (Joint PublicaƟ on 2-0), Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ , 22 June 2007, p. I-5.
18 Ib. p. I-5.
19 Intelligence OperaƟ ons MCWP 2-1, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United 
States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-1775, 10 September 2003.
20 hƩ p://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Intelligence_Agency.
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consists of several centers and directorates,21 e.g. the Directorate for Analysis, 
the Defense Intelligence OperaƟ ons CoordinaƟ on Center, and the Directorate for 
Intelligence but for the purposes of this arƟ cle the most important is the Defense 
Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center. It is mandated to manage, develop and 
execute U.S. Department of Defense counter intelligence and human intelligence 
acƟ viƟ es worldwide;22 it is also responsible for oversight for training, doctrine, 
policy, informaƟ on technology architecture, planning and career management.23 
For example, the Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence 
Center, takes part in Defense CriƟ cal Infrastructure Program (DCIP) and in this 
fi eld shall:24
• Deconfl ict CI acƟ viƟ es when mulƟ ple CI elements have an interest in the 
same criƟ cal asset. 
• Provide program management and deconfl icƟ on to Department of Defense 
components providing Counterintelligence support to the DCIP. 
• Coordinate with DoD Counterintelligence elements to develop and imple-
ment performance measures for CI support to the DCIP. 
• Create and maintain informaƟ on databases for Department of Defense Coun-
terintelligence support to the DCIP. 
• Develop and manage an advanced Department of Defense level training pro-
gram for Counterintelligence support to the DCIP.
CI acƟ viƟ es shall be undertaken to detect, idenƟ fy, assess, exploit, and coun-
ter or neutralize the intelligence collecƟ on eﬀ orts, other intelligence acƟ viƟ es, 
sabotage, terrorist acƟ viƟ es, and assassinaƟ on eﬀ orts of foreign powers, orga-
nizaƟ ons, or persons directed against the Department of Defense, its personnel, 
informaƟ on, materiel, faciliƟ es and acƟ viƟ es.25 The Department of Defense de-
scribes counterintelligence26 as informaƟ on gathered and acƟ viƟ es conducted to 
idenƟ fy, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence 
acƟ viƟ es, sabotage, or assassinaƟ ons conducted for or on behalf of foreign pow-
ers, organizaƟ ons or persons or their agents, or internaƟ onal terrorist organiza-
Ɵ ons or acƟ viƟ es. CI consƟ tutes acƟ ve and passive measures intended to deny 
a threat force valuable informaƟ on about the friendly situaƟ on, to detect and 
neutralize hosƟ le intelligence collecƟ on, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly 
capabiliƟ es and intenƟ ons.27
21 hƩ p://www.dia.mil/about/organizaƟ on.
22 hƩ p://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/07/defense_intel_reorg.html.
23 hƩ p://www.defense.gov/news/newsarƟ cle.aspx?id=50718.
24 Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5240.19, Counterintelligence Support 
for Defense CriƟ cal Infrastructure Program, August 27, 2007, IncorporaƟ ng Change 1, 
December 28, 2010. 
25 Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 5240.2, DoD Counterintelligence (CI), 
May 22, 1997. 
26 Department of Defense DicƟ onary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint PublicaƟ on 
1-02, 8 November 2010, p. 79.
27 Intelligence OperaƟ ons, op. cit. p. A-3.
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CI counters or neutralizes foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) and 
internaƟ onal terrorist organizaƟ ons (ITO) intelligence collecƟ on eﬀ orts. It does 
this through collecƟ on, CI invesƟ gaƟ ons, operaƟ ons, analysis, producƟ on, and 
funcƟ onal and technical services. CI includes all acƟ ons taken to detect, idenƟ fy, 
track, exploit, and neutralize the mulƟ discipline intelligence acƟ viƟ es of friends, 
compeƟ tors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies. It is the key intelligence com-
munity contributor to the protecƟ on of U.S. interests and equiƟ es. CI helps iden-
Ɵ fy EEFIs28 by idenƟ fying vulnerabiliƟ es to threat collecƟ on and acƟ ons taken to 
counter collecƟ on and operaƟ ons against U.S. forces.29 According to Joint Intelli-
gence30 CI analyzes the threats posed by foreign intelligence and security services 
and the intelligence acƟ viƟ es of non-state actors such as organized crime, terror-
ist groups, and drug traﬃ  ckers. CI analysis incorporates all-source informaƟ on 
and the results of CI invesƟ gaƟ ons and operaƟ ons to support a mulƟ discipline 
analysis of the force protecƟ on threat.
CI is similar to, and oŌ en confused with, HUMINT, as CI uses many of the 
same techniques for informaƟ on collecƟ on. CI obtains informaƟ on by or through 
the funcƟ ons of CI operaƟ ons, invesƟ gaƟ ons, collecƟ on and reporƟ ng, analysis, 
producƟ on, disseminaƟ on, and funcƟ onal services.31 The funcƟ on of CI is to pro-
vide direct support to operaƟ onal commanders, program managers, and decision 
makers. This support includes: CI support to force protecƟ on during all types and 
phases of military operaƟ ons; detecƟ on idenƟ fi caƟ on and neutralizaƟ on of espi-
onage; anƟ terrorism; threat assessments; countering illegal technology transfer; 
acquisiƟ ons systems protecƟ on; support to other intelligence acƟ viƟ es; informa-
Ɵ on systems protecƟ on; and treaty support.32
Counterintelligence (CI) in the Combatant Commands and Other Department 
of Defense Components is strictly described by DoD instrucƟ on.33 According to 
this regulaƟ on:34
• Authorized CI acƟ viƟ es shall be conducted in the Department of Defense 
Components as part of an integrated DoD and naƟ onal eﬀ ort. 
• CI invesƟ gaƟ ons shall only be conducted by the MDCOs35 and in accordance 
with DoD regulaƟ ons. 
• All Department of Defense personnel conducƟ ng CI acƟ viƟ es shall aƩ end for-
mal CI training approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 
the Secretaries of the Military Departments, or their designees.
28 EssenƟ al Elements of Friendly InformaƟ on – key quesƟ ons likely to be asked by adver-
sary oﬃ  cials and intelligence systems about specifi c friendly intenƟ ons, capabiliƟ es, 
and acƟ viƟ es, so they can obtain answers criƟ cal to their operaƟ onal eﬀ ecƟ veness. 
29 FM 2-0 Intelligence, Headquarters Department of the Army, March 2010, p. 1-22.
30 Joint Intelligence, op. cit. p. I-19.
31 Ib. p. B-7.
32 Ib. p. B-7.
33 Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5240.10Counterintelligence (CI) in the 
Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components, October 5, 2011.
34 Ib. p. 1-2.
35 MDCO (Military Department Counterintelligence OrganizaƟ on) – Army Counterintel-
ligence, Naval Criminal InvesƟ gaƟ ve Service, Air Force Oﬃ  ce of Special InvesƟ gaƟ ons. 
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The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ , shall:36
Develop a CI capability to conduct authorized CI acƟ viƟ es or rely on the sup-
porƟ ng MDCO. 
• Select Military Department-nominated personnel to serve as the CCICA37 and 
conduct and exercise staﬀ  coordinaƟ on authority over CI acƟ viƟ es. 
• Establish a wriƩ en agreement with the supporƟ ng MDCO that describes the 
ongoing and conƟ nued CI support MDCO shall provide. 
• Annually or as directed by emerging operaƟ onal needs, idenƟ fy, prioriƟ ze, 
and disseminate resource requirements for the individual Combatant Com-
mand headquarters to the Joint Staﬀ  with copies provided to the Director, 
DCHC, and the MDCOs. 
• Ensure that eﬀ ecƟ ve measures exist to compartmentalize and protect sensi-
Ɵ ve CI invesƟ gaƟ ve or operaƟ ons informaƟ on and techniques which are in 
support of the Combatant Command.
The CI agencies (Military Department Counterintelligence OrganizaƟ ons) 
within the four Services have historically demonstrated dramaƟ cally diﬀ erent 
CI areas of emphasis, concepts of operaƟ ons, and methods of execuƟ on.38 The 
Naval Criminal InvesƟ gaƟ ve Service and the Air Force Oﬃ  ce of Special InvesƟ ga-
Ɵ ons have tradiƟ onally viewed CI with a strategic focus drawn from their per-
specƟ ves as, primarily, law enforcement organizaƟ ons.39 The NCIS has exclusive 
responsibility for CI policy development and implementaƟ on and execuƟ on and 
management of CI programs, with the excepƟ on of those combat and combat 
related CI responsibiliƟ es of the Marine Corps. CI acƟ viƟ es of the NCIS are funded 
from the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP). The OSI is a fi eld-operaƟ ng 
agency of the Air Force. CI acƟ viƟ es of the OSI are also funded from the Foreign 
Counterintelligence Program (FCIP). Like the NCIS, there is no programmaƟ c pro-
vision in the OSI for tacƟ cal intelligence and related acƟ viƟ es (TIARA) funding or 
resources. The Army and Marine Corps maintain CI as a component of their intel-
ligence staﬀ s. The Marine Corps CI orientaƟ on is enƟ rely tacƟ cal, with funding 
exclusively within the DON’s budget for TIARA. The Army emphasizes both stra-
tegic and tacƟ cal CI and is supported by a mixture of FCIP and TIARA resources.40 
Taking into account that the US Marine Corps and the Army conduct the most 
common operaƟ ons (ground operaƟ ons) I am going to focus mainly on the CI 
acƟ viƟ es connected with these Services. 
36 Ib.p.7.
37 Command Counterintelligence CoordinaƟ ngAuthority (CCICA) – The senior command 
representaƟ ve to conduct and exercise staﬀ  coordinaƟ on authority over CI acƟ viƟ es. 
Develops and implements the Combatant Command’s CI strategy and plans, serves 
as the focal point for CI issues impacƟ ng the command, idenƟ fi es command resource 
requirements, and coordinates CI support to the command.
38 Counterintelligence U.S. Marine CorpsMCWP 2-14, Department of the Navy Head-
quarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380-17755 September 2000, 
p. 1-3.
39 Ib. p. 1-3.
40 Ib. p. 1-3.
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Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5240.10 Counterintelligence 
(CI) in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components41 states that the 
senior CI advisor and subject maƩ er expert to the Combatant Command, the, 
CCICA, shall be in the military grade of 05 or 06, or civilian equivalent, and have 
CI experience. The main aims of the CCICA are:42
• Develop and implement the Combatant Commands’ and Joint Staﬀ ’s CI strat-
egy and plans; integrate CI into Combatant Command and Joint Staﬀ  planning, 
operaƟ ons, exercises, and other acƟ viƟ es; idenƟ fy and forward Command re-
source requirements; coordinate CI support as needed by the Command; and 
oversee CI acƟ viƟ es supporƟ ng the Combatant Command headquarters staﬀ  
and geographically separated elements. 
• Provide for staﬀ  supervision, awareness, deconfl icƟ on, and coordinaƟ on of CI 
acƟ viƟ es and policies within the Combatant Command AOR. 
• IdenƟ fy and provide Combatant Command resource requirements to the Di-
rector, DCHC.
Counterintelligence supports commanders providing them with informaƟ on 
and conducƟ ng acƟ viƟ es in the fi eld of credibility assessment, CI invesƟ gaƟ ons, 
Technical Surveillance Countermeasure, CI Awareness and ReporƟ ng (CIAR), CI 
Security Classifi caƟ on Guide, Oﬀ ensive Counterintelligence OperaƟ ons (OFCO), 
CI CollecƟ on, CI Analysis and ProducƟ on, CI Inquiries, Force ProtecƟ on. Research, 
Development, and AcquisiƟ on (RDA) and other.
The Army conducts aggressive, comprehensive, and coordinated counterin-
telligence acƟ viƟ es worldwide, to detect, idenƟ fy, assess, and counter, neutral-
ize, or exploit the intelligence collecƟ on eﬀ orts, other intelligence acƟ viƟ es, sab-
otage, subversion, sediƟ on, terrorist acƟ viƟ es, and assassinaƟ on eﬀ orts of for-
eign powers, organizaƟ ons, or persons directed against Department of the Army 
or Department of Defense personnel, informaƟ on, materiel, and acƟ viƟ es. This 
mission will be accomplished during peaceƟ me and all levels of confl ict.43 Army 
CI has four primary mission areas:44
• Counterespionage.
• Support to force protecƟ on.
• Support to research and technology protecƟ on.
• Cyber CI.
CI core competencies are interrelated, mutually supporƟ ng, and can be de-
rived from one another. The CI core competencies include:45
• OperaƟ ons.
• InvesƟ gaƟ ons.
• CollecƟ on.
41 Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5240.10 Counterintelligence, op. cit. 
p. 8.
42 Ib. p. 8.
43 Military Intelligence the Army Counterintelligence Program Army RegulaƟ on 381-20, 
Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 15 November 1993, p. 1.
44 FM 2-0 Intelligence, op. cit. p. 6-1.
45 Ib. p. 6-2.
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• Technical services and support.
• Analysis and producƟ on.
Counterintelligence operaƟ ons are broadly executed CI acƟ viƟ es that support 
a program or specifi c mission. CI operaƟ ons46 are proacƟ ve acƟ viƟ es designed to 
idenƟ fy, exploit, neutralize, or deter foreign intelligence collecƟ on and terrorist 
acƟ viƟ es directed against the United States. Oﬀ ensive CI operaƟ ons in the US 
Marine Corps use of specialized CI techniques and procedures. They are directed 
against espionage, sabotage, subversion, and the threat of terrorism. These op-
eraƟ ons are planned, coordinated, and conducted by MAGTF47 CI personnel and 
include the following operaƟ ons:48
• Counterespionage OperaƟ ons.
• Countersubversion OperaƟ ons.
• Countersabotage OperaƟ ons.
• Counterterrorism OperaƟ ons. 
• ExploitaƟ on and NeutralizaƟ on OperaƟ ons. 
There are two types of Army CI operaƟ ons—special operaƟ ons and general 
operaƟ ons.49 Special operaƟ ons involve direct or indirect engagement with FIS 
through human source or technical eﬀ orts. General operaƟ ons are usually de-
fensive in nature and are aimed at supporƟ ng force protecƟ on programs and 
formal security programs of Army commanders at all levels. Included in general 
operaƟ ons are:50
• Advice and assistance programs.
• Technical support acƟ viƟ es.
• Support to acquisiƟ on and SAP.
• Support to intelligence disciplines.
• Support to treaty verifi caƟ on.
• Support to domesƟ c civil disturbances.
• Support to natural disaster operaƟ ons.
• Support to HUMINT.
CI techniques are means used to accomplish the mission eﬃ  ciently and ef-
fecƟ vely.
SelecƟ on of techniques occurs at the lowest level possible by the on-scene 
CI element to meet the needs of the supported military commander within the 
constraints of the operaƟ on and applicable regulaƟ ons. Techniques include vul-
nerability assessments, hosƟ le intelligence simulaƟ on (Red Team), and covering 
agent support.51
46 Department of Defense DicƟ onary of Military and Associated Terms, op. cit. p. 80.
47 Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
48 Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit. p. 2-1.
49 FM 34-60, op. cit. p. 3-1.
50 Ib. p. 3-2.
51 AR 381-20 Military Intelligence The Army Counterintelligence Program, Department of 
the Army Washington, DC 15 November 1993, p. 14.
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CI invesƟ gaƟ ons are conducted when naƟ onal security crimes are allegedly 
commiƩ ed by anyone under CI authority. Counterintelligence invesƟ gaƟ on52 is 
an oﬃ  cial, systemaƟ c search for facts to determine whether a person is engaged 
in acƟ viƟ es that may be injurious to US naƟ onal security or advantageous to 
a foreign power. Counterintelligence InvesƟ gaƟ ons are invesƟ gaƟ ons concern-
ing personnel, security maƩ ers, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive 
acƟ viƟ es, including defecƟ on.53
I am going to show an example of CI invesƟ gaƟ ons in the fi eld of acƟ viƟ es car-
ried out by US Army CI. The Army counterintelligence conducts two types of in-
vesƟ gaƟ ons: CI invesƟ gaƟ ons (aka Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US 
Army and Deliberate Security ViolaƟ ons invesƟ gaƟ ons) and personnel security 
invesƟ gaƟ ons.54 CI invesƟ gaƟ ve jurisdicƟ on is derived from naƟ onal, Department 
of Defense, and Army policy that defi nes the types of incidents and personnel 
who are subject to invesƟ gaƟ on by Army CI components. Army CI jurisdicƟ on 
includes the following:55
• Treason.
• Espionage and spying.
• Subversion.
• SediƟ on.
• FIS-directed sabotage.
• CI aspects of terrorist acƟ viƟ es directed against the Army.
• CI aspects of assassinaƟ on or incapacitaƟ on of Army personnel by terrorists 
or by agents of a foreign power.
• InvesƟ gaƟ on of the circumstances surrounding the defecƟ on of military per-
sonnel, and DA civilians overseas, and debriefi ng of the individual upon return 
to U.S. control. InvesƟ gaƟ on of the circumstances surrounding the detenƟ on 
of DA personnel by a government or hosƟ le force with interests inimical to 
those of the United States.
• InvesƟ gaƟ on of the circumstances surrounding military members, and DA ci-
vilians overseas, declared absent without leave (AWOL), missing or deserters, 
who had access within the last year to TOP SECRET naƟ onal defense infor-
maƟ on or sensiƟ ve compartmented informaƟ on (special category absentees) 
(SCA); who were in a special mission unit (SMU); who had access to one or 
more special access programs; or were in the DA Cryptographic Access Pro-
gram (DACAP); and debriefi ng of these personnel upon return to U.S. con-
trol.
• CI aspects of security violaƟ ons; known or suspected acts of unauthorized 
disclosure of classifi ed informaƟ on or material; unauthorized access to DA 
computer systems; and COMSEC insecuriƟ es.
52 Ib. p. 80.
53 Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit. p.2-2.
54 FM 34-60, p. 2-1.
55 AR 381-20 Military Intelligence, op. cit. p. 7-8. 
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• CI aspects of incidents in which DA personnel with a SECRET or higher security 
clearance, access to a SAP or sensiƟ ve compartmented informaƟ on, or in the 
DACAP or an SMU, commit or aƩ empt to commit suicide.
• CI aspects of unoﬃ  cial travel to designated countries, or contacts with foreign 
diplomaƟ c faciliƟ es or oﬃ  cial representaƟ ves, by military personnel or by DA 
civilians overseas.
• CI invesƟ gaƟ ons of CI scope polygraph examinaƟ ons.
Within the United States, Army CI has invesƟ gaƟ ve jurisdicƟ on over the fol-
lowing persons:56
• U.S. Army personnel on acƟ ve duty.
• ReƟ red Army military personnel when the act(s) under invesƟ gaƟ on took 
place while the individual was on acƟ ve duty.
• AcƟ ve and inacƟ ve members of the U.S. Army Reserve Components, when 
the act(s) under invesƟ gaƟ on took place while the individual was in military 
duty status.
• AcƟ ve, reƟ red, and Reserve Components personnel of other services, where 
Department of Defense has given Army CI geographic jurisdicƟ on.
Outside the United States, Army CI has invesƟ gaƟ ve jurisdicƟ on over the fol-
lowing persons (unless responsibility is otherwise assigned by U.S. law, execuƟ ve 
direcƟ ve, or agreement with the host government):57
• Army personnel on acƟ ve duty and their family members.
• Current DA civilian employees, including foreign naƟ onal employees, and 
their family members.
• Army contractors and their family members, subject to coordinaƟ on with the 
FBI, CIA, and host government agencies.
• ReƟ red Army personnel, Reserve Components personnel, and other U.S. per-
sons, subject to coordinaƟ on with the FBI, CIA, and host government agen-
cies.
• Foreign naƟ onals who are applicants for Army employment, are Army em-
ployees, or are former Army employees, no maƩ er whether they have, re-
quire, or had access to U.S. classifi ed informaƟ on, unless responsibility is oth-
erwise assigned by U.S. law, execuƟ ve direcƟ ve, or agreement with the host 
government.
• Foreign naƟ onals not aﬃ  liated with the Army, subject to coordinaƟ on with 
the CIA and agreements with the FBI, other Department of Defense intel-
ligence components and host naƟ on governments.
• AcƟ ve, reƟ red, and Reserve Components personnel of other services, DOD 
civilian employees and family members, and Department of Defense foreign 
naƟ onals, where DOD has given Army CI geographic jurisdicƟ on.
Army CI elements will conduct personnel security invesƟ gaƟ ons (PSI) over-
seas. PSI will be conducted under DIS58 direcƟ on and control and all personnel 
56 Ib. p. 8.
57 Ib. p. 8.
58 Defense InvesƟ gaƟ ve Service.
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conducƟ ng PSI will be evaluated under the DIS courtesy leƩ er program. I pass 
over this kind of invesƟ gaƟ on in this arƟ cle because of its volume. 
Counterintelligence collecƟ on59 is the systemaƟ c acquisiƟ on of informaƟ on 
(through invesƟ gaƟ ons, operaƟ ons, or liaison) concerning espionage, sabotage, 
terrorism, other intelligence acƟ viƟ es or assassinaƟ ons conducted by or on be-
half of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizaƟ ons, or foreign 
persons that are directed against or threaten Department of Defense interests. CI 
collecƟ on is conducted by using sources, elicitaƟ on, oﬃ  cial liaison contacts, de-
briefi ngs, screenings, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) to obtain informaƟ on 
that answers the standing CI collecƟ on requirements or other collecƟ on needs-
based on commanders’ requirements.60
CI technical services are used to assist in the CI core competencies of invesƟ -
gaƟ ons, collecƟ ons, and operaƟ ons or to provide specialized technical support to 
a program or acƟ vity. This includes:61
• Performance of technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM).
• Performance of cyber CI acƟ viƟ es that provide protecƟ on to informaƟ on net-
works as well as idenƟ fy vulnerabiliƟ es and aƩ empted intrusions into Army 
and Department of Defence computer networks.
• Performance CI scope polygraph examinaƟ ons.
• Provision of support to Army informaƟ on tasks.
Counterintelligence producƟ on62 is the process of analyzing all-source in-
formaƟ on concerning espionage or other mulƟ discipline intelligence collecƟ on 
threats, sabotage, terrorism, and other related threats to US military command-
ers, the Department of Defense, and the US Intelligence Community and devel-
oping it into a fi nal product that is disseminated. Counterintelligence produc-
Ɵ on is used in formulaƟ ng security policy, plans, and operaƟ ons. CI analysis and 
producƟ on are used to saƟ sfy the supported commander’s intelligence require-
ments and to provide focus and guidance to CI operaƟ ons. CI analysis and pro-
ducƟ on can be accomplished at any level in which Army CI assets are assigned to 
counter the FISS and ITO collecƟ on threat; support protecƟ on of U.S. personnel, 
property, and operaƟ ons; protect the research and development (R&D) of criƟ cal 
technologies; and support Army informaƟ on tasks to protect U.S. forces informa-
Ɵ on systems.63
According to the Marine Corps,64 producƟ on is the acƟ vity that converts in-
formaƟ on into intelligence. It involves the evaluaƟ on, interpretaƟ on, integra-
Ɵ on, analysis, and synthesis of all informaƟ on that is relevant to a parƟ cular 
59 Ib. p. 79.
60 FM 2-0 Intelligence, op. cit. p. 6-2.
61 Ib. p. 6-3.
62 Department of Defense DicƟ onary of Military and Associated Terms, op. cit.p.80.
63 FM 2-0 Intelligence, op. cit. p. 6-3.
64 Intelligence OperaƟ ons, op. cit. p. 3-10.
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Intelligence Requirements to answer the quesƟ on that has been asked. During 
the producƟ on phase, informaƟ on is65:
• Evaluated to determine perƟ nence, reliability, and accuracy.
• Analyzed to isolate signifi cant elements.
• Integrated with other relevant informaƟ on and previously developed intel-
ligence.
• Interpreted to form logical conclusions that refl ect on the situaƟ on and sup-
port the commander’s decision-making process.
• Applied to esƟ mate possible outcomes.
• Placed into the product format that will be most useful to its eventual user.
The role of CI is to support the commander’s requirements to preserve es-
senƟ al secrecy and to protect the force. To carry out his force protecƟ on respon-
sibiliƟ es, a commander requires support from several sources, one of which is 
the intelligence community.66 CI support to force protecƟ on must be tailored to 
the supported organizaƟ on and its vulnerability. CI support can be tailored from 
a combinaƟ on of acƟ viƟ es to include:67
• MobilizaƟ on security, including ports and major records repositories.
• CombaƟ ng terrorism.
• Rear operaƟ ons.
• Civil-military aﬀ airs.
• Psychological operaƟ ons.
• BaƩ lefi eld decepƟ on.
• OPSEC.
• Friendly CommunicaƟ ons-Electronics (C-E) (C-SIGINT).
• CI force protecƟ on source operaƟ ons (CFSO).
The Army conducts CI during peaceƟ me and at all levels of confl ict to pro-
tect the force from foreign exploitaƟ on. During peaceƟ me, CI supports the com-
mander’s needs. During war, CI operaƟ ons are much the same as in peaceƟ me, 
except the adversary state or naƟ on is well-defi ned.68 The commander’s needs 
are the top priority informaƟ on. OperaƟ ons Other than War are conducted by all 
Services, e.g. MOOTW69 (Military OperaƟ ons Other than War) refers to the con-
duct of Marine and naval expediƟ onary operaƟ ons across the range of military 
operaƟ ons short of war. MOOTW encompass a wide variety of acƟ viƟ es intend-
ed to deter war, resolve confl ict, promote peace, and support civil authoriƟ es. 
MOOTW encompass a broad range of 16 possible missions and tasks, each of 
which has its own unique Intelligence Requirements.
OperaƟ ons Other Than War may include the direct or indirect support of for-
eign governments or internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons such as the North AtlanƟ c Treaty 
65 Ib. p. 3-10.
66 FM 34-60 Counterintelligence, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington 
DC, 3 October 1995, p. 1-6.
67 Ib. p. 1-6.
68 FM 34-60 Counterintelligence, op. cit. p. 1-8
69 FM 2-0 Intelligence, op. cit. p. 7-1. 
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OrganizaƟ on. OOTW consist of the following operaƟ onal categories70:
• Noncombatant evacuaƟ on operaƟ ons.
• Arms control.
• Support to domesƟ c civil authoriƟ es.
• Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
• Security assistance.
• NaƟ on assistance.
• Support to anƟ -drug operaƟ ons.
• Combaƫ  ng terrorism.
• Peacekeeping operaƟ ons.
• Peace enforcement.
• Show of force.
• Support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.
• AƩ acks and raids.
Other Counterintelligence acƟ vity conducted to support military operaƟ ons 
is the Threat Awareness and ReporƟ ng Program (TARP).71 The primary focus of 
this regulaƟ on is to ensure that Army personnel understand and report potenƟ al 
threats by foreign intelligence and internaƟ onal terrorists to the Army. Threat 
awareness and educaƟ on training is designed to ensure that DA personnel recog-
nize and report incidents and indicators of aƩ empted or actual espionage, sub-
version, sabotage, terrorism or extremist acƟ viƟ es directed against the Army and 
its personnel, faciliƟ es, resources, and acƟ viƟ es; indicators of potenƟ al terrorist 
associated insider threats; illegal diversion of military technology; unauthorized 
intrusions into automated informaƟ on systems; unauthorized disclosure of clas-
sifi ed informaƟ on; and indicators of other incidents that may indicate foreign in-
telligence or internaƟ onal terrorism targeƟ ng of the Army.72 All Army personnel 
have to take part in threat awareness training but there is special threat-aware-
ness training for vulnerable personnel and posiƟ ons.
Certain Army personnel may be especially vulnerable to exploitaƟ on by for-
eign intelligence or internaƟ onal terrorism. Foreign intelligence services have 
tradiƟ onally targeted personnel with access to sensiƟ ve compartmented infor-
maƟ on, cryptographic, and Special Access Program informaƟ on. The CI units will 
coordinate with supported unit security managers to idenƟ fy potenƟ ally vulner-
able personnel and provide them with special threat-awareness training, either 
one-on-one or in small groups. The following personnel should receive special 
threat awareness training:73
• DA personnel scheduled to travel to or through countries with a high intelli-
gence or terrorist threat level as idenƟ fi ed by the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA). 
70 Ib. p. 1-9.
71 AR 381-12 Military Intelligence, Threat Awareness and ReporƟ ng Program, Depart-
ment of the Army Washington, DC 4 October 2010.
72 Ib. p. 1.
73 Ib. p. 5.
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• DA personnel scheduled to aƩ end scienƟ fi c, technical, engineering, or other 
professional meeƟ ngs or symposia that representaƟ ves from foreign coun-
tries sponsor or aƩ end, whether in the U.S. or abroad.
• DA personnel parƟ cipaƟ ng in training, educaƟ on, commercial ventures, tech-
nical informaƟ on sharing, or exchange programs with foreign governments or 
organizaƟ ons.
• Members of agencies sponsoring or meeƟ ng with foreign visitors, foreign ex-
change personnel, foreign liaison oﬃ  cers, and foreign students.
• DA personnel who have close and conƟ nuing relaƟ onships with relaƟ ves or 
others residing in, who have foreign business connecƟ ons or fi nancial inter-
ests in, or who have other signifi cant Ɵ es to foreign countries.
• System administrators and other key informaƟ on network personnel who 
have administrator-level privileges on classifi ed or unclassifi ed Army informa-
Ɵ on systems.
• Personnel whose jobs require interface with foreign governments or busi-
nesses regarding RDA acƟ viƟ es or criƟ cal military technology.
• Persons with access to SAP informaƟ on and persons assigned to special mis-
sion units (SMU).
• Personnel serving as military aƩ achés or serving in U.S. embassies or diplo-
maƟ c missions abroad.
In Army RegulaƟ on 381-12 there are a large number of duƟ es in this case 
for all level commanders but I am going to focus on this topic only on the level 
of unit commanders with counterintelligence personnel assigned or aƩ ached. 
These commanders will:74
• Support all Army commanders in the unit’s area of responsibility with 
a TARP.
• Ensure that the content of threat awareness training includes correct items 
and that CI trainers are following these guidelines.
• Ensure that the content of threat awareness training is tailored appropriately 
to the mission, geographic locaƟ on, and degree of potenƟ al internaƟ onal ter-
rorist or foreign intelligence threat to the organizaƟ on receiving training.
• Coordinate with supported commands to idenƟ fy those personnel who re-
quire special threat-awareness training and conduct the briefi ngs and de-
briefi ngs of these personnel, as appropriate.
• Ensure that Army personnel reporƟ ng CI incidents are interviewed about the 
details of the incident as soon as possible.
• Submit CIR75 within 72 hours of the incident being reported to the CI unit.
During their acƟ viƟ es CI personnel use a variety of HUMINT sources to collect 
informaƟ on. All sources of informaƟ on should be used, consistent with mission, 
policy, and resources, to saƟ sfy command CI collecƟ on requirements.76 Similar CI 
collecƟ on sources of informaƟ on are exploited by the US Marine Corps.77
74 Ib. p. 3. 
75 CIR – Counterintelligence Incident Report.
76 FM 34-60, p. 4-1, 4-2.
77 Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit. p. 6-8.
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• A casual source is one who, by social or professional posiƟ on, has access to in-
formaƟ on of CI interest, usually on a conƟ nuing basis. Casual sources usually 
can be relied on to provide informaƟ on which is rouƟ nely available to them. 
They are under no obligaƟ on to provide informaƟ on. 
• Oﬃ  cial sources are liaison contacts. CI personnel conduct liaison with foreign 
and domesƟ c CI intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies to ex-
change informaƟ on and obtain assistance. CI personnel are interested in in-
vesƟ gaƟ ve, operaƟ onal, and threat informaƟ on. 
• Recruited sources include those who support CFSO. Such acƟ viƟ es are, by 
design, human source networks dispersed throughout the area, who can pro-
vide Ɵ mely and perƟ nent force protecƟ on informaƟ on. 
• Refugees, civilian detainees, and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) are other 
sources of CI informaƟ on.
• Open source publicaƟ ons of all sorts and radio and television broadcasts are 
valuable sources of informaƟ on of CI interest and operaƟ onal informaƟ on. 
• Documents not openly available, such as adversary plans and reports, are ex-
ploited in much the same way as open source publicaƟ ons.
Counter Human Intelligence acƟ viƟ es are the core of CI eﬀ ort. These acƟ ons 
include screening, cordon and search operaƟ ons used to gain intelligence infor-
maƟ on. The purpose of CI screening operaƟ ons is to idenƟ fy persons of CI inter-
est or verify persons referred by interrogators who are of CI interest, and gather 
informaƟ on of immediate CI interest.78 The purpose for conducƟ ng cordon and 
search operaƟ ons is to idenƟ fy and apprehend persons hosƟ le to our eﬀ orts and 
to exploit informaƟ on gathered.79 US Marine Corps CI uses two types of cordon 
and search operaƟ ons:80
• Community OperaƟ ons.
• SoŌ  or area operaƟ ons.
Counter Human Intelligence techniques and procedures conducted by the 
Army and US Marine corps counterintelligence are similar.81 The eﬀ ecƟ veness of 
CI operaƟ ons depends largely on the planning that precedes the operaƟ on. The 
most important is to obtain informaƟ on on the adversary’s intelligence, sabotage, 
terrorism, and subversion capabiliƟ es. During the intelligence cycle collected in-
formaƟ on is processed and analyzed, and from it the CI oﬃ  cer formulates a list 
of CI targets. These targets are personaliƟ es, organizaƟ ons, and installaƟ ons of 
intelligence or CI interest which must be seized, exploited, or protected.
These are persons who are a threat to security, whose intenƟ ons are un-
known, or who can assist the intelligence and CI eﬀ orts of the command. Person-
aliƟ es are grouped into these three categories. For ease in idenƟ fi caƟ on, a color 
code indicates the category. Colors currently in use are black, gray, and white and 
pertain to the three categories in the order listed above.82
78 FM 34-60, op. cit. p. A-IV-1.
79 Ib. p. A-IV-8.
80  See: Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit.
81 See: The Army and US Marine Corps CI RegulaƟ ons.
82 FM-34-60, op. cit. p. AͳVͳ1.
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The black list is an oﬃ  cial CI lisƟ ng of actual or potenƟ al enemy collaborators, 
sympathizers, intelligence suspects, and other persons whose presence menaces 
the security of the friendly forces. Black list includes8384:
• Known or suspected enemy or hosƟ le espionage agents, saboteurs, terrorists, 
poliƟ cal fi gures, and subversive individuals.
• Known or suspected leaders and members of hosƟ le paramilitary, parƟ san, or 
guerrilla groups.
• PoliƟ cal leaders known or suspected to be hosƟ le to the military and poliƟ cal 
objecƟ ves of the US or an allied naƟ on.
• Known or suspected oﬃ  cials of enemy governments whose presence in the 
theater of operaƟ ons poses a security threat to US Forces.
• Known or suspected enemy collaborators and sympathizers whose presence 
in the theater of operaƟ ons poses a security threat to US Forces.
• Known enemy military or civilian personnel who have engaged in intelligence, 
CI, security, police, or poliƟ cal indoctrinaƟ on acƟ viƟ es among troops or civil-
ians.
• Other personaliƟ es indicated by the G2 as automaƟ c arrestees. Included in 
this category may be local poliƟ cal personaliƟ es, police chiefs, and heads of 
signifi cant municipal and naƟ onal departments or agencies, and tribal or clan 
leaders.
The gray list contains the idenƟ Ɵ es and locaƟ ons of those personaliƟ es whose 
inclinaƟ ons and aƫ  tudes toward the poliƟ cal and military objecƟ ve to the US 
are obscure. These people are the “unknowns.” They may be individuals whose 
poliƟ cal moƟ vaƟ ons require further exploraƟ on before they can be used eﬀ ec-
Ɵ vely by US Forces. Examples of individuals who may be included in this category 
are:8586
• PotenƟ al or actual defectors from the hosƟ le cause whose bona fi des have 
not been established.
• Individuals who have resisted, or are believed to have resisted, the enemy 
government and who may be willing to cooperate with US Forces, but whose 
bona fi des have not been established.
• ScienƟ sts and technicians suspected of having been engaged against their will 
in enemy research projects of high technology programs.
The white list contains the idenƟ Ɵ es and locaƟ ons of individuals who have-
been idenƟ fi ed as being of intelligence or CI interest and are expected to be able 
to provideinformaƟ on or assistance in exisƟ ng or new intelligence allies. They 
are usually in accordance with, or favorably inclined toward, US policies. Their 
contribuƟ ons are based on a voluntary and cooperaƟ ve aƫ  tude. Examples of 
individuals who may be included in this category are:8788
83 Ib. p. A-V-1. 
84 Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit. p. 6-9, 6-10.
85 Ib. p. 6-10.
86 FM 34-60, p. A-V-2.
87 Ib. p. A-V-2.
88 Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit. p.6-10, 6-11.
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• Former poliƟ cal leaders of a hosƟ le state who were deposed by hosƟ le poliƟ -
cal leaders.
• Intelligence agents employed by US or allied intelligence agencies.
• Key civilians in areas of scienƟ fi c research, who may include faculty mem-
bers of universiƟ es and staﬀ  of industrial or naƟ onal research faciliƟ es, whose 
bona fi des have been established.
• Leaders of religious groups and other humanitarian groups.
• Other persons who can materially and signifi cantly aid the poliƟ cal, scien-
Ɵ fi c, and military objecƟ ves of the US and whose bona fi des have been estab-
lished.
Counterintelligence organizaƟ ons are also interested in specifi c installaƟ ons, 
which may containmaterials or documents of CI interest. They also keen on any 
group that is a potenƟ al threat to the security of the friendly force in the Area of 
Responsibility. 
Military Department Counterintelligence OrganizaƟ ons conduct a huge 
amount of CI acƟ viƟ es but there is not possible to discuss all of them in this 
arƟ cle, e.g. we have not menƟ oned counter-signal intelligence acƟ viƟ es and 
counter-imagery intelligence techniques and procedures as well as CI training 
and interrogaƟ on. I would like to emphasizethat to become successful in its ac-
Ɵ viƟ es, CI needs professional overt and covert sources of informaƟ on, especially 
human sources. Informant handling is a very sensiƟ ve area and suchsources have 
to be controlled and protected from disclosure. It is common knowledge that 
sources of informaƟ on are essenƟ al for counterintelligence and it is impossible 
to take any CI acƟ on without informaƟ on from AOR. The most important fea-
tureof CI operaƟ ons is counterintelligence support to military operaƟ ons. Pro-
viding commanders with useful informaƟ on is crucial for fulfi lling their mission. 
The secondelement is collaboraƟ on between CI organizaƟ ons and Armed Forces. 
It is a two-way communicaƟ on system. Commanders and all military personnel 
should cooperate with CI components (oﬃ  cers, agents) not only to receive the 
above-menƟ oned intelligence for security reasons, such as Force ProtecƟ on but 
have to inform CI about threat-related incidents. 
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Marek Zawartka
Security of Mass Events 
Regarding Stadium 
Hooliganism
Hooliganism as a subculture of violence
The progressive transformaƟ on of civilizaƟ on, with economic, social, cultural, po-
liƟ cal changes taking place in modern democracies – in addiƟ on to their obvious 
posiƟ ve consequences such as the creaƟ on of civil society, or fulfi lling the exis-
tenƟ al needs of the possibility of saƟ sfying “happiness”, nevertheless brought 
together a number of adverse events involving social loss, fear and suﬀ ering of 
many individuals.1 Such negaƟ ve phenomena, contrary to the universal order, 
among them deviant behavior of children and youth, have been categorized by 
Piotrowski as part of the subculture2 of escape characterisƟ c of youth subcultures 
1 Krzyżak-Szymańska E., Szymański A.: Some selected deviance among children and 
youth in the province of Silesia. (in:) children youth safety – the risks of civilizaƟ on in 
terms of: educaƟ onal, insƟ tuƟ onal and legislaƟ ve. Mysłowice 2005, p.15. 
2 A subculture is an informal group that bases its acƟ ons on separate models and rules 
of conduct. Members of this group generally do not respect the standards of conduct 
adopted in a given society. The classic defi niƟ on of subcultures usually includes small 
social groups marginalized in the dominant cultural system of social trends, which ne-
gate or undermine the established and generally accepted paƩ erns of social funcƟ on-
ing. A subculture is also said to be a social group rejecƟ ng part of the values, norms 
and paƩ erns of behavior found in their society and creaƟ ng their own rules, that it 
is a system of cultural paƩ erns, respecƟ vely, selected for specifi c characterisƟ cs, and 
the parƟ cular social environment, and because the characterisƟ cs of social roles are 
unique for this environment.
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including : a) ideological assumpƟ ons, b) customs, c) creaƟ ng an image, d) cre-
aƟ ve acƟ vity.3
The acƟ vity of certain subcultures (such as hippies, punks, skinheads) all con-
tain such characterisƟ cs, it can happen, however, that this creates a youth sub-
culture, fascinated by such a kind of music (meatheads), sports (skateboarders) 
or the possibiliƟ es oﬀ ered by modern technology informaƟ on (hackers). In these 
cases, the main element of group idenƟ ty is the raƟ o of the “object of worship,” 
and other manifestaƟ ons of the funcƟ oning of a subculture (e.g., symbolism, 
ideology, customs) are formed on the basis of side eﬀ ects or not. It should also 
be noted that members of informal groups of young people diﬀ er from one de-
gree of involvement in subcultural acƟ vity. In addiƟ on to the leaders and ideolo-
gists of subcultures, and so people that shape the acƟ vity, there are a number of 
members of the movement, implemenƟ ng the ideas of leaders, as well as a large 
group of fans, who idenƟ fy with the overall message or selected manifestaƟ ons 
of the subculture. 
Youth subcultures are primarily a kind of culture of spontaneity in the way of 
living reality. At the same Ɵ me young people who want to achieve specifi c social 
posiƟ on always have two choices: accept norms and insƟ tuƟ ons in force in the 
socio-legal order, or their rejecƟ on, together with a value system imposed by the 
ruling class or party; in recent years, this has become a major social problem.
RepresentaƟ ves of the currently acƟ ve subcultures disƟ nguish themselves 
from other youth and adult community many features:
• their lifestyle with a disƟ nct system of values and ideological assumpƟ ons;
• diﬀ erent role models represenƟ ng the objects of imitaƟ on, and the specifi c 
objects of worship;
• separate standards and procedures, which in many cases are expressed in 
acƟ viƟ es disturbing public opinion, and even evoking fear and panic among 
people;
• diﬀ erent, fl amboyant style of dress;
• diﬀ erent expression of views such as publishing their own newspapers;
Also diﬀ erent are the reasons why contemporary youth choose to belong to 
youth subcultures. Above all, they are:
a) criƟ cal aƫ  tude to the environment;
b) lack of acceptance by the young generaƟ on of the surrounding socio-cultural 
realiƟ es, including the exisƟ ng norms and values, especially the pracƟ ces pre-
ferred by adults;
c) aƩ empt by youth to abolish the exisƟ ng order to change their own life;
d) the socio-economic and poliƟ cal, which becomes a source of social instabil-
ity and growing unrest. Not everyone has equal access to life opportuniƟ es, 
resulƟ ng in accumulaƟ on of frustraƟ ons for those who may have less access 
and are aware of it;
3 Piotrowski P., Youth Subcultures. op. cit., p. 14–15. 
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e) socio-poliƟ cal events that cause the values of the average person to be mar-
ginalized;
f) the current crisis of values;
g) the resoluƟ on of issues without the parƟ cipaƟ on of young people and treat-
ing them marginally.4
With the use of the terms “hooligans” and “fan” there is a great deal of confu-
sion. One of the many reasons for this phenomenon may be that general aware-
ness of these terms reaches us through reports in the media of sporƟ ng events, 
which use these terms “fan”, “hooligan” and “bandit” collecƟ vely, and almost as 
synonyms.
Czeslaw Matuszewski, a fan, recognizes an individual emoƟ onally involved in 
either side of the fi ghƟ ng (...) “He’s cheering, and not watching, and is engaged 
in combat sports.” Fans are those stadium goers who are fascinated by the game, 
respect the players and want to support them, do not believe in haƟ ng their opp-
ponts, and imagine sporƟ ng events without vulgarity and aggression.
NegaƟ ve connotaƟ ons are associated with the word “hooligans” (“pseudo-
fans”). According to the dicƟ onary of foreign words “pseudo” (gr. pseudo – lie), 
that “(...) the fi rst part of compound words, meaning: fake, the alleged”.
In the spirit of such an approach hooligans are imitaƟ on, fake, fans, pretend-
ing to be real fans. Wikipedia sees the phenomenon of hooligans, as an aggres-
sive audience. As stated above, the defi niƟ on of “hooligans” appears in the term 
“hooligan”, which has permanently stuck to this category.
The phenomenon of hooliganism and hooligan subculture is variously de-
fi ned. On the basis of criminology acts of hooliganism are described as a kind 
of aggressive behavior of an irraƟ onal nature.5 According Czapów hooligans are 
people who have taken over paƩ erns of hooligan subculture and idenƟ fy with 
the social role of the hooligan. This author also believes that “the word hooligan-
ism, understood as a social role, is commonly used to defi ne deeds of aggressive, 
unselfi sh and reckless criminal acƟ vity commiƩ ed and viewed as a means of ob-
taining presƟ ge”6.
In his book, Youth Subcultures, Piotrowski in a very clear way lists the most 
important features of hooligan subculture, namely:
• a negaƟ ve, dismissive aƫ  tude to the rules of social coexistence,
• valuing as posiƟ ve qualiƟ es such as courage, physical strength, willingness to 
take risks, cunning, a contemptuous aƫ  tude towards women,
• commiƫ  ng non-economic crimes, oŌ en under the infl uence of alcohol and 
treaƟ ng them as a kind of entertainment or sport,
• immaturity, expressing an inability to delay graƟ fi caƟ on, disregard of the re-
sults of their own acƟ ons and lack of plans for the future7.
4 Kowalski R., Descendants of Hooligans. Socio-cultural sources of aggression among 
sports spectators. Torun 2000, p. 19–20.
5 Piotrowski P., Youth subculture. Warsaw 2003, p. 66.
6 Czapów Cz., Hooliganism as a social role. “Law and Life” 2/169, p. 2.
7 Piotrowski P., Subcultures, op. Bogan, p. 67.
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Among the many factors that determine criminal behavior important are 
both inadequate educaƟ onal methods used by parents and teachers, and the 
normaƟ ve expectaƟ ons of the subculture The phenomenon of hooligan behavior 
is generated in the family, school and peers. The increase in violence and cruelty 
among young people is due not only to geneƟ c factors in human nature, but also 
impaired socializaƟ on.8
There is one specifi c term associated with the phenomenon of cheer and 
a sense of fashion. This term is szalikowiec. This name is reserved for those who 
wear colorful scarves, which are sort of a sign of their belonging and aƩ achment 
to a sports club and its colors. Other accessories of the szalikowiec are huge fl ags, 
banners, the emblem of the club, fi reworks, painted faces, hair dyed in club col-
ors as well as military jackets, denim pants and military boots, so called glans. 
Hooligans appeared on Polish stadiums in the early 70’s, a fact that essenƟ ally 
all researchers agree on is there are growing uncertainƟ es in determining which 
group was the fi rst.
Hooligans of ŁKS insist on their primacy. According to Ełkaesiak they originated 
when a group of students dressed in scarves, armed with fl ags gathered, in the 
same place for every game, singing songs and chanƟ ng slogans of ŁKS. The group 
soon began to grow. In addiƟ on to ŁKS hooligans, three other groups of claim that 
they were the fi rst: Polonia Bytom, Lechia Legia Warsaw and Gdańsk. The fact is 
that in the early 70’s fans ŁKS were the largest, most colorful and most acƟ ve group. 
Shortly aŌ erwards in the same decade, supporters of Lech Poznan, Leg Hooligans 
appeared in Polish stadiums. Shortly aŌ erwards supporters of Lech Poznan, Legia 
Warsaw, Wisla Krakow and Polonia Bytom appeared on the scene soon joined by 
supporters of Arka Gdynia, Pogon Szczecin, Wrocław and Silesia GKS Tychy. How-
ever, one should also note the parƟ culariƟ es of Polish football hooliganism, which 
in its early days coincided with the dominant period of ‘gits’. The account must 
warrant that, in the ciƟ es where the movement of “gits” was the strongest, most 
were also hooligans.9 There is no doubt that in the matches among younger fans, 
most violence was caused by ‘gits’. It was evident also that hooligans took over 
from the gits most of their rules. These were: hatred of the MiliƟ a and the prohi-
biƟ on of any contact with it, a strong internal solidarity within the group (one for 
all and all for one), aversion to and independence from the world of adults, the 
recogniƟ on of the leaders of the brave men and women, strong, good in the fi ght, 
but above all “hard” and a strong manifestaƟ on of individuality.10
AdopƟ ng the ideology of ‘gits’, hooliganism spilled outside the stadiums. Hoo-
liganism existed no longer just for the game, or shortly before it, hooligansism 
was all the Ɵ me, and aﬀ ected the whole a neighborhood. Groups of hooligans 
marked their territory by the scarves they wore, fi ghƟ ng with other groups of 
hooligans. On the walls of houses began to appear graﬃ  Ɵ  with slogans such as: 
“Legia rules”, etc.
8 Jędrzejewski J., A subculture of violence, Warsaw 2001, p. 53.
9 Kowalski R., Descendants of hooligans. Socio-cultural sources of aggression among 
sports spectators. Radom 2000, p. 13.
10 Sielecki P., Sobiech P., Hooligans. Katowice, 2006, p. 10–11.
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In the late 70s, when gits began to rapidly disappear from Polish towns hooli-
gans conƟ nued to develop as a movement,
The authoriƟ es became aware of such informal groups forming around the 
teams in all major ciƟ es. Since the consƟ tuƟ on did not allow the existence of in-
dependent power groups, it was decided to take over the movement at the same 
Ɵ me subjecƟ ng it to strong control. Grzegorz Aleksandrowicz gave the green light 
for promoƟ ng the iniƟ aƟ ve of “Fan Clubs” engaged in support for their team, 
introducing a “League Stadium” which scored the behavior of the fans and their 
cheering.11
Hooligans were not well-disposed towards such undertakings, suspecƟ ng 
that the new movement would not be independent. In part, however, they ben-
efi ted from the events organized by the club fans, especially from club-subsidized 
travel to matches, meeƟ ngs with players and programs issued by the fan club 
at football matches. They also parƟ cipated in fan club meeƟ ngs. Make friends 
working together, were guests on the occasion of the matches. ParƟ cularly well 
placed was the co-operaƟ on between Silesia Wroclaw fan clubs, Wisla Krakow, 
Ruch Chorzow, Polonia Bytom, GKS Tychy and Gdynia ark. But fan clubs rarely 
became informal leaders of hooligans groups. In their eyes the fan clubs did not 
fulfi ll the hopes pinned on them and aŌ er the death of Grzegorz Aleksandrowicz 
began to gradually decline. Nevertheless, it should be noted that clubs began to 
think of supporters clubs, as an organized group to be reckoned with. 
In subsequent years, the movement “szalikowcy” developed rather quickly. 
Hooligans appeared in ever new and ever-smaller ciƟ es. Ideology hooligans fi rm-
ly established in the late 70s one could already speak of more than 20 groups 
hooligans.12 There was already a strong movement but in large part they were 
sƟ ll random. On the map of Poland, Lubuskie, Warmia and Mazury, Lublin, and 
Świętokrzyskie were relaƟ vely free from the phenomenon.
AŌ er the formaƟ on of “Solidarity” (1980) by reducing censorship, news of the 
“exploits” of hooligans increasingly appeared in the press. Frequent reports of 
excesses of hooligans led to calls for severe punishment.13
During MarƟ al Law hooligans were frequent parƟ cipants in demonstraƟ ons 
and baƩ les with riot police. Scarves served as a useful method of hiding one’s 
face in order to avoid idenƟ fi caƟ on, and of protecƟ ng against tear gas. Hooligans 
fi ghƟ ng with the miliƟ a could be seen mainly in Gdansk, Wroclaw, Krakow and 
Szczecin. SomeƟ mes there were also demonstraƟ ons at matches, and for several 
years: 31 August (anniversary of “Solidarity”), or 3rd May there were no organized 
football matches. All this did not cause too much change in the rules of the Hooli-
gan Code. Perhaps the example of “Solidarity” showed hooligans that the MiliƟ a 
need not always be a source of fear as one could escape from it or fi ght it. In the 
late 80s the number of independent groups of hooligans rose to 60, there was 
now no region free of stadium hooligans.
11 hƩ p://wildboyszineblog.interia.pl.
12 Piotrowski P., Hooligans – the deviant behavior of sports fans. Torun 2000, p. 64–65.
13 Ibid., p. 30.
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Another youth subculture, which (aŌ er gits) had a strong impact on the sza-
likowcy was the ideology of ‘skinheads’.
Skinhead ideology is based on love for the Polish and a deep hatred of strang-
ers, especially Gypsies, blacks, Germans, Arabs and Jews. Skinheads believe that 
Canadians are being manipulated by Jewish naƟ onalists and that the United 
States, Germany and Israel are taking over our good naƟ on, pushing the Poles 
to the role of unskilled laborers. Skinheadss take care of their physical condiƟ on 
considering that they must be strong, brave, proud, ready to fi ght. They must also 
develop a resistance to physical pain, so they cover their bodies with numerous 
taƩ oos.
The skinhead appearance is also characterisƟ c: shoes, “Doc Martens” or com-
bat boots, military jackets, military pants. They also oŌ en wear shirts with inscrip-
Ɵ ons like “Skinhead 0I” or CelƟ c crosses. They have, of course, cropped hair, (not 
to interfere with fi ghƟ ng). Skinheads had their own bands where they exchange 
informaƟ on. In the fi rst period of their acƟ vity they began fi ghƟ ng with the more 
numerous punks. In the struggle they were ruthless. They aƩ acked leather jack-
ets punks by “slicing”. Skinheads quite quickly drove the punks oﬀ  the streets.
Follwing the footsteps of their predecessors in the west, skinheads soon ap-
peared in groups in the stadiums. At the beginning of this was in Warsaw (FC), 
Wroclaw (Silesia) and in Gdansk (Lechia). Then they appeared in the other stadi-
ums. Skinheadss in no way consƟ tuted the majority of hooligans, but they were 
acƟ ve. OŌ en they went on trips where they were very appreciated. Because of 
their “familiarity with the struggle”. At the same Ɵ me they infl uenced hooligans, 
more and more, by their habits and ‘ideology’. 
Hooligans quickly adopted the heavy shoes, and above all the close-cropped 
hair of skinheads. Hooligans began to visit more oŌ en matches played by the Pol-
ish NaƟ onal Team, oŌ en emphasizing their “Polishness” with expressions of anƟ -
Jewish, anƟ -German, anƟ -Ukrainian feeling and to a lesser degree of aversion to 
blacks (occurring in league matches). Henceforth fans from central Poland were 
called “Jews”, from the south-east “Ukrainians” and from Upper Silesia, “Germa-
ny”. Hooligans did not tolerate the German fl ag in the fi rst half of the 90s in the 
stadiums of the Silesian teams. During this period, almost all were broken with 
the consent of Silesian clubs. Hooligans began to resemble skinheads in their be-
haviour and acƟ ons. They would ‘cut’ the scarves of hosƟ le fans on the street. 
Increasingly, they began to organize “fan meeƟ ngs”, they began to become part 
of the football environment, making the skinhead movement beƩ er known, Also, 
hooligans began to aƩ ach parƟ cular aƩ enƟ on to their physical condiƟ on, oŌ eh 
training for combat sports and reducing their consumpƟ on of alcohol.14
Currently in Poland there are over 200 independent team hooligans. Indepen-
dent fan clubs of local teams are becoming more and more common.
14 Zawartka M., Hooligans – young people in the stands of sports stadiums. (in:) The 
safety of children and adolescents – risk civilizaƟ onal aspects: pedagogical, insƟ tu-
Ɵ onal and legislaƟ ve. Mysłowice 2005, p. 54–65.
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The behaviour of parƟ cipants in the hooligan subculture is characterized by 
mysƟ fi caƟ on of rioƟ ng. De CouberƟ n’s ideals are rejected, and the subculture 
seems to prove George Orwell’s statement that “serious sport has nothing to 
do with fair play. It is associated with hatred of jealousy, boasƞ ulness, with con-
tempt for all rules and sadisƟ c pleasure in witnessing violence. In other words, 
sport is war – minus the shooƟ ng”. War minus the shooƟ ng became the domain 
of fans gathered every year for a more and more bloody harvest.
Fans of tradiƟ onally hosƟ le clubs wage conƟ nuous war with each other, with 
diﬀ erent levels of rage, both on their own, as well as during “guest appearances” 
of their club.
Trips to matches provide an opportunity to demonstrate “heroism” “cour-
age”, and “bravery”; one of the fundamental precepts of hooligan ideology is to 
“overcome fear.”
The so-called “FanaƟ c’s Handbook”, compiled by Zielinski15, shows a pecu-
liar code of conduct, whereby hooligans emphasize the need for mutual aid and 
solidarity. “SomeƟ mes it is beƩ er to leave the situaƟ on bloodied than to escape 
thanks to fast legs.”
As follows from the analysis presented, hooligan subculture represents a seri-
ous threat before, during and aŌ er matches.
Hooligans perceive their envrionment in a way that recalls the structure of 
the social organizaƟ on of primiƟ ve tribes, dividing the world into two parts: ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ (strangers, enemies, all those which must be eliminated).16 At the 
same Ɵ me in this world of savagery and primiƟ vism acts of destrucƟ on carried 
out are parƟ cular source of pride and saƟ sfacƟ on for hooligans, and the damage 
caused is a source of inspiraƟ on for the next Ɵ me, Among them, Przemyslaw Pi-
otrowski17 idenƟ fi es fi ve most common forms of negaƟ ve among hooligans, clas-
sifying them as follows:
• physical fi ghƟ ng;
• throwing dangerous objects;
• violent behavior on trains;
• acts of vandalism;
• inƟ midaƟ on of players and oﬃ  cials;
As already menƟ oned, much of the negaƟ ve events that we classify as taking 
place during mass events, takes place immediately aŌ er its compleƟ on. From the 
perspecƟ ve of hooligans this is most reasonable, because on the one hand they 
do not have to rush to catch the match, which is in fact of liƩ le interest to them, 
and on the other hand, this gives them an irresisƟ ble opportunity to give vent to 
their emoƟ ons, hence the meeƟ ng. 
 When they are not separated from each other by a fence, hosƟ le parƟ es try 
even more diﬀ erent types of aƩ acks. Most confrontaƟ ons start with supporters 
15 Zieliński R., League hooligans. Wroclaw 1996, p. 15–16.
16 Sahaj T., The fans and hooligans – Analysis of stadium hooliganism. “Professional 
sports” 7–8, 2002, p 16.
17 Piotrowski P., Subcultures, op. cit., p. 91–93.
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of the opposing team, or insults and stones at police oﬃ  cers. Then there is only 
a collecƟ ve direct clash during which injuries occur, ranging from the light to 
heavy, and in extreme cases, also fatal18.
Although the degree of internal organizaƟ on of groups of hooligans are loose, 
their strength is a hierarchy founded on a parƟ cular structure. At the boƩ om are 
ordinary “hooligans newcomers” who do not engage in aggressive acƟ ons. For 
them, the game is “fashionable way of spending their free Ɵ me and avoiding 
boredom. Above the “newcomers” are the warriors, who themselves are called 
hooligans. At the top are “Holses” who are the Iron Guard19, an hooligan elite.20 In 
this area, however, there is a conƟ nuous evoluƟ on towards a more mobile struc-
ture, where the leaders are the “leaders”, then Holses, and fi nally the soldiers. 
Holses are – oŌ en the oldest and best-paid. They create a budget reserve, so the 
group can provide fi nancial support in diﬃ  cult Ɵ mes such as in case of confl ict 
with the law on the part of a member. They are also responsible for providing 
military equipment to soldiers. In some groups there are even scouts, creaƟ ng 
a bank of informaƟ on about the enemy. Warriors fi ght “cwels”, the enemy team’s 
fans. On the front line fi ghƟ ng the so-called nawojka consist of the most sea-
soned members of the hooligans. These radical facƟ ons of hooligans also bear 
the name “Ultras Hooligans” or “ Oﬃ  cial Hooligans “. They provide miliƟ a, which 
together with the most acƟ ve hooligans travel to their teams, matches around 
the country and abroad. 
IdenƟ fi caƟ on with the city or the club that makes a group of fans express 
a form of patrioƟ c ideology, and war club colors are a subsƟ tute for the old baƩ le 
fl ags strengthening unity of the group. But every war requires rules, and hooligans 
try to establish rules that direct the behavior of the members of their gangs.
As already menƟ oned, the hooligans are guided by certain principles.
At present a “code of honor”, also known as the seven commandments, is 
widely known among Polish fans. According to the hooligan code:
1) A fan is with the club for beƩ er or worse, regardless of the performance of the 
players.
2) A fan does not work with the Police, he does not seek Police protecƟ on from 
other fans.
3) The struggle between the supporters must be fought with bare knuckles or in 
special cases, with the consent of both parƟ es, with weapons.
4) HosƟ le fans cannot take cell phones, jackets, shoes and other things not re-
lated to rioƟ ng.
5) When a fan is alone against a larger group, he may, at most, propose 
a “solo”.
18 Tajak I., The occurrence of criminal events surrounding crowds and the role of the 
members of youth subcultures (in:) Materials Safety Conference audience of sports 
and culture. II Regional Narada, Silesian Stadium in Chorzow 22.10.2003, Katowice 
2003, p. 10–11.
19 Kudzia P., Pawełczyk G., Republic of scarves. “On” No. 15, 2003.
20 Piotrowski P., Subcultures, op. cit., p. 97–100.
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6) There should be a truce between fans during internaƟ onal matches when the 
Polish naƟ onal team is playing.
7) Respect their own rules and hierarchies.21
The szalikowcy ideology itself as can be seen is not overly complicated. It is 
expressed in the desire to manifest aﬀ ecƟ on and sympathy for the team, beaƟ ng 
the supporters of other clubs, baƩ les with the Police and causing as much dam-
age as possible. According to S. Wanat “for hooligans the situaƟ on is somewhat 
similar to that in the case of alternaƟ ve youth movements occurring in previous 
years. They protested in the name of poliƟ cal or moral values. For hooligans to-
day rebellion is based on idenƟ fi caƟ on with the club. Everything outside of this 
system is foreign, hosƟ le bad. So [they must] fi ght it.”22
Hooligans also created some extreme form of compeƟ Ɵ on, modeled on tour-
naments. These are meeƟ ngs of rival groups (tradiƟ onally or occasionally op-
posed to each other) in specifi c places and Ɵ mes in order to fi ght. A pre-defi ned 
number of parƟ cipants is involved in a fi ght, and the parƟ cipaƟ on of outsiders is 
not permiƩ ed. The places of these meeƟ ngs are meadows, parks and deserted 
sports stadiums. In this confrontaƟ on – “uptake” fans usually arrange to support 
the Internet posƟ ng “invitaƟ on” to the pages devoted to football. BaƩ le fought 
in the brouhaha caused uptake and are refl ected in the numerous commentaries 
published in newspapers hooligans “zines” and ‘presƟ gious’ hooligans’ leagues 
created for the occasion.23
The League is a compilaƟ on of disorderly conduct made by the same hooli-
gans. It is made on an ongoing basis, but about the posiƟ on in the league decide 
themselves fans. They do so in specially prepared quesƟ onnaires. In these, each 
group writes its opinion as to who the ten most dangerous groups of supporters 
are. Completed forms are returned to those who count the votes. 10 points are 
awarded for fi rst place, nine for the second, eight for third, etc.24
Here, a dangerous phenomenon is that fans have embraced fanaƟ cism and 
hatred, aƩ acking at every opportunity. Among them are smart people with ambi-
Ɵ ons for personal power and who can provide hooligans with charismaƟ c leader-
ship. This presents an important social problem, as evidenced by the reacƟ on of 
public opinion, naƟ onal and internaƟ onal authoriƟ es and insƟ tuƟ ons including 
the management of sports organizaƟ ons. 
Characteristics of the study population of fans
Seeking answers to the quesƟ ons: Who are the “stadium Gladiators”, and the ex-
tent to which they are prone to breaking norms of social intercourse – hooligans 
who declared that they are acƟ ve parƟ cipants in such acƟ viƟ es were quesƟ oned. 
Research involved 180 fans of teams from the Province of Silesia and Małopolska 
21 hƩ p://www.kibice.pl.net.
22 J. Dudała, TradiƟ onal antagonisms. “Sport” of 02.27.1998, p. 9.
23 Sahaj T., Fans, op. cit, p.17.
24 Pawłowski T., A Few Good Men. “PoliƟ cs”, 18 November 2000, p. 98th.
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Among those surveyed the most numerous and acƟ ve groups of fans were aged 
15–20 years (43.3% of respondents). The second largest segment comprised old-
er fans aged between 21–29 years (41.1% of respondents). The least numerous 
was the last category, fans over 30 years of age (15.6% of respondents). It seems 
that the age structure of the fans is a refl ecƟ on of the exisƟ ng trend in this regard. 
Hooligans are relaƟ vely young people, not having too many social obligaƟ ons, 
who could devote their Ɵ me and money to be with the club and travel with their 
team.
An analysis of respondents’ educaƟ on suggests that hooligans are character-
ized by low levels of educaƟ on and that the largest segment (39%) of respon-
dents consisted of people with vocaƟ onal educaƟ on (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Supporters EducaƟ on
However, taking into account the known fact that this group consists of young 
people, in addiƟ on to quesƟ ons concerning their educaƟ on respondents were 
asked about their current acƟ vity.
In assessing the indicated variable, it turned out that 88 of those surveyed 
(48.9%) declared that they were sƟ ll conƟ nuing their educaƟ on – whether in 
technical schools 13.3%, or as high schools (2.8%) or basic vocaƟ onal school (5%) 
or as students (17.2%). It is worth noƟ ng that the remainder of those who are 
not in educaƟ on is not enƟ rely passive in life. Indeed, they are either working 
odd jobs (16.7% of respondents) or have permanent employment (19.4% of re-
spondents). 27 people, represenƟ ng 15% of the sample group, declared that they 
had no work.
Respondents were also asked about their possible criminal convicƟ ons. The 
results showed that despite the fact that they operate in a confl ict-prone environ-
ment relaƟ vely few stated that they had any convicƟ ons (28 people, 15.6 %). This 
suggests that respondents were either very quiet or street-smart. (FIGURE 2). 
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Here it should be noted that football hooliganism has rarely resulted in prosecu-
Ɵ ons.
Matusewicz wrote in his book “Sports Event” that hooligans are mainly young 
people with no depth of interest, coming so oŌ en from marginalized and patho-
logical families. As it turns, the results obtained contradicted this descripƟ on and 
widespread social stereotypes.
It may be surprising, then, that not only hordes of half-wits and unemployed 
wasters parƟ cipate in stadium brawls. It should be noted that hooligans oŌ en 
come from so-called ‘good homes’; they have no problems with learning or ev-
eryday work and are exemplary ciƟ zens and “exemplary heads of families”, which 
is also confi rmed by further data on the family situaƟ on of the respondents.
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Figure 2. Judicial penality fans
I am a fan of my team, and idenƟ fy with it. My enemies are all those who are 
doing anything to interfere with my team. Who is not with me is against me! And 
who is against me, he must be punished. (...) The world is evil and vile, because it 
is against my club. Those who think otherwise are stupid and abnormal.25
Such declaraƟ ons and percepƟ ons of what it means to be a fan for hooligans 
in the raise the issue of rioƟ ng.
First respondents were asked what it means to be a real fan.
The analysis of the collected material shows that for more than 22% ques-
Ɵ oned, being a fan is above all cheering their team. Among the more important 
statements exchanged in this regard, there are statements indicaƟ ng that being 
a true fan is wearing scarves and colors of the club (16.1%), this being with the 
team in good and bad Ɵ mes (10%) and regularly going to sporƟ ng events and club 
away matches (14.4%).
For some respondents to be a supporter of not only associated with spon-
taneous encouragement, team loyalty, knowledge of the players or going to the 
25 Zieliński R., Memoirs of the fans. People from the sƟ gma of Heysel. Wroclaw, 1993, 
p. 47.
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stadium and travel for the club, but the destrucƟ on of colors and scarves of the 
opposing team (12.8%) and parƟ cipaƟ on (13.9% .) (Table 1).
Table 1. What does it mean to be a fan?
O. Response of categories
Responses of Number 
N %
1 Cheering the squad 41 22,8
2 Being with the team in situaƟ ons of good and bad 18 10,0
3 SystemaƟ c going to sporƟ ng events and parƟ cipaƟ on in meeƟ ngs away 26 14,4
4 Wearing a scarf and club colors 29 16,1
5 Involvement in fi ghts 25 13,9
6 DestrucƟ on of colors, scarves opposing team 23 12,8
7 Being faithful to only one team 9 5,0
8 Knowledge of all party members 9 5,0
Total 180 100,0
B. Karolczyk-Biernacka points out that the behavior of supporters oŌ en are 
close to psychopathological symptoms.26 This thesis is confi rmed by the analysis 
of another quesƟ on in which respondents were asked to comment on what they 
think should accompany each sporƟ ng spectacle.
The material gathered shows that for 36.7% of respondents, a sporƟ ng event 
is primarily associated with a fi ght with the police.
According to respondents, the a sports event is also good where there is a fi ght 
with the other team’s fans (17.8%) and those where there is a club picking up 
fl ags and scarves (15%). A certain proporƟ on (6.7%) of the sample group also be-
lieved that the city and stadium should be spectacularly vandalized. Only a small 
group of people stated that the match is most important (8.3%) and should be 
supported by spontaneous cheering (6.7%). Some respondents also felt that the 
fans should paint their faces in the team colors (6.7%). A detailed breakdown of 
the variable is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. What should accompany each sporƟ ng spectacle?
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1 DevastaƟ on and vandalizaƟ on of the city and stadium 12 6,7
2 Disturbing bystanders 4 2,2
3 Fights with police 66 36,7
4 Taking the club scarves 27 15,0
5 Paint color club 12 6,7
26 Karolczyk-Biernacka B., The problem of aggression in sport. (in:) violence in everyday 
life. Red. B. Hołyst. Warsaw 1997, p. 128.
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6 The fi ght against the opposing team fans 32 17,8
7 Match fi xture 15 8,3
8 Cheering team 12 6,7
Total 180 100,0
Being a supporter is inextricably associated with acƟ vity associated with par-
Ɵ cipaƟ on in sports events. In the next quesƟ on the respondents were asked to 
indicated how oŌ en they took part in matches played in their area and away 
matches of their team.
The results indicate that over 40% of respondents believed that they aƩ end-
ed the games very oŌ en. 27% surveyed said that their parƟ cipaƟ on was frequent. 
It is noteworthy that 15% of the study declared that they always went to their 
team’s matches.
Nearly 10% of those responding stated that they were rarely involved in the 
matches of their team. (Table 3)
Table 3. Frequency of aƩ endance at matches on “home soil”
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1 Always 27 15,0
2 Very oŌ en 77 42,8
3 OŌ en 49 27,2
4 SomeƟ mes 10 5,6
5 Rarely 13 7,2
6 Very rarely 4 2,2
Total 180 100,0
Looking at this share of fans in the away meeƟ ngs it must be stated that over 
60% of them believe that they took part in trips very oŌ en or oŌ en. Add to this 
almost 9% of the fans who defi ned their commitment in the ‘always’ category 
suggests that whether a team plays at home or away, they can always count on 
the support of their fans. (Table 4)
Table 4. Frequency of aƩ endance at matches at away
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1 Always 16 8,9
2 Very oŌ en 58 32,2
3 OŌ en 55 30,6
4 SomeƟ mes 23 12,8
5 Rarely 14 7,8
6 Very rarely 14 7,8
Total 180 100,0
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Respondents supporters also believed that parƟ cipaƟ on in the culture of fans 
gives them a sense of security (Figure 4) 94 people (52.2%) of 180 respondents 
are convinced of this. 
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Figure 4. ParƟ cipaƟ on in the culture of fans and a sense of security
Also, more than half of respondents (56.1%) feel that parƟ cipaƟ on in the 
group of fans gives them a sense of power (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. ParƟ cipaƟ on in the culture of fans and a sense of power
Respondents also believe that a group of fans saƟ sfy their inner need related 
to separaƟ on from the exisƟ ng reality. 102 respondents are convinced about this 
aspect of their lives, represenƟ ng 56% of the sample populaƟ on (the distribuƟ on 
of variable graph 6).
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Figure 6. ParƟ cipaƟ on in culture and meeƟ ng fans’ needs of detachment from 
reality
A similar posiƟ on is accompanied by the fans in terms of their parƟ cipaƟ on 
in the culture of fans and the possibility of anonymity and a sense of impunity. 
About this aspect, and “the blessings of divine” belonging to the group, says 70% 
of the respondents (Figure 7).
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Figure 7. ParƟ cipaƟ on in the culture of fans and a sense of anonymity and impu-
nity
It may seem curious that the vast majority (65.6%) of supporters believe that 
parƟ cipaƟ on in the group of supporters do not raise their self-esteem (the distri-
buƟ on of variables are presented in Table 5).
Table 5. ParƟ cipaƟ on in the culture of self-fans 
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1 No increase self-esteem 118 65,6
2 Raised self-esteem 62 34,4
Total 180 100,0
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Respondents also believed that the hooliganism subculture did not saƟ sfy 
their need to demonstrate their abiliƟ es to a wider group of people (for the dis-
tribuƟ on of variables, see Table 6).
Table 6. ParƟ cipaƟ on in the culture of fans and the opportunity to demonstrate 
to a wider group of people
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1 It does not allow to demonstrate 107 59,4
2 Lets show 73 40,6
Total 180 100,0
Also asked whether parƟ cipaƟ on in the culture of other fans met their needs 
– the vast majority of the respondents (91.7%) stated that they did not. If the 
answer was yes, they pointed to such needs as belonging and acceptance.
In discussing the issues, we also need to menƟ on a confl ict of roles. Role con-
fl ict occurs when the provisions relaƟ ng to two or more statuses are contradic-
tory because of the presence of many roles, such as student, friend, supporter, 
member of the group. In many cases, it causes tension in the role when the eﬀ ort 
in the accomplishment of acƟ ons resulƟ ng from the social status causes anxiety, 
stress and tension. It can therefore be said that if at least two diﬀ erent systems of 
norms oblige their recipients to alternate their behavior, it encourages a situaƟ on 
of confl icƟ ng expectaƟ ons. Therefore, out of necessity, standards of one of the 
systems will not be respected.
Because people derive great saƟ sfacƟ on in life from parƟ cipaƟ on in groups, 
they will have a signifi cant eﬀ ect on the behavior of group members. Generally, 
groups are less tolerant of behavior that deviates from their standards than so-
ciety as a whole. In this line, it was decided to examine whether the group put 
pressure on the respondents by approval or disapproval.
Respondents believe that the fans (hooligans) in their neighborhood environ-
ment met with approval (31%) or with general acquiescence (28%). Almost 20% 
believe that their neighbors are rather against them and more than 10% are con-
vinced that they are the subject of strong opposiƟ on (Table 7).
Table 7. The assessment of the environmental approval by the fans’ neighbors
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1 Accept 56 31,1
2 SomeƟ mes accept 50 27,8
3 Rather, they are against 35 19,4
4 Strongly oppose 19 10,6
5 I do not know 20 11,1
Total 180 100,0
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Respondents also believed that they did not feel a strong obstrucƟ on because 
of their situaƟ on. They believe that being hooligans is not associated directly 
with any sƟ gma and overt disapproval. Some respondents were aware that in 
the neighborhood in which they operate part of the populaƟ on is opposed to 
them or despise them. A signifi cant proporƟ on are also people (28%), who did 
not know how to answer.
Table 8. The assessment of the environmental approval by the residents of the 
estate of fans. 
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1  Accept 41 22,8
2  SomeƟ mes accept 23 12,8
3  Rather, they are against 32 17,8
4  We strongly oppose 24 13,3
5  Disregard 10 5,6
6  I do not know 50 27,8
Total 180 100,0
Research also indicates that acƟ ve supporters do not need to worry about the 
potenƟ al role confl ict, and that the vast majority (65%) have friends who accept 
their love for violent rioƟ ng (Table 9).
Table 9. The assessment of the environmental approval by the friends of fans
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1  Accept 118 65,6
2  SomeƟ mes accept 27 15,0
3  Rather, they are against 10 5,6
4  Disregard 15 8,3
5  I do not know 10 5,6
Total 180 100,0
To sum up this part of the discussion, we can say that the group behavior, 
like all social behavior, depends largely on the standards in force in the immedi-
ate social structure. Standards are the result of a gradual process of interacƟ on 
between members of groups. An individual behaves in his own way, and others 
confi rm the adequacy or inadequacy of this behavior and suggest the desired 
change. Therefore is not surprising that hooligans do not feel the need to change 
their behavior when their aƫ  tude and conduct, even if apparently inconsistent 
with general rules, and moral standards, do not meet with social rejecƟ on by 
their closest friends and acquaintances.
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Many sociologists emphasize that hooligans present a permanent structural 
element of football and other sports. At the same Ɵ me J. Zdebski points out that 
in Poland football fan subculture is a widely recognized and signifi cant segment 
of youth. However, an important starƟ ng point for the analysis of hooligan sub-
cultures and accepted by them was to check the value of what respondents con-
sider to be a subculture, and whether they themselves as supporters believe that 
they belong to a subculture.
Of the 180 respondents 18 (10%) could not idenƟ fy what for them is a subcul-
ture, although the three alternaƟ ve defi niƟ ons of the term were provided in the 
survey. Although respondents were given the possibility of providing their own 
defi niƟ on of a subculture, none did so.
The most common defi niƟ on of elecƟ on enjoyed subculture indicaƟ ng that it 
is a relaƟ vely stable social group living on the margins of the dominant trends in 
the system of social life, expressing their individuality through denial or under-
mining the well-established and widely accepted cultural paƩ erns. A third of the 
surveyed people chose this defi niƟ on. The other two defi niƟ ons of subculture as 
a range of symbolic and axiological references, indicaƟ ng the separateness of the 
group from other groups, and describing subculture as part of a group of people 
rejecƟ ng the values, norms and paƩ erns of behavior accepted in their society 
and forming its own rules, received, respecƟ vely, 31.1% and 25.6% of responses 
– the overall distribuƟ on of variable Table 10.
Table 10. The defi niƟ on of a subculture
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1 A social group living on the margins of social life. 60 33,3
2 A range of symbolic references disƟ nguishing the group from other groups. 56 31,1
3 Group rejecƟ ng the values  and norms recognized so-ciety. 46 25,6
4 I do not know 18 10,0
5 Other 0 0
Total 180 100,0
As for whether the fans felt that they belong to a subculture, 10% said that 
they did not belong to a subculture, they were just fans. 14.4% of respondents 
were inclined to say that that they were unlikely to belong to a subculture. 12.8% 
of those surveyed could not decide.
One third of respondents were fully convinced that as fans they belonged to 
a subculture. One in four believed that to be a fan (hooligans) rather meant that 
one belonged to a subculture.
The distribuƟ on of the variable suggests that fans prefer to talk of themselves 
as hooligans, etc. rather than as members of a subculture. Perhaps the concept 
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of a subculture is seen by hooligans as unmanly, and prefer a more masculine 
formulaƟ on.
Over the years, the socially accepted model of a football fan underwent 
conƟ nual, albeit systemaƟ c changes. In the past, a common example, which ap-
pealed to the media was a fan paƩ ern associated with each club. RepresentaƟ ve 
of this paƩ ern were supporters, who not only remained true to their team, re-
gardless of its ups and downs, but were also prepared to make various sacrifi ces, 
such as fi nancial support for their team. Today, this “ordinary fan” remains on 
the margins of interest to both the world of scholarship, and the media. What 
arouses interest, instead is the stadium “gladiator”, seeking adventure and the 
opportunity for a fi ght.
Among hooligans can be found many extreme facƟ ons and groups whose ac-
Ɵ viƟ es and inƟ midaƟ ng names are reminiscent of the modus operandi of various 
gangs. ParƟ cular members of the gangs are parƟ cularly aggressive and violent, 
and in so doing, radical and ruthless. They put into pracƟ ce what might be called 
a philosophy of violence.27 Not afraid to use dangerous weapons they do not fear 
serious injury.
However, not everyone can become a knight of the stadium and enter the 
gang. Such a group requires dedicaƟ on, courage, respect and knowledge of the 
hooligan ideology. Gang members themselves claim to be the worthy representa-
Ɵ ves of club team. They have to be representaƟ ves of the city region and usually 
acƟ vely and faithfully support their regional favorites.
Around the “real hooligans”, on the fringes of groups gravitate enthusiasts, 
who can only dream of parƟ cipaƟ ng when they demonstrate bravery and cour-
age.
Bearing in mind this aspect the respondents were asked whether they be-
longed to the gang of his team.
113 respondents answered the quesƟ on in the aﬃ  rmaƟ ve, represenƟ ng 
nearly 63% of the sample populaƟ on. The remainder – 37.2% – said that they are 
not part of the structure of the gangs operaƟ ng around their sports club.
Table 11. Membership in the club gangs 
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1  No 67 37,2
2  Yes 113 62,8
Total 180 100,0
However, non-membership of the gangs does not imply passivity of acƟ on 
The data obtained reveal that more than 68% of the subjects took part in such 
events. Almost a third of respondents denied having taken part in such acƟ viƟ es 
(Table 12).
27 Zdebski J., Football and emoƟ ons. “Characters” NR6, 1998, p. 28.
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Table 12. The share of respondents 
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1  No 57 31,7
2  Yes 123 68,3
Total 180 100,0
One can say that membership in the gangs, is inextricably linked to parƟ cipa-
Ɵ on. Hooligans of lower rank are responsible for, cheering, small skirmishes, or 
iniƟ aƟ on of fi ghts.
Those surveyed, indicated, as the reason for his parƟ cipaƟ on in this form of 
fi ght, in parƟ cular the desire to show the superiority of their club to other fans. 
For many fans, fi ghts provide the opportunity to test their skills.
Table 13. Theme share
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1 He did not take / a 52 28,9
2 The possibility of discharge of aggression 27 15,0
3 The desire to demonstrate in front of others 15 8,3
4 Raising self-esteem 15 8,3
5 Check your skills in baƩ le 26 14,4
6 Persuasion of other fans 14 7,8
7 The desire to show the superiority of our club to the other supporters 26 14,4
8 Other reasons 5 2,8
Total 180 100,0
Not everyone gets a chance to represent the club in prearranged baƩ les. The 
rules for this compeƟ Ɵ on include, as a basic element, a confrontaƟ on during the 
melee, and an equal number of “fi ghters” that may be involved in a skirmish. The 
best hooligan teams to represent the club are like famous gladiatorial schools in 
ancient Ɵ mes and so select only the most courageous, strongest and toughest 
fi ghters.
The group’s eﬀ ecƟ veness in fi ghƟ ng provides glory or shame in the hooligan 
league and the wider community around the club subculture.
It should also be noted that interest in these meeƟ ngs is becoming increasing-
ly popular among fans and we hear more and more views, that this illegal acƟ vity 
carried out on commons and desolate parking lots is becoming more important 
than the oﬃ  cial sports performance.
Polish football stadiums have suﬀ ered a wave of brutal violence over the 
years. This has resulted in a series of measures including the urgent adopƟ on of 
the Law on safety of mass events.
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Currently, the law is an important instrument to ensure not only the security 
of public events, but also to protect public safety and order. The Act has a num-
ber of secƟ ons, which are designed to combat crime in and around the stadium. 
These include stadium bans, monitoring, or the relaƟ vely new obligaƟ on to iden-
Ɵ fy parƟ cipants in certain events.
With such a broad formulaƟ on of projects and legal maƩ ers, the quesƟ on sƟ ll 
remains what eﬀ ect these new laws will have on football hooliganism.
It is also clear that further invesƟ gaƟ on and research are needed on the rea-
sons for the excesses of football hooligans.
First, respondents were asked to evaluate soluƟ ons implemented to reduce 
stadium excesses.
Table 14. The eﬀ ecƟ veness of prevenƟ ng destrucƟ ve behavior 
on a scale of 1 to 10 
O. Categories of response
Responses of Number
N %
1  RaƟ ng 1 38 21,1
2  RaƟ ng 2 36 20,0
3  RaƟ ng 3 18 10,0
4  RaƟ ng 4 38 21,1
5  RaƟ ng 5 18 10,0
6  RaƟ ng 6 10 5,6
7  RaƟ ng 7 13 7,2
8  RaƟ ng 8 9 5,0
Total 180 100,0
The results do not inspire opƟ mism. Although some respondents are tempted 
to issue an “8” in the adopted ten-scale, but the number of such evaluaƟ ons was 
only 5%. Few more percentage points gained “7” and “6”, which the indicated 
7.2% and 5.6% of those surveyed.
From the data in table 14 it is evident that the legal system adopted against 
violent behavior is assessed by sports spectators as ineﬃ  cient, ineﬀ ecƟ ve, and 
weak. In assessing it, respondents focused on a scale of “1” to “4” which suggests 
that public authoriƟ es and sports clubs need to present new ideas, in order to 
eﬀ ecƟ vely counteract the threats presented by stadium hooligans.
The main idea introduced in 2007 by specialists in the fi ght against crime and 
hooliganism was that of 24-hour courts. The promoters of this soluƟ on indicated 
that the severity of the punishment is not a deterrent, but rather its inevitability, 
and how quickly it will be applied. This idea was analyzed with interest. Unfortu-
nately, a plurality of respondents gave it the lowest possible raƟ ng, 1, indicaƟ ng 
a complete lack of eﬀ ecƟ veness of the soluƟ on. 65% of respondents made this 
assessment. The second most common score was found to be “2” which was the 
assessment of almost 20% of respondents. From these data it can be concluded 
that this aspect of the policy of limiƟ ng stadium hooliganism turned out to be 
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a paper Ɵ ger. At the same Ɵ me it is hardly surprising that assessment of the situ-
aƟ on by those concerned, the highest representaƟ ves of the Government, led to 
the conclusion that this law presents more problems than benefi ts, and requires 
a deep reform because of its narrow scope of acƟ vity mainly involving drunk 
drivers.
Safety at sports events is an element of public safety. It is regulated by numer-
ous Acts and the Council of Europe convenƟ ons, raƟ fi ed by the Polish Republic.
The basic legal act regulaƟ ng the safety issues at sports grounds as previously 
stated is the law on safety of mass events, where the event organizer is chiefl y 
responsible for the safety of persons present at the event and for order during 
the event..
The research material collected and experience with the operaƟ on of the law 
on safety of mass events show that we do not guarantee a soluƟ on to maintain 
public order and security at events, especially at football matches. The escalaƟ on 
of violence and disorderly behavior of football fans in parƟ cular, increasingly re-
quire the Police force to restore order.
The proposed legislaƟ ve measures are only one tool in the fi ght against vio-
lence, xenophobia, and intolerance in sports stadiums. To be eﬀ ecƟ ve, it must 
be properly applied. This requires the cooperaƟ on and common strategy of the 
Police, jusƟ ce, organizers, the management of club stadiums, stadium staﬀ , fans 
and non-governmental organizaƟ ons.
AcƟ viƟ es related to the prevenƟ on of violence and racism should proceed in 
an integrated way. LegislaƟ ve measures should be complemented by educaƟ onal 
and social progress. With regard to the problem of aggression and social pathol-
ogy of groups of supporters, eﬀ orts should be made to boost posiƟ ve behavior 
and reduce the role of factors that may cause negaƟ ve behavior. Basically, the 
aim of such measures is prevenƟ on, which in future will result in the absence of 
social risks.
The most desirable soluƟ on, to reduce the pathological behavior of sports 
fans, from a social point of view and because of the cost of its implementaƟ on is 
primary prevenƟ on. Many researchers points out that this type of intervenƟ on 
is characterized by two features: fi rst, it is proacƟ ve, in that promotes posiƟ ve 
behavior, the second is a warning that there is a problem.
Criminologists suggest that the prevenƟ on of crime should include four inte-
grally linked planes.
1. PrevenƟ on of crime before it occurs.
2. LegislaƟ ve prevenƟ on, which aims to create standards of criminal law.
3. The pracƟ ce of criminal law, consisƟ ng of a policy of judicial punishment and 
prosecuƟ on of perpetrators.
4. Punishment, including fi nes and imprisonment.28
28 Hołyst B., Criminology. Warsaw 1994, p. 539.
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